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SUMMARY 
 
Access to electricity is an important precondition to many aspects of human and 
economic development. Yet, in rural sub-Saharan Africa in particular, access rates 
remain very low — at an average of 17% and much lower in some cases. Rural 
electrification in Kenya, the focus of this thesis, had only reached 7% in 2014. Given 
the goal of universal electrification by 2030, formulated as part of Sustainable 
Development Goal 7, scalable and replicable approaches that are able to support 
productive and non-productive uses are required.  
Mini-grids are one promising solution to this problem, alongside grid extension and 
off-grid approaches such as solar home systems. However, their long-term operational 
sustainability has historically been a challenge. While the academic literature to date on 
sustainable energy access has largely been two-dimensional in its analysis of mini-grids 
(focusing on technology and economics or financing), this thesis contributes to an 
emerging body of recent contributions to the literature, which have begun to foreground 
socio-cultural considerations. 
Bridging the literature on collective action for common-pool resource (CPR) 
management and property rights theory, a refined theoretical framework is produced for 
the purpose of analysing the institutional conditions for sustainable management of rural 
mini-grids. The utility of this framework and of treating electricity in a mini-grid as a 
CPR is demonstrated via empirical analysis of three case studies of mini-grids in rural 
 ii 
Kenya and evidence from 24 expert interviews. This yields insights on non-
technological approaches to addressing operational challenges relating to sustainable 
mini-grid management, e.g. fair allocation of limited amounts of electricity to different 
consumers in ways that are acceptable to the entire community. This thesis develops 
contributions to the literature on sustainable CPR management and collective action, 
property rights theory and energy access in developing countries. From these theoretical 
and empirical insights, it explores a novel institutional structure for sustainable 
management of pro-poor mini-grids in the form of a community–private property hybrid 
management platform, thereby opening up opportunities for future research into the 
implementation of such a platform. The thesis represents the first comprehensive 
attempt to analyse the institutional aspects of pro-poor mini-grid management as well as 
the first comprehensive attempt to treat electricity in a mini-grid as a CPR. 
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[…] When a number of individuals have a common or collective interest - when they 
share a single purpose or objective - individual, unorganized action […] will either not 
be able to advance that common interest at all, or will not be able to advance that 
interest adequately. (Olson, 1965, p. 7) 
 
Chapter 1  - Introduction 
 
When United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon launched the Sustainable 
Energy for All Initiative (SE4All) in 2011 with the goal, among others, to achieve 
universal electrification by 2030, he opened his speech with a simple statement: ‘energy 
enables’ (United Nations, 2011). This focus on the importance of energy as an enabler, 
or a necessary precondition for development, brings attention to the broad spectrum of 
areas in which access to electricity enables improvements in human development (for 
example, the improvement of levels of health and education) or economic development 
(measured by, for example, gross domestic product per capita or poverty rates).  
 
1.1 Electricity as a Precondition to Development 
 
According to a review of electrification projects in Asia and the Pacific by the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP, 2011), electricity access could 
contribute positively to the achievement of all eight Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). For example, fuel efficiency gains and the productive use of energy can lead 
to a ‘reduction in extreme poverty and hunger’ (MDG 1) by reducing the expenditure on 
fuel for lighting (Dutta, 2005). Improved lighting for studying helps to ‘achieve 
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universal primary education’ (MDG 2), and the opportunity for women to learn new 
skills, also facilitated by lighting, ‘promotes gender equality and empowers women’ 
(MDG 3). Replacing traditional sources of light with LED lights promotes the reduction 
of indoor pollution caused by kerosene lamps and the burning of biomass, which 
‘reduces childhood mortality’ (MDG 4) while also ‘improving maternal health’ (MDG 
5). The ability to refrigerate medicines and vaccines is critical to ‘combat HIV/AIDS, 
Malaria and other diseases’ (MDG 6). Reduced consumption of fuelwood and fossil 
fuels such as kerosene, and the potential to improve access to water through mechanical 
pumps contribute to ‘ensuring environmental sustainability’ (MDG 7). Furthermore, 
access to electricity is also crucial for communication, be that in the form of radio, 
television, telephone or the Internet, as well as access to finance and simple banking 
facilities, particularly in the case of Africa where mobile telephone banking is very 
widespread. These benefits help in the ‘promotion of a global partnership for 
development’ (MDG 8).  
The inclusion of ‘access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for 
all’ as goal 7 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (United Nations, 2015), 
which were the successors of the MDGs, made explicit the role of energy access (i.e. 
access to electricity and clean cooking) in the pursuit of sustainable development and 
the eradication of poverty. The goal of eradication of poverty also motivated the focus 
of this thesis on pro-poor rural electrification. In this context, ‘pro-poor’ should be 
understood to mean that the mini-grid can serve more than the needs of large anchor 
loads, businesses or the comparatively wealthier households often directly attached to 
micro and small enterprises in rural areas of sub-Saharan Africa. Rather, the mini-grid is 
capable of serving all households, including the comparatively poorer ones, whose 
demand initially may not exceed a single LED light and mobile phone charger. This 
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definition is naturally more in flux than a quantitative definition of poor households 
(e.g. less than $1.90 per day in 20l1 U.S. dollars, which is the poverty line currently set 
by the World Bank).1 However, it is more useful in this context as it remains all-
inclusive, since electricity demand patterns are expected to change and evolve over 
time.  
However, access to electricity in and of itself is not a guarantor for development. 
While there is a clear correlation between levels of poverty and access to electricity 
(See Figure 1.1 for an example based on Kenyan data), causality is not straightforward. 
These two factors form more of an iterative feedback loop, rather than clearly running 
from electricity access to reduced levels of poverty. Nevertheless, the data presented in 
this Figure suggest that access to electricity forms a necessary precondition for 
development.  
                                                 
1 http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/brief/global-poverty-line-faq 
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Figure 1.1 - Poverty Rates vs. Electricity Access in Kenyan Counties in 2009 
 
 
1.2 The Current State of Access to Electricity 
 
The challenge of achieving universal electrification, let alone by 2030 as required by 
SDG 7 and SE4All, still remains monumental.2 The overall electrification rate for 
developing countries reached 78% in 2013, which represented 1.2 billion people, and 
was considerably higher in urban areas (92%) than in rural areas (67%) (IEA, 2015). 
                                                 
2 Note: Due to the difficulties involved in collecting reliable and granular data on electrification rates, 
especially in rural areas, it was difficult to access current data. Most of the data used in this thesis come 
from the International Energy Agency’s ‘World Energy Access Database 2015’, which included data 
from 2013, as well as the ‘World Energy Access Database 2012, which presented 2012 data. More recent 
data could not be obtained. 
Based on data from the 2009 Kenyan National Census published on www.opendata.go.ke; poverty is 
defined as having less than $1 per person/day. Each data point represents a Kenyan county. 
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While China has accomplished universal electrification and India has already electrified 
four-fifths of its population, the situation remains most dire in sub-Saharan Africa. 
More than half of the total global population currently lacking access to electricity lives 
in this region, and the overall electrification rate is only 32% (Ibid). Rural areas in 
particular are underserved, where only 17% of the population have access to electricity 
(Ibid). In fact, even though this represents a four percentage point improvement from 
2010, the total number of people lacking access to electricity in the region increased by 
35 million from 2010 to 2013, due to the fact that the overall population growth in sub-
Saharan Africa exceeded the rate of new electricity connections (IEA, 2015, 2012). 
Kenya provides a good example of this challenge. This sub-Saharan African country 
is the focus of this thesis and the location of all three case studies that are further 
described in chapter 3. In 2010, the overall electrification rate in Kenya was at 18%, 
with an urban rate of 65% and an average rural rate of only 5%, amounting to 34 
million people without access to electricity (IEA, 2012). Three years later, the overall 
rate had reached 20%, while the urban rate had fallen to 60%. The International Energy 
Agency (IEA) provides no explanation for this drop, but it is likely that the urbanisation 
of the population proceeded faster than the electrification of those new urban 
populations. Meanwhile, rural electrification had reached 7% (IEA, 2015). Yet, the 
population without access to electricity increased by 1 million to a total of 35 million 
(Ibid). A different way of expressing the chasm between urban and rural electrification 
rates is shown in Figure 1.2, based on data for all 47 counties in Kenya. The larger the 
proportion of the population within a county that lives in rural areas, the lower the 
overall electrification rates for that county. In some of the more remote western and 
northern counties, electrification rates in 2009 were below 5%. Given the lack of 
significant progress at the aggregate country level as shown in the IEA data, it is 
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unlikely that the situation would appear significantly different in those more remote 
areas of Kenya if a survey were conducted today. With rural electrification rates in 2013 
of 4%, 7% and 10% in Tanzania, Uganda and Ethiopia, respectively (IEA, 2015), the 
situation is not much better for Kenya’s regional East African neighbours.  
 
Figure 1.2 - Proportion of Rural Population vs. Electrification Rates in Kenyan Counties 
 
 
1.3 Alternative Approaches for Rural Electrification and the Role of 
Mini-Grids 
 
Hence, there exists a promising opportunity and challenge to develop methods to 
bring access to modern energy services to dispersed rural populations. The extension and 
expansion of national grids, alongside the addition of centralised electricity generation 
Based on data from the 2009 Kenyan National Census published on www.opendata.go.ke. Each data point represents a 
Kenyan county. 
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capacity, is potentially one way to frame a solution to this problem. While this is often 
seen as the most promising way to electrify urban and peri-urban areas, it is more difficult 
to be rendered feasible in rural areas with widely dispersed populations (Zeyringer et al., 
2015).  
Using East Africa as an example, and assuming fixed costs of USD 22,000 per 
kilometre of transmission lines and USD 18,000 per kilometre of distribution line, 
Anderson et al. (2012, p. 4) estimate that grid extension is not economically feasible in 
areas that would average less than five connections per kilometre of grid extension. Given 
the fact that over 80%, 65% and 60% of the population live more than 20 kilometres from 
the nearest substation in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda, respectively (Eberhard et al., 
2011, p. 126), it is unlikely that grid extension is a feasible solution in large parts of rural 
East Africa. Even though Deichmann et al. (2011) estimate that ‘decentralized power 
supply is unlikely to be cheaper than grid supplies any time soon’ (p.225), this does not 
mean that grid connection is an option that households can easily afford, given the fact 
that most African utilities charge fairly substantial connection fees. In Kenya, for 
example, the national utility charges each household KSH 34,980–49,0803 (USD 410-
580) in connection fees, an amount that is unaffordable for most rural households. In 
addition, if the household is further than 600 metres from the furthest substation, it is 
required to cover the full cost of grid extension.  
Furthermore, even taking into account the high capital cost of solar photovoltaics 
(PV) at USD 7,230 per kilowatt (kW) of installed power, the levelised cost of solar PV 
                                                 
3 See the REA NEWS Newsletter Issue 8, Vol. 5, July 2014 by the Kenyan Rural Electrification 
Authority at: 
http://www.rea.co.ke/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=860&Itemid=505  
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mini-grids ‘will generally be competitive with that of grid extension when the extension 
would imply <10 connections/km’ (Anderson et al., 2012, p. 5). Since Anderson et al. 
conducted their analysis, the cost of solar PV has roughly halved. Using 2016 data from 
the U.S. National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL)4, the cost of PV for installations 
between 10–100 kilowatts (kW) (the relevant size considered in this thesis) has dropped 
to just under USD 3,500 per kW installed. This will make solar PV mini-grids even more 
cost-competitive compared with grid extension, and hence feasible even in less remote 
areas. In addition, the existing power generation infrastructure is already unable to meet 
the current levels of demand in many cases, let alone the additional demand created by 
connecting more rural households to the power grid. Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania 
already average approximately 80, 70 and 65 days of power outages per year, 
respectively, and their total installed generation capacity is less than 30 watts (W) per 
capita, or the equivalent of two typical compact fluorescent light bulbs (Eberhard et al., 
2011, pp. 4–8). 
One possible solution to this challenge is solar home systems (SHSs), consisting of 
a small PV cell charging a battery, which can then be used to power a compact 
fluorescent or LED light bulb or a number of appliances, such as a radio or a 
refrigerator, depending on the system’s size. These systems have been successfully 
implemented across the developing world and sub-Saharan Africa, especially in Kenya 
(Byrne, 2011; Sebitosi et al., 2006). Alternatively, instead of electrifying individual 
households, it is possible to connect whole communities or villages by constructing a 
mini-grid, independently of the national grid, that draws its power from one (or in a 
                                                 
4 See: http://www.nrel.gov/analysis/tech_lcoe_re_cost_est.html 
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hybrid system two or more) small electric power generation source(s). This approach 
has been realised very successfully, particularly in East Asia and Latin America, 
typically relying on small hydro plants or diesel generators as the source of electricity 
(Casillas and Kammen, 2011). In fact, the IEA (2014, p. 496) expects that in their New 
Policies Scenario5 over 140 million people in sub-Saharan Africa will be connected to 
between 100,000 and 200,000 mini-grids by 2040, amounting to an overall installed 
generation capacity of 26 million kilowatt-hours (or terawatt-hours, TWh). This is 
roughly the equivalent of the entire generation capacity of Ireland in 2013 (BP, 2014).  
Compared to SHSs, mini-grids offer a number of beneﬁts by their very nature. They 
generally involve generation capacities that, given proper load management, can be high 
enough to support economically productive uses, such as pumping water for irrigation 
or welding, or other economically beneficial uses such as refrigeration, thereby 
improving the ways in which electriﬁcation can catalyse economic development. As 
demand increases, their generation capacities can be upgraded and their reach expanded 
relatively easily compared to SHSs, which are typically fixed in size and less modular. 
Furthermore, mini-grids distribute beneﬁts across the whole community and may 
include the electriﬁcation of households, businesses and public facilities, such as 
schools and health clinics. Simultaneously, street lights may be installed, which have 
been shown to signiﬁcantly increase safety, particularly for women (Ilskog et al., 2005).  
At this point, it should be clarified that the term ‘mini-grid’ is not universally 
defined. Other terms that are also used in the literature, depending on the size of the 
                                                 
5 According to the IEA (2014, p. 36) “the New Policies Scenario is the central scenario of WEO-2014. It 
takes into account the policies and implementing measures affecting energy markets that had been 
adopted as of mid-2014, together with relevant policy proposals, even though specific measures needed to 
put them into effect have yet to be fully developed.” 
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grid, are nano- or micro-grids. However, there are no clear and universal definitions for 
the sizes of nano-grids versus micro-grids and mini-grids. For the purposes of this 
thesis, the term ‘mini-grid’ is used exclusively and is defined as a grid-independent (or 
islanded) electricity grid with between 5 kW and 50 kW peak power and between 10 
and 100 connections, which will exhibit the benefits over SHSs described above. 
Additionally, if citizens use renewable sources of electricity such as small hydro, 
wind or solar PV, they can also contribute to environmental sustainability, which is a 
further requirement for achieving SDG 7. This is a crucial factor, considering that in the 
most recent Assessment Report the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
estimates that in the case of the two scenarios closest to business-as-usual (referred to as 
RCP 6.0 and RCP 8.5), global warming is likely to exceed 2° Celsius by the end of the 
century (IPCC, 2014, p. 10). The IPCC also reports that roughly one quarter of total 
annual CO2 emissions are contributed by electricity and heat production, which suggests 
that providing access to electricity to the roughly 20% of the global population that is 
currently lacking must be achieved through non-fossil forms of electricity generation. 
However, despite these benefits of rural mini-grids, their long-term operational 
sustainability has been problematic in the past.  
 
1.4 Operational Sustainability of Mini-Grids and a Brief History of 
Mini-Grids in Kenya 
 
Since operational sustainability of rural mini-grids is one of the central concerns of 
this thesis, the term ‘operational sustainability’ as it is used in this thesis must be 
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defined before proceeding with a short overview of the challenges that mini-grids have 
faced in developing countries in the past, as well as a brief history and overview of the 
current status of mini-grids in Kenya. Sustainability in this context is less concerned 
with ecological sustainability, although, as previously mentioned, this is still a potent 
argument for the deployment of mini-grids using renewable sources for electricity 
generation. Rather, ‘sustainability’ is defined as the ability of the mini-grid to cover its 
operating costs and maintain, repair and upgrade the system and, beyond those financial 
concerns, to understand the needs of the end users in order to avoid and resolve conflict, 
which may otherwise arise from demand exceeding supply, or a mismatch of supply and 
demand patterns.  
This requires a number of factors. First of all, the mini-grid operations must, at the 
very least, be capable of earning enough revenue to fully cover the costs of 
management, operation and maintenance, and to build up small reserves for repairs or 
eventual upgrades. Ideally, of course, a mini-grid should also offer a return on the 
capital invested in its construction in order to be capable of attracting sources of capital 
beyond donor funds or other sources of development aid. However, this is not a 
requirement for operational sustainability as defined in this thesis, because the focus of 
this analysis is not on the potential sources of financing (which might require certain 
returns on investment) but rather on the operational sustainability before interest or debt 
service is taken into account. The presence of technological capability (for operations, 
maintenance and repairs) and the ability to source and to afford spare parts, however, 
are important requirements. Finally, operational sustainability, as defined in this thesis, 
also includes the ability of the entity operating the mini-grid to avoid conflicts among 
different end-user groups, whose interests may not be naturally aligned, and resolve 
those that arise. For example, households that primarily use electricity for lighting, 
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telephone charging and entertainment, i.e. non-productive uses, and small businesses 
using electricity for productive purposes may have different requirements. Small 
businesses will use electricity during the day, which can prevent the batteries of a solar 
PV mini-grid from fully charging during that time, thereby reducing the amount of 
electricity available to households for lighting at night.  
This operational sustainability, however, has proven challenging in the past, due to 
the relatively high complexity of operation and maintenance of a mini-grid, compared 
with SHSs, for example, and the difficulty of charging tariffs that cover costs. For 
example, in an analysis of 27 community-based mini-grids in Northern Pakistan, Maier 
(2007) found that after approximately 10 years, a third of the mini-grids were no longer 
functioning. Similarly, Greacen (2004) found that of the 59 micro hydro mini-grids built 
in Thailand between 1982 and 2001, fewer than 50% were still operational by 2003. 
(Both of these author’s works are reviewed in more detail in chapter 2.)  
While Kenya does not have as long and varied a history of mini-grids for rural 
electrification as those of Asian countries, such as Indonesia (Schmidt et al., 2013) 
Nepal (Mainali and Silveira, 2011) and Bangladesh (Alam and Bhattacharyya, 2016; 
Bhattacharyya, 2015), there is nonetheless a relatively long history of mini-grids for 
rural electrification in Kenya. There have been at least 10 community-based mini-grids 
installed in the 2000s. Moreover, according to the author’s best estimates based on 
desk-based research and information gathered during 276 interviews with mini-grid 
experts in Kenya, there were between 20 and 30 privately owned mini-grids in 
operation in Kenya in 2015, when most of the empirical research for this thesis was 
                                                 
6 24 individuals were interviewed, some of them twice, for a total of 27 interviews. 
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conducted. This figure disregards the 16 off-grid power stations, which the Kenyan 
national utility, Kenya Power and Lighting Company (KPLC), is currently operating 
(SE4All and Kenya MEP, 2016). These will not be considered in this thesis as they are 
special cases in several respects. First of all, their operation is heavily cross-subsidised 
through the national uniform tariff that KPLC charges across the country (Kenya MEP, 
2016). Secondly, they are currently all diesel-operated (Ibid) and thus their operational 
sustainability is heavily dependent on diesel prices and the diesel supply chain. Finally, 
they are considerably larger than what is considered a mini-grid in this thesis, i.e. each 
of these off-grid stations has a capacity of approximately 1000 kW.  
The installation of non-public mini-grids in Kenya began in the early 2000s with 
mini-hydro7 mini-grids in the region around Mount Kenya, primarily in Kirinyaga 
county (the county in the Central province that is closest to Nairobi, yet also includes a 
part of Mount Kenya). The geology and hydrology of this area is suitable for small-
scale hydro power. Even though it is difficult to acquire reliable (much less peer-
reviewed) information concerning these early mini-grids, in-depth online searches as 
well as project documents shared with the author by some of the experts interviewed for 
this thesis (see chapter 3 for more detail on the interview process) have led to the 
development of the following overview of the early history of mini-grid development in 
Kenya. 
Throughout the early 2000s, approximately 10 mini-hydro mini-grids were installed 
by intergovernmental and nongovernmental organisations, often using donor money 
from multilateral or bilateral organisations such as the UNDP or the European 
                                                 
7 Again, the terms ‘pico-’, ‘micro-’ and ‘mini-hydro’ tend to be used interchangeably, but for the 
purposes of this thesis, ‘mini-hydro’ is meant to include capacities of 1–100 kW. 
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Commission. These mini-grids had generation capacities ranging from as low as 1 kW 
for over 60 households up to 100 kW for approximately 200 households. All followed a 
community-based approach, meaning that after construction and commissioning of the 
mini-grid, full ownership as well as all operational responsibilities including tariff-
setting and collection, maintenance and repairs, were transferred to a community-based 
organisation established with the assistance of the implementing organisation 
specifically for this purpose. They also largely used a flat fee tariff structure, i.e. 
electricity consumption by the end user was not metered; they simply paid a monthly 
flat fee for their connection to the mini-grid. In many cases, the community either 
contributed small amounts of capital for the construction, or contributed labour during 
the construction, also known as ‘sweat equity’. Most of these early community-based 
mini-grids struggled with financial sustainability, largely due to the flat fee tariff 
structure, and often relied on repeated donor support. As solar PV became more 
affordable, more mini-grids using solar PV panels as their main means of electricity 
generation were installed, yet they still followed the same approach of a community-
based ownership model financed with donor money (for example, see two of the case 
studies described in chapter 3, Kitonyoni and Olosho-Oibor). 
As previously mentioned, a few private sector companies began to install and 
operate (mainly solar PV) mini-grids in rural Kenya as for-profit businesses in recent 
years, i.e. since 2012, a development that was also facilitated by the reduction in solar 
PV prices. This development was led by three main companies: SteamaCo 
(www.steama.co), PowerGen (www.powergen-renewable-energy.com), and Powerhive 
(www.powerhive.com), which between them now operate 20–30 mini-grids in rural 
Kenya. Compared to the early community-based mini-grids, these follow a completely 
different approach, using prepaid electricity meters and remote monitoring and control 
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technology, which are discussed further in chapter 4. While the early community-based 
mini-grids had a clear focus on being pro-poor (as defined above), these mini-grids, by 
necessity, are largely driven by the requirement to earn a return on their invested 
capital, albeit a small one compared to other investments bearing similar risk. 
Despite these recent developments, replicable approaches for mini-grid-based rural 
electrification in Kenya that are operationally sustainable in the long-run while also 
including arrangements to ensure that they can be considered pro-poor, i.e. an enabler 
for poverty alleviation, remain difficult to find. This thesis argues that the technical and 
financial aspects of mini-grid operation are comparatively well-researched and 
understood. Yet, the socio-cultural and, in particular, the institutional aspects are 
relatively under-researched, even though they hold considerable promise in connecting 
knowledge gained from both community-based and private-sector mini-grid operation 
with the development of replicable models for the sustainable management of rural 
mini-grids. In this specific context of mini-grid operation and thus throughout the rest of 
this thesis, ‘institutions’ are understood to mean established norms, customs and 
practices, or ‘the rules of the game’ (North, 1990, p. 4), which are acted upon by local 
specialised organisational structures for the management of a clearly boundaried 
resource system. Another area that is also comparatively under-researched, yet not the 
focus of this thesis, is political and political economy aspects of rural electrification. 
Ahlborg and Hammar (2014) as well as Newell and Bulkeley (2016) have recently 
started to place emphasis on these factors in the context of sub-Saharan Africa. 
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1.5 Limitations in the Literature and the Identification of a 
Research Question 
 
The majority of existing literature on energy access in sub-Saharan Africa is 
characterised by a two-dimensional focus on finance and technology from conventional 
economic and engineering perspectives. This has led to an important body of knowledge 
on the nature of the economic and engineering aspects of managing mini-grids. Socio-
cultural and political aspects of the energy access problematic have, however, been 
largely ignored, as canvassed in sections 2.1 and 2.2. This failure to attend to socio-
cultural considerations represents a fundamental gap in research on sustainable mini-
grid management in particular and sustainable energy access in general. This thesis 
therefore aims to contribute to a small, emerging body of recent contributions to the 
sustainable energy access literature, which has begun to foreground socio-cultural 
considerations, as noted in section 2.3. The key contribution to this recent socio-cultural 
turn in the emerging literature is to foreground the core role that institutional 
(understood, as defined above, as rules and norms acted upon by local specialized 
organisational structures) considerations play in determining critical aspects of both the 
social and economic operational sustainability of mini-grid management. This includes, 
for example, how electricity is allocated among users (e.g. avoiding capture of benefits 
by the more powerful people in the community hierarchies or free-riding); how 
individuals are prevented from overloading (and thus bringing down) the grid at 
different times of day (e.g. early morning or evening peak times) and different times of 
year when the demand for electricity changes (e.g. high demand at harvest time when 
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disposable household income increases); how revenues are collected; and how 
maintenance of the grid is managed and funded. This explicit focus on local institutions 
for boundaried resource management represents a novel aspect of socio-cultural 
considerations in the literature and thus requires the application of theoretical 
frameworks that have not yet been comprehensively studied in the context of rural mini-
grids. 
As elaborated in sections 2.5 to 2.8, there are two fields of academic literature in 
particular that have foregrounded the role of institutions. Property rights theory provides 
one of those frameworks, which can be used for the study of institutions, where 
property rights are understood to be ‘an instrument of society and derive their 
significance from the fact that they help a man form those expectations which he can 
reasonably hold in his dealings with others’ (Demsetz, 1967, p. 347). This definition 
closely aligns with the definition of institutions for the purposes of this thesis, as 
introduced above. Theories of collective action in the presence of common-pool 
resources are another area of study that emphasise the role of institutions, as evidenced 
by the fact that the title of this field’s arguably most seminal and famous work by Elinor 
Ostrom is Governing the Commons – The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action 
(Ostrom, 1990). In the past, neither of these theoretical areas have been systematically 
applied to the context of the operational sustainability of mini-grids in rural areas of the 
developing world. 
Building on the aforementioned emerging socio-cultural literature (for example, 
Ahlborg and Sjöstedt, 2015; Campbell et al., 2016; Ockwell and Byrne, 2016) this 
thesis seeks to contribute to the existing literature on pro-poor sustainable energy 
access, property rights theory and common-pool resource management, especially 
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focusing on the associated literature on collective action. It aims to achieve this by 
demonstrating how well-established frameworks from property rights theory and 
collective action — previously only applied to natural resource management problems 
as opposed to electricity in a mini-grid — may be refined, revised and combined to 
assist in analysing the institutional conditions under which long-term operational 
sustainability of pro-poor rural mini-grids in developing countries can be achieved. 
This primary aim leads to the emergence of an overarching research question as well 
as five sub-questions, which will guide the structure and methodological approach of 
the thesis. Therefore, the main research question asks:  
To what extent can theories of collective action and property rights address 
challenges affecting the long-term operational sustainability of pro-poor rural mini-
grids? 
This research question focuses on the two key guiding concepts of this thesis: (a) the 
application of theories of collective action and property rights to the novel context of a 
rural mini-grid and (b) the importance of the concept of operational sustainability as 
defined above. The following five sub-questions provide a more detailed outline of the 
analytical approach adopted in this thesis and, therefore, its objective of making an 
original contribution to knowledge:  
➢ Sub-Question 1: What underlying assumptions must be made in order to treat 
electricity in an isolated rural mini-grid as a common-pool resource?  
➢ Sub-Question 2: What are the major operational challenges faced in different 
types of community-based and private-sector mini-grids in Kenya?  
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➢ Sub- Question 3: How does modern demand-side technology, such as prepaid 
meters and mobile money enabled payment systems, affect the allocation of 
bundles of property rights in the mini-grid; which operational challenges can 
thus be overcome and which challenges remain?  
➢ Sub-Question 4: How can the existing theory on enabling conditions for 
sustainable institutions for common-pool resource management be used to 
analyse these challenges in mini-grids and develop non-technical institutional 
responses to them? 
➢ Sub-Question 5: Based on this analysis, what lessons can be learned from 
community-based and private sector mini-grids in Kenya for the operational 
sustainability of mini-grids, and how may these two approaches be combined? 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 begins with a review 
of the existing literature on energy access generally and mini-grids specifically, 
evidencing the two-dimensional focus of this body of literature on 
engineering/technology and economics/finance. This leads to the introduction and 
further development of the theoretical frameworks upon which this thesis is founded, 
including a more comprehensive introduction to the potential relevance of collective 
action for common-pool resource management and property rights theory. Chapter 3 
outlines the methodology, placing particular emphasis on the description of the three 
case studies as well as the expert interview process. Chapter 4 analyses the first part of 
the empirical data, based on the application of property rights theory. In chapter 5, 
theories of collective action are used to structure the analysis of the second part of the 
empirical data, which then leads to the discussion in chapter 6. Chapter 6 combines the 
empirical findings from chapters 4 and 5 in order to propose an innovative institutional 
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arrangement for mini-grid management as well as a number of original contributions to 
theory. Chapter 7 concludes and articulates the scope of future research.  
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Chapter 2  - Literature Review and Theory Development  
 
This chapter begins by providing an overview of the literature on rural 
electrification in general and the sustainability of mini-grids more specifically, 
demonstrating and critiquing the two-dimensional focus on technology/engineering and 
finance/economics of the majority of this literature, as identified by Watson et al. 
(2012). The focus on these two general topics reflects the fact that in the past, technical 
and financial challenges, such as an inability to cover operational costs, unsuitable 
technology or a lack of technological and managerial capabilities, were typically 
identified as the main reasons for a lack of long-term sustainability, as noted in chapter 
1. While there is a recent turn in the literature towards more socio-cultural approaches, 
this field is still comparatively small and focused on socio-technical frameworks (e.g. 
Ahlborg and Sjöstedt, 2015; Campbell et al., 2016; Ockwell and Byrne, 2016; Rolffs et 
al., 2015; Ulsrud et al., 2011, 2015; Winther, 2008). The role of socio-cultural and 
institutional interventions at the local level in the long-term sustainability of pro-poor 
mini-grids are shown to be under-researched and it is demonstrated that existing 
theoretical frameworks commonly used in the study of rural mini-grids are not able to 
attend to these concerns.  
However, there is a large body of literature on the role of local institutions in the 
management of other boundaried resource systems. This body of literature is mainly 
concerned with community-based management of common-pool resources, such as 
pasture for grazing and water for irrigation, and can be drawn upon due to the similarity 
between the characteristics of electricity in a small and isolated mini-grid and a 
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common-pool resource. This concept of electricity as a common-pool resource is 
illustrated using the hydraulic analogy — an educational tool used to teach the basic 
functionality of electrical circuits at all levels of education.  
After demonstrating this similarity, the chapter addresses the widespread belief that 
a common-pool resource must fall under a common property regime when, in fact, it 
can be managed under various property rights regimes (Ostrom, 2003). This is followed 
by a brief introduction to the concept of property rights theory and the concept of 
bundles of property rights (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). After discussing the 
applicability of this concept to the management of water for irrigation, using an 
example from the literature to demonstrate how this can be done, the analysis then 
shows how this theoretical framework can be applied to the context of a mini-grid 
(referring back to the hydraulic analogy) in order to understand the manner in which 
technology, in the form of modern electricity metering and tariff payment collection 
technology, affects the allocation of property rights.  
The idea of electricity as a common-pool resource is then advanced by introducing 
the concept of a complex, multiple-use common-pool resource wherein the most 
important resource management issue is the need to balance multiple interests among 
different user groups (Steins and Edwards, 1999). This challenge is highly relevant to a 
mini-grid, in which anchor loads, businesses and households have very different 
requirements and uses for the limited electrical capacity that is available. It is in this 
context that the need for more in-depth research into institutional arrangements for 
long-term operational sustainability becomes particularly relevant. 
The study of management institutions in the presence of common-pool resources is 
the empirical foundation for the development of theories of collective action. After 
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summarising the key theoretical foundations for collective action, the chapter introduces 
the central theoretical framework of this thesis: a collection of 33 enabling conditions 
for collective action drawn from key publications in this field (Agrawal, 2001; Baland 
and Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1988).  
There is a large body of literature operationalising theories of collective action and 
the concept of enabling conditions more specifically in the context of the sustainable 
management of natural resources (fisheries, irrigation, forests, etc.) in order to 
understand the socio-cultural and institutional arrangements required to facilitate long-
term sustainability. However, there is no precedent for a systematic application of this 
theory to the concept of the management of a mini-grid as a human-made resource 
system. A search for instances in which electricity has been treated as a common-pool 
resource in order to analyse the long-term sustainability of mini-grids revealed only 
three instances (one working paper and two doctoral theses). However, a review of 
these cases demonstrates that their treatment of the concept is limited, and there remains 
scope for a much more in-depth and systematic application of this theory to the context 
of institutions for mini-grid management. 
In order to address this gap in the theory, the chapter then takes the first original 
analytical step of this thesis by refining the framework of enabling conditions for 
collective action for this novel application. This is achieved by determining the 
relevance and applicability of each enabling condition to the specific context of socio-
cultural, institutional interventions to operational challenges in pro-poor mini-grids. The 
theory of bundles of property rights and the refined framework on enabling conditions 
for collective action form the basis for developing the methodology in chapter 3 and 
structuring the presentation of the empirical findings in chapters 4 and 5.  
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2.1 Key Concepts from the Literature on Rural Electrification in 
Developing Countries 
 
The academic literature on rural electrification in developing countries is, of course, 
too voluminous to review in its entirety in this chapter. Rather than claiming 
completeness and replicating the considerable work already done in systematic reviews 
of rural electrification literature such as Watson et al. (2012), this section illustrates 
some of the commonly used conceptual approaches using recent publications as 
examples. In general, there are four groups of factors affecting the long-term 
sustainability of rural electrification efforts as identified by Watson et al. (2012): 
financing and economics; technical and engineering; political and institutional; and 
cultural and social. In particular, the technical and financial factors are very well 
researched using a number of different conceptual approaches. The most commonly 
used theoretical approaches employed in this literature are reviewed and demonstrate 
that these concepts are not well-suited to analyse institutional arrangements to overcome 
operational challenges, which is the focus of this thesis. It should also be noted that the 
institutions referred to by Watson et al. are political or civil-society institutions at the 
national or international level, where institutions are understood to be specialised 
organisations or laws, policies and regulations. This concept of institutions is shared by 
most of the literature on rural electrification. This is a slightly broader definition of 
institutions or institutional arrangements than the one adopted in this thesis, which 
focuses specifically on the norms and rules of the game for the local management of a 
clearly boundaried resource system.  
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2.1.1 Insights from Finance and Economics 
In the literature related to the financial or economic considerations involved in rural 
electrification efforts, three key concepts stand out as being frequently studied: least-
cost or cost-benefit analysis for economically focused studies; willingness and ability to 
pay for financial feasibility analysis of rural electrification efforts; and the role of 
financing mechanisms in making rural electrification projects financially viable. Levin 
and Thomas (2014) provide a useful example of the kind of study that relies heavily on 
least-cost and cost-benefit analysis. After determining the conditions under which SHSs 
represent the least-cost approach for providing rural electricity access, i.e. areas with 
low consumption per end user and high costs of grid connection, they then determine 
what types of financing mechanisms (loan, rental or subsidy) can be employed to 
maximise the benefit to the rural customer at the lowest cost under various different 
circumstances. While such an analysis is an important tool for policy-makers and 
practitioners alike, it does not lend itself to an application beyond the consideration of 
purely financial factors. Other authors have taken similar approaches, albeit some with a 
greater focus on least-cost (Nerini et al., 2015, 2016) and some with an emphasis on 
cost-benefit analysis (Anderson et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2014). There is also a body of 
literature specifically concerned with cost-benefit analysis in the context of rural mini-
grids, which is reviewed separately in section 2.2.1. 
Willingness and ability to pay are other important factors in the long-term financial 
sustainability of any rural electrification effort, regardless of the specific technology 
being used. Abdullah and Jeanty (2009, 2011) use a survey-based methodology in order 
to reveal the willingness of households in rural Kenya to pay for electricity provided by 
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a SHS compared with electricity provided by a national grid and find that, in general, 
their willingness to pay (WTP) is higher for grid electricity. One important type of WTP 
study analyses the current expenditure of households on traditional energy sources, such 
as biomass or kerosene, in order to estimate their revealed WTP for modern energy 
services, in particular electricity. Bacon et al. (2010) provide a particularly thorough 
example of this type of study covering nine countries in Asia and Africa. Combining a 
study of WTP with the type of least-cost analysis previously discussed can also be used 
to estimate the demand for electricity from different energy sources and at different 
price points (Alfaro and Miller, 2014). Without a doubt, WTP is thus a critical, well-
studied and well-understood factor to consider in rural electrification projects, not only 
for use in financial planning but also because it can be used to determine end users’ 
preferences for different sources of energy and electricity, as in the case of large 
revealed preferences studies such as Bacon et al. (2010) or comparative studies such as 
Abdulla and Jeanty (2011).  
As has already been alluded to in relation to the work of Levin and Thomas (2014), 
there are a variety of different financing mechanisms that may be employed to support 
the financial viability of rural electrification efforts and make them more affordable to 
relatively poor rural populations, ranging from donations and subsidies to grants and 
partnerships, as well as fee-for-service, loan or leasing models and tax reductions. 
Bhattacharyya (2013) provides a useful overview of these financing mechanisms and 
emphasises the importance of micro credits, particularly for financing at the end-user 
level, a conclusion that is shared by UNDP (2011). The necessity of focusing on the 
demand side of rural electrification is also identified by Monroy and Hernandez (2005) 
based on an analysis of 185 questionnaire responses from international experts on rural 
electrification. They found that almost 60% of respondents identified a demand-side 
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focus as a main parameter influencing the sustainability of electrification projects. They 
therefore conclude, among other things, that micro-financing and the active support and 
development of productive uses for electricity are the two factors with the biggest 
influence on long-term financial sustainability. Nevertheless, the role of other financial 
mechanisms should not be discounted, based on the studies by Glemarec (2012) and 
Gujba et al. (2012), which emphasise the importance of public finance in supporting and 
leveraging private financing of rural electrification in developing countries. Low carbon 
funding mechanisms and renewable energy funds are identified as important funding 
sources alongside energy sector subsidy reforms. Finally, Zerriffi (2011) provides an 
example of a study focused in particular on financing mechanisms and the role of 
regulation and their effects on both the supply and demand side. He studies producer- 
and consumer-side financing solutions and concludes that subsidy and regulatory 
reforms are needed in conjunction with a greater facilitation of financing mechanisms 
for energy access projects, in order to enable scalable business models which are 
financially sustainable for the producer and affordable for the consumer. 
This overview is by no means exhaustive and cannot cover the entire body of 
literature using financial and economic theoretical perspectives to study rural 
electrification options in developing countries. However, it serves to illustrate the types 
of analyses that a financial or economic focus enables. While such a focus covers 
important challenges around the financial viability of different electrification 
approaches and their affordability to the (often very poor) end users, there is less 
concern for operational challenges unrelated to the economics of the particular 
approach. The body of literature concerned with technological/engineering approaches 
addresses some of these other operational challenges, but also largely excludes the role 
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of institutions and lacks theoretical approaches to attend to them, as the following 
section shows. 
 
2.1.2 Insights from Technology and Engineering 
Theoretical approaches focused on technological or engineering perspectives 
represent the second dimension of the largely two-dimensional literature on rural 
electrification. These studies often follow a top-down and prescriptive approach to 
arrive at recommendations for different technical solutions to the challenges faced in 
rural electrification in developing countries. Again, there are three thematic groups in 
particular that emerge: technology selection to determine the most suitable technical 
configurations for particular environments; technology comparison and the review of 
different technologies and their advantages and disadvantages; and approaches based on 
the concept of the energy ladder (albeit often critical) and energy transitions.8 
Technology selection using a methodology of indexing different alternatives is one 
of the conceptual approaches commonly found in the literature. Barry et al. (2011), 
using eight case studies in Malawi, Rwanda and Tanzania, develop and verify thirteen 
factors that must be considered for sustainable, renewable energy technology selection 
in Africa. These factors range from ease of maintenance to site selection, government 
support and financial capacity. This demonstrates that the technical factors involved in 
rural off-grid electrification exceed the mere selection of suitable technologies and also 
                                                 
8 Energy transitions are concerned with the transition from one source of energy (e.g. firewood) to 
another (e.g. electricity). This is a separate area of study from the socio-technical transitions literature that 
will be reviewed below.  
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include the technological capability required to operate and manage them within a 
certain regulatory, environmental and economic context. A similar concept is the energy 
technology sustainability index (ETSI) as developed by Brown and Sovacool (2007), 
which Mainali and Silveira (2015) apply to the context of rural electrification to find 
that more mature technologies such as micro-hydro and biogas have a higher ESTI than 
wind and solar PV in the context of rural India. While these approaches thus cover a 
broad set of factors which are relevant for appropriate technology selection, they all 
begin from the perspective that selecting the right technology is the deciding factor in 
determining the long-term sustainability of a particular rural electrification approach, 
thereby discounting the importance of socio-cultural practices and institutional 
arrangements.  
Rather than selecting a particular technology based on a pre-defined set of criteria, it 
is also common practice in the academic literature to determine the applicability of a 
particular technology to a specific context or compare the suitability of a pair of 
technologies. Azimoh et al. (2016), for example, compare SHSs with mini-grids for 
rural electrification in two villages in South Africa and arrive at the conclusion that, due 
to their ability to support productive uses, mini-grids are the preferable option, given the 
availability of suitable renewable energy sources. However, they do not speak to the 
significant challenges involved in operating such a mini-grid in a remote and rural 
place, which frequently arise, as is shown in a separate review of the literature on mini-
grids for rural electrification in the following sections. Other examples of such 
comparative studies include Kishore et al. (2013) and Narula et al. (2012). Kaundinya et 
al. (2009) provide a comprehensive review of literature comparing stand-alone off-grid 
electrification with grid extension. A slightly different approach is taken by Sebitosi et 
al. (2006) who, instead of recommending a technology for rural electrification, look at 
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existing rural electrification efforts in Kenya and recommend how they may be made 
more technically efficient, again demonstrating the technocratic nature of this particular 
body of literature. Yadoo and Cruickshank (2012), on the other hand, demonstrate that a 
study largely focused on comparing two different technological approaches, namely, 
biomass and micro-hydro powered rural mini-grids in Kenya, can nevertheless be based 
on an analysis of other dimensions affecting their sustainability, including the role of 
institutional frameworks. The institutional frameworks they refer to are, however, 
chiefly at the regional or national level and considered in connection with the regulatory 
framework, rather than at the level of a clearly defined and boundaried resource system 
— the focus of this thesis.  
Instead of technology selection, other authors have also examined technology 
adoption, often using the concept of the energy ladder. The concept of the energy ladder 
posits that as household income increases, energy use moves up the ladder from 
biomass for firewood, being the lowest rung of the ladder, via other more modern 
sources of energy, such as LPG and kerosene, all the way to electricity, which is the top 
rung (Hosier and Dowd, 1987). This implies a linear progression from least 
sophisticated to most sophisticated source of energy, each replacing its predecessor. 
Generally speaking, the literature using this theoretical concept finds that the adoption 
of electricity as a source of energy takes time and is more rapid for higher-income 
households, yet they also find that the concept of the energy ladder is flawed, as 
electricity does not fully replace traditional sources of energy such as firewood and 
kerosene even in the highest-income households (Campbell et al., 2003; Hiemstra-van 
der Horst and Hovorka, 2008; Murphy, 2001). Hence, the concept of energy transition 
or fuel stacking is now frequently used in the literature instead, which allows for the 
simultaneous use of various different types of energy sources. Elias and Victor (2005) 
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provide a comprehensive overview of the literature on energy transition, both in the 
context of developed and developing countries, including a review of the causes for and 
consequences of transitioning away from less efficient, traditional energy sources such 
as biomass to cleaner (at least at the point of consumption), more modern energy 
sources such as electricity. They find that while there is a strong correlation between 
income levels and increased use of modern energy sources, a causal relationship 
between energy transition and economic development is difficult to establish.  
Two additional conceptual approaches are commonly found within the literature, 
which, while heavily concerned with technology selection, also take other factors into 
consideration. Nevertheless, they may usefully be reviewed in this section. Bazilian et 
al. (2012) develop a set of best practice principles for rural electrification from a set of 
nine case studies in developing countries. Similarly, Terrado et al. (2008) develop a set 
of best practice recommendations. Both of these publications are examples of a wider 
body of best practice literature. They develop recommendations that go beyond the 
selection of technology or the economics of a particular approach, including the role of 
regulations, the political environment, and, especially in the case of Terrado et al., the 
importance of sustainable institutions at the community level. However, they provide 
little guidance as to the design and implementation of such institutions and explicitly 
identify the need for more research in this area, a call to which this thesis responds. 
The other remaining conceptual approach is more technocratic and prescriptive in 
nature. This approach involves spatial planning or mapping techniques, which model 
the costs of different electrification options, typically grid extension, mini-grids and 
SHSs, in order to arrive at the least-cost technologies for a particular geographic context 
(Deichmann et al., 2011; Ohiare, 2015; Szabó et al., 2011). Specific to the context of 
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Kenya, Zeyringer et al. (2015, p. 84), using a spatial planning model, find that grid 
extension is only viable in areas which are already close to the grid and that off-grid 
solar PV is a viable electrification technology for approximately 17% of the Kenyan 
population, supporting the relevance of this thesis’ focus on mini-grids using solar PV. 
Figure 2.1 presents the map showing the output of their optimisation model comparing 
grid extension to solar PV for electrification in Kenya. Thus, the next logical step in this 
chapter is to review the literature on mini-grids in particular, rather than rural 
electrification in general, although it should be noted that, predictably, there is 
considerable overlap between the two bodies of literature. 
 33 
Figure 2.1 – Least-Cost Electricity Supply in Kenya 
 
Source: Zeyringer et al. (2015, p.83) 
 
 
2.2 Key Concepts from the Literature on Rural Mini-Grids in 
Developing Countries 
 
Being a subset of the rural electrification literature more broadly, the literature on 
rural mini-grids in developing countries exhibits a similar two-dimensional focus, as the 
following two sections demonstrate. Again, as noted in the previous section, this review 
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cannot claim to exhaustively discuss the entirety of this body of literature. Rather, it 
provides a mapping overview of recent works to identify the main foci and thus begins 
to formulate the gap in the academic literature. This thesis aims to address the gap by 
developing from and augmenting the extensive existing body of knowledge.  
 
2.2.1 More Insights from Finance and Economics – Mini-Grid Business 
Models 
Given the fact that the literature on rural mini-grids is a subset of the rural 
electrification literature, there exists considerable overlap between the two, as 
evidenced by the fact that a number of the aforementioned studies concern themselves 
with mini-grids as well as other electrification options. Lee et al. (2014) have been 
mentioned previously as an example of a study using a cost-benefit approach. They 
develop an energy balance algorithm in order to develop a mini-grid sizing strategy, 
which balances the costs of increasing the mini-grid’s generating capacity with the 
benefits that it provides in the form of greater reliability. Their study is based on the 
case of a mini-grid in Mali, which frequently experiences overloading of the system due 
to demand patterns that do not match the supply characteristics of a solar PV mini-grid. 
Their model suggests an update to the sizing of the grid, which balances the benefits of 
fewer periods of excess demand with the costs of a system upgrade. However, they do 
not pursue alternative (i.e. non-technological) ways of rebalancing demand to match 
supply in order to avoid this ‘tragedy of the commons’ (the latter is engaged with in 
more depth further below). Blum et al. (2013) use a similarly cost-focused approach to 
determine the least-cost electricity generation technology for rural mini-grids in 
Indonesia, comparing micro-hydro and solar PV to diesel. They conclude that if diesel 
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subsidies were to be removed, both renewable energy technologies would be cost 
competitive. While the findings of these studies are important and useful when 
designing a rural mini-grid, they speak very little to the challenges faced once they are 
operational. Within the mini-grid literature, however, there is a subset of analyses that is 
more concerned with these matters, and the business models used to operate the mini-
grid in particular. 
Knuckles (2016) provides an excellent overview of different business models, 
comparing 24 cases of mini-grids from developing countries around the world based on 
factors including: stakeholders in ownership; operation and maintenance of the mini-
grid; how tariffs are collected and consumption is measured; what types of end users 
have been connected; and whether financing exists for end users. He concludes that 
decisions made across these dimensions are important influences on the sustainability of 
a mini-grid, defending this statement with 11 observations informed by the empirical 
data. However, his analysis does not include an in-depth review of different institutional 
models for ownership, operation and maintenance, only differentiating among 
community, mini-grid developer or third party roles. Krithika and Palit (2011) provide a 
similar review based on case studies of different mini-grid business models, comparing 
cooperative, franchise, fee-for-service, community-based and private sector models. 
They find that cost recovery is one of the most critical factors in ensuring long-term 
sustainability regardless of the particular business model, as well as the participation of 
the community in the institutions operating and managing the mini-grid. This is an 
important finding, which is echoed by this thesis. However, Krithika and Palit do not 
provide an explanation rooted in theory for the importance of community participation; 
they merely state that the mini-grid business models that include more formal structures 
for community participation have been more sustainable. This therefore indicates the 
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need for a more in-depth analysis of these institutional arrangements that is more solidly 
rooted in theory.  
Rather than comparing different business models, other studies have focused on the 
analysis of specific organisational structures, in particular, private sector and 
community-based. Pigaht and van der Plas (2009) study four private sector micro-hydro 
mini-grids in Rwanda, showing the importance of private sector approaches for long-
term financial sustainability and indicating that local participation is a critical factor. 
However, their private sector focus means that they do not consider how the local 
community, in addition to local financing firms and mini-grid developers, could be 
included in their concept of local participation. Other studies that focused on private 
sector business models analysed the risk–return profile for private sector investment 
into rural mini-grids (Schmidt et al., 2013) and the importance of different financing 
mechanisms, ranging from subsidies to tax incentives, climate finance and preferential 
lending (Williams et al., 2015). While Williams et al. (2015) discuss different 
institutional models and the importance of effective institutions, they only refer to 
institutions at the level of the government or regulator, rather than local management 
institutions. These local management institutions are more commonly discussed in the 
literature on community-based mini-grids. 
Ferrer-Martí et al. (2012) analyse three community-based mini-grids in rural Peru 
along technical aspects, socio-economic aspects and the sustainability of the 
management model. While most of their work focuses on the technical design of the 
mini-grids, as well as their socio-economic impacts on indicators related to health and 
education, they also consider the participation of community members in management 
activities an important factor. However, much like the other literature previously 
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discussed, they only reference the importance of community involvement and present a 
quantitative measure in terms of a percentage of families that have partaken in meetings 
related to management activities in the past. But the authors do not provide a thorough 
theoretical perspective as to why this level of participation is desirable or which 
institutional arrangements exist to achieve it. Also building on the literature on rural 
energy delivery models, Yadoo and Cruickshank (2010) assess the usefulness of 
cooperatives as institutional models for the ownership and operation of rural mini-grids, 
using examples from Nepal and Bangladesh. They find that cooperatives ‘can represent 
a highly favourable delivery mechanism for rural electrification in developing 
countries’ (Yadoo and Cruickshank, 2010, p. 2946), a finding supported by other 
studies as well (Ilskog et al., 2005; NRECA, 2009). Yet again, these authors do not 
analyse this issue using a theoretical and conceptual approach that is particularly well-
suited to the study of institutional arrangements, but rather consider cooperatives merely 
as another energy delivery model alongside private sector investment or public 
provision of electricity.  
Finally, there is a small body of literature concerned with demand-side management 
technologies and different ways of metering and paying for electricity, in particular the 
use of prepaid (also known as pay-as-you-go) electricity meters, which falls between the 
literature on business models and technology and engineering. Pueyo (2013) provides a 
useful overview of pay-as-you-go technologies, the real-time monitoring opportunities 
they provide and the business models that are thereby supported. She finds, however, 
that the evidence of their effectiveness is largely anecdotal and that there is scope for 
more research into the role these technologies can play in rural electrification. Within 
this field there are also some studies concerned with the advantages and disadvantages 
of different technologies for demand-side management (Boait, 2014; Harper, 2013), 
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which exhibit a much stronger focus on the technologies themselves, rather than their 
impact on operations. Rolffs et al. (2015) also analyse the role of pay-as-you-go finance 
models in energy access, albeit it using a socio-technical systems approach rather than 
focusing on technology or finance. Their work is covered further in section 2.3, when 
discussing socio-cultural approaches.  
 
2.2.2 More Insights from Technology and Engineering – Technologies for 
Mini-Grids 
Most of the technologically oriented publications concerned with rural mini-grids in 
developing countries fall under the category of technology comparisons or reviews as 
presented in section 2.1.2. Dimitriou et al. (2014) is an example of a comprehensive 
comparison of technologies for mini-grids ranging from solar PV to wind, micro-hydro 
and biomass, comparing their advantages and disadvantages. Wetz (2012) provides a 
similar overview of technological options for mini-grids. Many publications, however, 
select a particular technology for their analysis and typically study either micro-hydro, 
or solar PV and wind hybrid systems. 
Technically minded studies of micro-hydro mini-grids and case studies of their 
operation, even in the Kenyan context, date back a number of years (e.g. Maher et al., 
2003) and the technical difficulties in operating them are therefore well-researched. 
Kusakana (2014) provides a particularly thorough analysis of technical innovations that 
may be implemented in order to improve the viability of micro-hydro mini-grids. While 
other authors have mentioned the importance of community involvement and capacity 
building at the local level (Murni et al., 2012), they do not explicitly analyse these 
requirements from an institutional perspective. 
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A similar pattern can be found in the literature dealing with solar PV or PV/wind 
hybrid technologies, a particularly thoroughly studied set of technologies. While too 
numerous to review in its entirety, this body of literature includes studies focused on the 
risks associated with operating PV hybrid mini-grids (Hazelton et al., 2014); statistical 
analyses of the operation and load versus electricity production patterns in PV hybrid 
mini-grids (Louie, 2016; Muñoz et al., 2007); detailed analyses of the benefits of 
hybridisation compared to relying on just one renewable source of electricity 
(Mohammed et al., 2014; Neves et al., 2014); as well as studies which determine the 
most suitable electricity generation technologies for rural mini-grids based on 
geographic and climatic data, using similar spatial analysis as introduced above 
(Ranaboldo et al., 2015). Again, while some of these studies (e.g. Hazelton et al., 2014) 
mention the importance of community participation, they do not offer a theoretical 
focus on this aspect, but rather consider it a finding that emerges from the study of past 
cases of mini-grids.  
Despite this two-dimensional focus on finance and technology found in the literature 
on rural electrification more generally, and the mini-grid literature specifically, there 
has been a turn in the academic literature in recent years towards more socio-culturally 
focused studies. A number of publications in this area of study use conceptual 
frameworks concerned with socio-technical transitions to study the long-term 
sustainability of rural electrification efforts. While some of these socio-technical 
transition inspired frameworks also study the role of institutions, such as strategic niche 
management as employed by Ockwell and Byrne (2016) for example, their definition of 
institutions is slightly broader in scope than the one taken in this thesis. They view 
institutions as “[…] laws, regulations and policies as well as practices, norms and 
conventions regarding a particular socio-technical system” (Byrne, 2011, p. 19), 
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whereas this thesis focuses more specifically on local specialised organisational 
structures for the management of a boundaried resource system. These socio-culturally 
focused approaches are reviewed in-depth in the following section and are used to 
identify the specific gap in current knowledge that this thesis aims to address.  
 
2.3 Socio-cultural Approaches and the Remaining Gaps in the 
Literature 
 
In recent years, a small body of literature has begun to foreground socio-cultural 
considerations, in most cases by operationalising socio-technical approaches. This thesis 
aims to contribute to this body of socio-culturally focused literature by explicitly 
analysing the role of local institutions for the management of a boundaried resource 
system and, for the first time, operationalising and adapting concepts concerned with 
institutional arrangements for the management of natural resources to the context of 
rural mini-grids in developing countries. Before introducing and developing this 
theoretical innovation, however, a review of the existing socio-cultural rural 
electrification literature is required in order to define the gap in the literature.  
One of the earliest examples of a socio-cultural analysis of rural electrification can 
be found in Winther (2008), who provides an anthropological account of an in-depth 
ethnographic study of the socio-cultural impacts of rural electrification, using a village 
on Zanzibar as a case study. While a study of institutional arrangements appears in the 
form of a discussion of the electricity company in the village, these arrangements do not 
form the cornerstone of this analysis. Rather, Winther emphasises the difficulty in 
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predicting the types of social and cultural changes that the introduction of electricity 
will introduce, and the role of community participation in the success of the 
electrification project. This focus on the social change brought on by technology has 
continued to inform a number of other studies, which have applied socio-technical 
approaches to the study of rural electrification, inspired by the largely Euro-centric 
socio-technical transitions literature. 
Ulsrud et al. (2011) is one of the earlier examples of this body of literature, using a 
socio-technical perspective to study solar mini-grids in rural India. The authors also find 
the existing rural electrification literature to be two-dimensional, being centred on 
economic and technical performance, and hence identify the need for more social 
science research. They view the mini-grid as a socio-technical system, which, in 
addition to the technical infrastructure, includes the end users, owners, operators and the 
local organisations involved in mini-grid operations. Through this lens, they identify 
five key issues in mini-grid operation: growing demand quickly exceeds supply; 
operators are a key link in mini-grid sustainability; it may be unclear who is responsible 
for which activities in mini-grid management; it is challenging to set tariffs that are 
affordable and economically sustainable; and batteries are a weak link. In particular, the 
problems of demand growth and responsibility for mini-grid operation are relevant to 
the focus of this thesis, as becomes evident in the empirical chapters. While Ulsrud et 
al. identify this challenge, they do not discuss how institutional arrangements to manage 
and avoid overloading of the system could be developed, thereby leaving an opportunity 
to augment their findings. 
In a later paper, the same authors use a very similar socio-technical perspective to 
analyse the case of a community-based energy centre in Kenya, which is a central hub 
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for charging appliances without power lines connecting to other end users (Ulsrud et al., 
2015). In this study, they develop and operationalise a five-step analytical framework 
for village-level energy access, which ranges from the framework conditions (policies, 
laws, regulations, etc.) to local conditions (geography, demography, etc.) to the quality 
and reliability of the service provided by the energy centre. However, this framework 
does not explicitly study the institutions involved in the management and operation of 
the system either, but rather focuses on the energy centre as a catalyst for socio-
technical change. 
Müggenburg et al. (2012) also use a socio-technical approach, albeit in a very 
different context and with a different goal. They study the acceptance of pico PV 
systems, i.e. solar lanterns, in rural Ethiopia in terms of their technical functioning, as 
well as the manner in which they interact with the needs and behavioural patterns of 
their users. Their application of a socio-technical approach is, however, technology-
centric in nature in that the explicit goal of the analysis is to develop pico PV systems 
that are better adapted to the local context and hence more acceptable to their users.  
In another example of a socio-technical approach used to study rural electrification, 
Sovacool (2011) studies barriers which impeded the use of micro-hydro mini-grids for 
rural electrification in Nepal. In addition to technical, financial and regulatory factors, 
he finds that there also are socio-cultural barriers: local opposition, particularly against 
the building of dams and sharing of water resources; unfamiliarity and unrealistic 
expectations; the presence of social norms against paying for electricity; and the aid 
dependency of Nepal. While a socio-technical systems approach is useful in identifying 
these barriers, it does not lend itself to the development of potential institutional 
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interventions which could overcome some of them. Consequently, Sovacool does not 
suggest how the development of such solutions could be advanced. 
Also operationalising a socio-technical transitions perspective, Ahlborg and Sjöstedt 
(2015) study the process of economic change in a Tanzanian village after the 
implementation of a micro-hydro mini-grid by a donor agency, placing particular 
emphasis on the role of community ownership and collaboration. The authors provide a 
detailed description of the relationship between the local community and the 
community-based local utility owning and operating the mini-grid. They show that the 
relationship can be complicated and that rules, even though they apply equally to all, are 
not necessarily perceived as fair by all community members. Even though the analysis 
identifies this local institution as a potential arena for collaboration, the theoretical 
framing that was used does not lend itself to an analysis of the emergence of 
institutional arrangements for this type of collaboration, further demonstrating the 
existence of a gap in the literature around institutions for the sustainable management of 
rural mini-grids. 
In an earlier paper, Ahlborg and Hammar (2014) use a socio-cultural approach to 
analyse drivers and barriers to rural electrification in Tanzania and Mozambique, 
comparing grid extension, off-grid and different renewable energy technologies from 
various perspectives: regulatory, technical, financial, socio-cultural and institutional 
(understood as policies, laws and regulations at the national level rather than local rules 
and norms). They find that one of the key barriers to off-grid electrification is ensuring 
reliability in operation and maintenance, and suggest that income-generating productive 
uses can improve local management practices.  
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There is a number of other publications that have taken socio-technical approaches 
to analysing rural electrification efforts, but none of them explicitly addresses an 
institutional perspective in the same way and at the same level as the common-pool 
resource management literature with which this thesis engages. Rolffs et al. (2015) 
critique the two-dimensional nature of literature on rural electrification so far, then use a 
socio-technical transitions perspective to analyse the importance of socio-cultural 
factors in the adoption of pay-as-you-go financing for SHSs. They find that the close 
alignment of this approach with existing socio-cultural practices of poor women and 
men in paying for and consuming energy services is an important contributor to its 
success.  
Ockwell and Byrne (2016) also adopt a socio-technical transitions based approach, 
but extend this perspective by combining it with theoretical insights from the innovation 
systems literature. They show how an approach based on building a ‘socio-technical 
innovation system’ can be operationalised in practice to inform ambitious policy 
programmes such as the United Nation’s Sustainable Energy for All initiative. In 
particular, the authors use the concept of strategic niche management to study the 
emergence of the Kenyan solar PV market in order to derive policy conclusions for the 
deployment of other pro-poor, green technologies. While strategic niche management 
(and thus Ockwell and Byrne’s analysis) is also concerned with institutions via niche 
management’s focus on the notion of ‘institutionalisation’ as a core analytical category, 
it considers them at a different level than the common-pool resource literature. It 
analyses how rules, norms and conventions that emerge from the development of a 
socio-technical niche can be widely adopted at the regional or national level into laws, 
policies and regulations, contributing to niche practices influencing dominant socio-
technical regimes. These processes of institutionalisation are just one of a number of 
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factors that must be analysed. Ockwell and Byrne provide the examples of import taxes 
and quality standards as the types of institutions that might emerge. This illustrates the 
somewhat narrower perspective taken in this thesis, which concerns itself with rules, 
norms and practices exclusively at the local community level in relation to how mini-
grids are managed and how they can be operationalised as specialised organisational 
structures at this level. 
Closely linked to the focus on the community level, Campbell et al. (2016) take an 
explicitly socio-cultural perspective to study the concept of community in the context of 
rural electrification, using examples from Nicaragua and Nepal. They recast a rural 
electrification project as a social energy system within a community of interest, thereby 
taking into consideration ‘existing skill sets, patterns of household interaction and 
community-level power relations’ (p. 136). They find that this approach provides 
valuable insights into the social context of energy beyond the mere technological 
construct of an energy system. By calling for a deeper study of ways in which 
collaboration within a social energy system can lead to better decision-making, they 
implicitly call for the type of study presented in this thesis, which focuses specifically 
on these issues. 
This review demonstrates that there has been a recent ‘socio-cultural turn’ in the 
literature on rural electrification. This development and the resulting body of literature 
has been a key inspiration for the focus on socio-cultural issues in this thesis, rather than 
attempting to expand the already large body of literature using technical/engineering or 
financial/economic approaches. Yet, while many of these recent socio-culturally 
focussed studies identify institutions at the local community level as an important factor 
in the long-term sustainability of pro-poor rural electrification in general, and mini-grids 
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specifically, the theoretical frameworks and conceptual approaches commonly found in 
the literature are not well-suited to analyse institutions as defined in this thesis. Even 
though some of the socio-technical approaches used in this literature, which formed a 
starting point for the theory development of this thesis, such as, for example, strategic 
niche management considered above, also concern themselves with institutions at the 
local level, they are not suitable for the analysis of the interaction between: institutions 
as rules and norms acted upon by specialised organisational structures; a clearly defined 
and boundaried resource system; and the variety of possible end uses and user groups.  
This is the gap in current knowledge which this thesis aims to address by drawing 
on two theoretical frameworks, which have not yet been used systematically in the 
context of mini-grid management. Firstly, collective action theory provides a 
framework developed in the context of other instances of local resource management 
(and particularly common-pool resources), which have been studied through an 
institutional lens. Secondly, property rights theory provides a theoretical basis for 
understanding and analysing the relationship between user groups and the resource 
system. The following sections introduce these theoretical frameworks and explain how 
they can be applied to the context of the management of rural mini-grids in developing 
countries.  
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2.4 How a Common-Pool Resource Perspective Can Contribute to 
Theoretical Knowledge 
 
This thesis draws upon two particular areas of work in order to introduce theoretical 
frameworks to the literature on mini-grids for rural electrification that are suitable for 
the analysis of institutions, where institutions are defined not specifically as 
organisations, but rather as norms and ‘rules of the game’ (North, 1990). These 
institutions are important because they can potentially provide alternative non-
technological solutions to such problems as the mismatch between demand and supply 
patterns (and the resulting ‘tragedy of the commons’) described by Lee et al. (2014). 
The two relevant areas of study are property rights theory, to analyse the institutional 
impact of the introduction of certain technologies (i.e. prepaid meters and mobile-
enabled cashless payment, which are explored in more depth in chapter 4), and theories 
of collective action, in order to identify specific factors and conditions that affect the 
emergence of institutions. Theories of collective action are most commonly associated 
with the study of long-lasting institutions for the management of common-pool 
resources. In particular, Ostrom (1990) laid the foundation for her work in showing how 
common-pool resources can successfully be managed by the people who use them — 
work that garnered the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 2009. 
In order to describe how these theoretical frameworks may be applied and adapted 
to the context of rural mini-grids so as to address the gap in the literature identified 
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above, understanding the relevance of a common-pool resource perspective is the first 
critical step.  
A common-pool resource is defined as being rivalrous (or exhibiting high 
subtractability), meaning that a resource unit consumed by one resource user can no 
longer be used by another and that exclusion from access to the resource is difficult 
(Hess and Ostrom, 2003). This is in contrast to a public good, for example, which is 
non-rivalrous (e.g. street lighting). These characteristics of a common-pool resource 
create a number of potential challenges:   
‘Thus common-pool resources are subject to the problems of congestion, 
overuse, pollution, and potential destruction unless harvesting or use limits are 
devised and enforced.’ (Hess and Ostrom, 2003, p. 120) 
It is important to note that a common-pool resource does not imply open access to 
all — exclusion is difficult but not impossible. Rather, a common-pool resource may 
still be associated with a variety of property rights regimes (Ostrom, 2003). This issue is 
examined in more depth in section 2.5. Typical examples of common-pool resources are 
fishing grounds, grazing pastures or water for irrigation. In particular, water for 
irrigation has been studied extensively as a common-pool resource and established as a 
case in which collective action can be a successful way of managing the resource 
(Araral, 2009; Bravo and Marelli, 2008; Ostrom, 1990, 1992; Sarker and Itoh, 2001; 
Theesfeld, 2004). An irrigation example is discussed in more detail in section 2.7 in 
order to demonstrate how theories of collective action can be applied to the study of 
long-lasting management institutions in the presence of a common-pool resource. At 
present, however, it is sufficient to note that water for irrigation is a prototypical 
common-pool resource and that the operational challenges in its management and the 
institutions involved in this management have been studied in depth. This is important 
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because it may be argued that an irrigation system shares a number of characteristics 
with electricity in a closed system, e.g. a mini-grid. 
The analogy between a system of water pipes or canals, such as those used in an 
irrigation system, and a closed electrical circuit is often used in educational material to 
help explain the way electricity behaves, since water flowing through pipes can be seen 
as analogous to electrons flowing through a conductor — the ‘hydraulic analogy’ 
(Greenslade, 2003). Hence, all the basic characteristics of an electrical circuit can be 
described using hydraulic analogues. Resistance in the electrical circuit is analogous to 
friction in the pipes, voltage equates with pressure and current with volume flow. 
As a result, a mini-grid that is independent of the grid shares a number of basic 
characteristics with an irrigation system. First of all, the total amount of water available 
in an irrigation system depends on the storage capacity of the water reservoir (m3) and 
the recharge rate of the reservoir (m3/s), whereas the total amount of electricity (or 
rather electric energy) available in a mini-grid depends on the storage capacity of 
batteries (kilowatt-hours or kWh), if any, and the power of the generator (kilowatts or 
kW). A mini-grid with no battery storage would be analogous to an irrigation system 
with no reservoir, which could be described as a ‘run-of-the-river’ irrigation system. 
Regardless, the two factors of storage capacity and recharging capacity determine the 
maximum discharge rate in cubic meters of water per second or joules of electric energy 
per second.9 
                                                 
9 One joule per second is one watt (W) and 1000W is 1kW 
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Given these similarities of resource system characteristics, a mini-grid and an 
irrigation system, in principle, have certain operational challenges in common. If a 
farmer who is upstream uses all the water in the irrigation canal, there is no water left 
for the remaining farmers further downstream. Similarly, if one electricity user with an 
open-access electricity connection continues to add powerful loads she will eventually 
demand more than the total electrical capacity available in the system, thereby 
overloading it, resulting in voltage drops and potentially causing a blackout. In both 
circumstances, action by one person leads to reduced performance and potential damage 
to the system (e.g. droughts and blackouts) affecting all users – leading to a potential 
‘tragedy of the commons’(Hardin, 1968), which is discussed in more detail in section 
2.5. However, upstream and downstream have no meaning in the case of an electrical 
circuit because all who are connected have equal access to it. A mini-grid is hence a 
human-made resource system sharing a number of characteristics with an irrigation 
system. Therefore, the electricity it transmits (which can generally be conceived of as 
rivalrous but non-exclusive) is arguably a type of common-pool resource. It is important 
to point out that the non-exclusivity of electricity depends on the mini-grid and only 
those consumers connected to it constituting the unit of analysis, without any technical 
limitations on consumption. This issue is explored further in section 2.5, which 
considers how different technologies for limiting consumption impact bundles of 
property rights within a mini-grid and hence impact the nature of the common-pool 
resource.  
It should be noted, however, that there are marked differences between irrigation 
systems and mini-grids. Most importantly, financial sustainability is usually much less 
prominent an issue in an irrigation system than in a mini-grid, as the actual common-
pool resource — water — has no cost of generation (disregarding the small potential 
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cost of pumping). Even though community irrigation organisations often charge their 
members small water tariffs to maintain physical infrastructure such as weirs, canals, 
gates and pipes, they face considerably less severe financial constraints than mini-grids. 
Furthermore, a mini-grid is much more technically complex, requiring technical 
knowledge to manage, maintain and operate.  
Nevertheless, electricity in a mini-grid shares certain characteristics with a common-
pool resource and thus suggests that analysing the operational challenges and 
institutions involved in managing a mini-grid from a common-pool resource perspective 
can yield novel insights. In addition, an important characteristic of a common-pool 
resource is that it may be managed under various different property rights regimes, 
meaning that private and common property rights can co-exist within the same resource 
system. This is an important point to re-emphasise. Common-pool resources need not 
automatically be associated with common property or any other property rights regime, 
as has also been observed by Ostrom and Hess (2007). This potential multiplicity of 
property rights regimes makes it necessary and potentially insightful to introduce the 
first key theoretical concept used in informing the theoretical and hence methodological 
approach of this thesis. 
 
2.5 Institutions for the Management of a Common-pool Resource 
Part 1 – Property Rights 
 
Some of the most important foundations of property rights theory have been 
articulated by Demsetz (1967). He provides a concise categorisation of property rights 
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into three types: private, communal (synonymous with common) and state property. 
While this is a simplistic view, especially considering the more nuanced property rights 
theories developed several decades later (e.g. Schlager and Ostrom, 1992), it provides 
the basis upon which later work on property rights theory has been able to build. 
Demsetz paints a rather bleak picture for communal property, arguing that ‘communal 
property results in great externalities’ (Demsetz, 1967, p. 357) and echoing some of the 
concerns that his contemporary, Garrett Hardin, famously summarised in The Tragedy 
of the Commons (Hardin, 1968). Hardin presents a particularly pessimistic outlook on 
the potential of sustainably managing common-pool resources without strong external 
coercion. This is due to the inherent incentive structure in which the most beneficial 
short-term behaviour for each resource appropriator is to maximise the consumption of 
the resource, which in turn will invariably lead to its collapse. Or, as Hardin himself put 
it, ‘Ruin is the destination to which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in 
a society that believes in the freedom of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968, p. 1244). 
Section 2.7 returns to the tragedy of the commons as it is important in introducing 
theories of collective action. With Hardin’s view in mind, one of Demsetz’ arguments 
against the viability of common property compared to private property is the necessity 
for everyone that is part of the community to reach agreement on any decision 
concerning the use of the resource under consideration (e.g. land, water, fisheries, etc.). 
These concerns already point towards the need for collective action and institutional 
arrangements for collective action in the management of common property resources, 
the foundations of which have been significantly shaped by Elinor Ostrom’s research on 
governing the commons (1990), which is treated in more depth in section 2.7. Beyond 
her contribution to theories of collective action, however, Ostrom has contributed 
important theoretical analysis to the conceptualisation of property rights as well. 
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Schlager and Ostrom (1992) introduced the concept of bundles of property rights and 
how different positions are associated with them within the resource system. In 
particular, they define five different property rights, divided into operational-level rights 
and collective choice rights. The operational-level rights are defined as: 
• ‘Access: the right to enter a defined physical area and enjoy 
non-subtractive benefits (e.g. hike, canoe, sit in the sun).’ 
• ‘Withdrawal: the right to obtain resource units or products of 
a resource system (e.g. catch fish, divert water).’  
(Schlager and Ostrom, 1992, p. 250) 
The collective choice rights build upon these, and as a result are more powerful 
because those who hold collective choice rights have the power to define and control 
operational-level rights:  
• ‘Management: the right to regulate internal use patterns and 
transform the resource by making improvements.’ 
• ‘Exclusion: the right to determine who will have an access 
right, and how that right may be transferred.’ 
• ‘Alienation: the right to sell or lease exclusion, management 
or withdrawal rights.’ 
(Schlager and Ostrom, 1992, p. 251) 
Based on these property rights, it is possible to define different positions within the 
resource system, based on the combination of property rights, or bundle, held. Each 
property right builds upon the previous one in the order presented above. Schlager and 
Ostrom (1992) developed a matrix of property rights bundles and associated positions 
 54 
within the resource system, which they later refined as shown in Table 2.1 (Ostrom and 
Schlager, 1996). 
 
Table 2.1 - Bundles of Property Rights Associated with Positions in a resource system 
 FULL 
OWNER 
PROPRIETOR AUTHORISED 
CLAIMANT 
AUTHORISED USER AUTHORISED 
ENTRANT 
ACCESS X X X X X 
WITHDRAWAL X X X X  
MANAGEMENT X X X   
EXCLUSION X X    
ALIENATION X     
Source: Ostrom and Schlager (1996, p. 133) 
 
This framework defines five positions within a resource system. An authorised 
entrant is allowed to access the resource system, e.g. she can enter the pasture for 
grazing, but is not allowed to use any of the resource. An authorised user can withdraw 
from the resource, either through a temporary or a permanent withdrawal right, but they 
cannot devise their own harvesting (or use) rules and schedules. In other words, they 
have no authority to change operational rules. That right is reserved to authorised 
claimants, who have the right to devise operational-level rules, but in turn cannot 
determine who gains access to the resource or alienate, i.e. sell, their right of 
management. Proprietors, on the other hand, possess the right to determine who gains 
access to the resource, but again cannot alienate that right. This right of alienation is 
reserved for the full owner of the resource system. 
This classification of property rights can be used to analyse the effect of the 
introduction of technology on the allocation of property rights in a resource system. 
Yandle and Morris (2001) illustrate this using the example of measurement of the 
volume and flow rate of water being used for irrigation. Initially, when the appropriate 
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technology for accurately measuring volumes and flow rates was not yet available, use 
rules may have been developed but access and withdrawal rights would in effect be 
synonymous. With the introduction of simple metering technology, it becomes easier to 
differentiate between access and withdrawal rights, because it is possible to monitor and 
control the flow rate to each user. With more sophisticated metering, rights of exclusion 
and alienation also become more widely available as water usage rights could be 
transferred and sold on the market.  
Considering the hydraulic analogy and the similarities between a mini-grid and an 
irrigation system described above, there is considerable scope for the application of this 
logic to the mini-grid context. However, the theory of bundles of property rights and 
their associated positions has not yet been applied to a mini-grid or, more generally, to 
an electrical grid. In a mini-grid, like an irrigation system, modern metering technology 
facilitates and streamlines the collective choice rights of management and exclusion, 
compared to less advanced technologies such as unmetered open-access connections or 
current-limited connections. Furthermore, metering systems allow an easy 
differentiation between access and withdrawal rights, i.e. they facilitate operational-
level property rights allocation. For example, an unmetered connection, by definition, 
grants access and withdrawal rights at the same time, as the only method of removing 
the withdrawal rights from a connected authorised user is to disconnect her from the 
grid entirely, removing both property rights at the same time. However, if a smart, 
possibly prepaid, meter is used to control the authorised user’s connection to the mini-
grid, potentially using mobile-enabled technologies allowing for remote control of the 
meter, withdrawal rights can be temporarily revoked to make her an authorised entrant, 
without physically removing the access right, i.e. the connection to the grid. Such 
revocation of withdrawal rights can be useful if the authorised user is, for example, in 
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arrears on her electricity account or has exhausted her prepaid amount. Technologies, 
therefore, can make it easier for the full owner or proprietor holding the right of 
exclusion to exercise that right.  
Based on these considerations, Table 2.2 represents a conceptual innovation in the 
application of property rights theory by analysing how technology, in the form of a 
prepaid meter in this case, can streamline and automate the allocation of property rights 
bundles in a mini-grid. In addition, modern metering technology facilitates management 
of the mini-grid as well, as it allows the full owner, proprietor or authorised claimant 
holding the right of management to control which end user can withdraw how much 
power during times of excess demand, prioritising, for example, productive uses during 
the day and household uses such as lighting and entertainment at night. Chapter 4 will 
analyse in more depth how prepaid meters, as well as other metering technologies, 
affect the allocation of property rights. 
 
Table 2.2 - The Role of Prepaid Meters in the Allocation of Property Rights 
 
    Source: Author (developed from original framework by Ostrom and Schlager (1996, p. 133)) 
 
This role of technology in the allocation of property rights and the execution of 
different positions within the resource system leads to the insight that, by changing the 
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nature of property rights bundles, metering and payment collection technologies may be 
able to overcome some of the key operational challenges in a mini-grid. 
These operational challenges naturally must be identified, which is the first 
empirical step in chapter 4 of this thesis, followed by empirical testing of the application 
of this theoretical framework. Following the logic of the analogy of a mini-grid and an 
irrigation system outlined above, the resulting common-pool resource characteristics of 
electricity in a mini-grid and the potential for a tragedy of the commons to emerge 
suggests that there are likely to be other operational challenges that technology cannot 
easily address, however. There is further evidence pointing towards the need for 
institutional arrangements beyond property rights, because electricity in a mini-grid not 
only exhibits certain characteristics of a common-pool resource in general, but more 
specifically, a complex and multiple-use common-pool resource.  
 
2.6 Electricity as a Complex, Multiple-Use Common-pool Resource 
 
The analogy between water for irrigation and electricity in a mini-grid can be 
extended even further by introducing the concept of a complex and multiple-use 
common-pool resource as developed by Steins and Edwards (1999), rather than a simple 
common-pool resource as defined above. According to their analysis, a complex 
common-pool resource is characterised as a resource that is used for different purposes 
by different stakeholder groups. Critically, a complex common-pool resource requires 
different interests to be balanced among a variety of user groups, and hence requires 
platforms that can accommodate these different user groups, as Meinzen-Dick and 
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Bakker (1999) and Meinzen-Dick and Hoek (2001) demonstrate in the case of 
irrigation. 
Meinzen-Dick and Bakker (1999) not only apply the concept of a complex, 
multiple-use common-pool resource to the case of water for irrigation in Sri Lanka, but 
also acknowledge the importance of property rights, since allocation changes with 
increasing scarcity of the resource. They examine the variety of uses for water beyond 
agriculture, and hence stakeholders involved, in the context of an irrigation system in 
south-eastern Sri Lanka. After studying the various organisations involved in the 
institutional environment of the irrigation system and the rights, including property 
rights, these different groups hold, they introduce uses for water and the associated user 
groups other than those primarily focused on field crop production, which range from 
drinking water for livestock to domestic water uses. They find that creating or 
expanding an existing institutional arrangement whereby representatives of all user 
groups have a voice in water allocation is a critical requirement in order to manage 
trade-offs, as well as identify potential complementarities in the management of water 
as a multiple-use common-pool resource. Meinzen-Dick and Hoek (2001) expand on 
this concept and further emphasise the importance of analysing the multiple end uses for 
water beyond irrigation, drawing on empirical data from the aforementioned Sri Lankan 
as well as an Indian case study. They find that an assessment of the different uses and 
user groups will lead to improved allocation of water between users; more productive 
and sustainable uses; improved social sustainability (i.e. the absence of conflict around 
the resource); and equitability of management practices and outcomes. 
This thesis argues and demonstrates empirically that an issue such as balancing 
interests among different user groups is an operational challenge that is also found in a 
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rural mini-grid and that, considering the various potential end uses and user groups, 
creating institutions to overcome this challenge can have similar benefits as those found 
in the case of water for irrigation. A useful way of categorising these different user 
groups according to their electricity requirements is the A-B-C model (Rodríguez 
Gómez, 2013), which defines three user groups. Rodríguez Gómez introduces the A-B-
C model as part of an analysis focused on financial modelling for solar PV mini-grids in 
East Africa with telecom towers as their anchor tenants. Anchors (A) are large entities, 
often public or commercial, such as hospitals or cell-phone towers that require a reliable 
supply of electricity 24 hours per day, seven days per week. Businesses (B) form the 
second group, including mostly small and micro enterprises in rural areas, which require 
electricity primarily during the day during normal business hours, but also at night in 
the case of bars or video halls, for example. Finally, the community (C), i.e. households, 
require electricity largely at night for lighting, as well as potentially to power radios or 
televisions. Even if, as is often the case, a mini-grid does not have a single anchor load, 
balancing the interests within and among these groups, and allocating a limited amount 
of electric power among them, can be very challenging, as is demonstrated in the 
empirical chapters of this thesis (see chapters 4 and 5). 
Thus, this thesis aims to empirically and analytically test the idea that despite the 
introduction of modern metering technologies and their ability to facilitate management, 
institutions for collective action are required to develop fair access rights in mini-grids, 
as is typical for a complex common-pool resource. According to Steins and Edwards 
(1999), collective action user platforms for resource use negotiation are needed in order 
to facilitate this, a concept developed and defined by Röling (1994) in the context of 
natural resource management:  
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‘“Platforms” involve meetings of farmers who perceive the same 
problem, realize their interdependence for solving it, and come 
together to agree.’ (Röling, 1994, p. 129) 
Thus, such platforms have the purpose of developing a collective understanding of 
the resource base and cooperating to avoid and solve actual and perceived problems 
(Steins and Edwards, 1999). This concept of a platform for resource use negotiation is 
revisited at various stages of the thesis and discussed in more depth in the context of a 
mini-grid, based on the empirical data presented in chapters 4 and 5. This argument 
further relates to the analogy of an irrigation system, which also involves inevitable 
trade-offs between uses and user groups, and in which negotiation among the various 
user groups is also more likely to lead to decisions that are acceptable for all, compared 
to externally imposed rules (Meinzen-Dick and Bakker, 1999). However, theories of 
collective action must first be introduced in more detail, given that their application to 
the case of a rural mini-grid is one of the key theoretical contributions of this thesis.  
 
2.7 Institutions for the Management of a Common-pool Resource 
Part 2 – Collective Action 
 
The study of collective action in the presence of common-pool resources is largely 
founded on two seminal works. The Logic of Collective Action (Olson, 1965) argued 
early on that in the presence of public or common goods, self-organised collective 
action is very unlikely to occur due to the inherent free-rider problem involved if the 
benefits of the good in question are accessible to everyone, regardless of their 
participation in collective action. Collective action, according to Olson, would not occur 
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in the presence of non-excludability. The other critical early analysis of the issue, The 
Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968), has previously been introduced. Since then, 
however, there has been a shift in analysis and understanding of collective action in the 
presence of common-pool resources, chiefly led by Elinor Ostrom’s and Robert Wades’ 
numerous assessments of this issue (e.g. Blomquist and Ostrom, 1985; Ostrom, 1990, 
1992, Wade, 1987, 1988). Their analysis, as well as that of various other authors 
(Baland and Platteau, 1996; Schlager et al., 1994) have focused on case studies of 
authentic, long-lasting collective action institutions which have formed and persisted 
against all the odds outlined by Olson and Hardin. A large proportion of these case 
studies are village collectives or cooperatives that have formed to manage pasture or 
irrigation resources, and in some cases have been able to persist for centuries (e.g. 
Ostrom 1990: pp. 58-87). Given the hydraulic analogy and the similarities, as well as 
differences, between water for irrigation and electricity in a mini-grid outlined above, 
the potential applicability of this theory becomes apparent. 
Three seminal publications in particular have laid some of the most widely 
recognised foundations for understanding and analysing institutional sustainability in 
the management of common-pool resources. Village Republics (Wade, 1988) is the 
earliest of these three works and is based on the study of several villages in south India, 
which have created institutions to manage the use of either grazing grounds or water for 
irrigation. Through the analysis of these case studies, Wade develops 13 conditions 
regarding the resource system, user group, technology and interactions between them 
upon which successful collective action depends. 
In a similar manner, Governing the Commons (Ostrom, 1990) is also based on case 
studies of collective action institutions. After reviewing the existing literature on the 
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commons as well as institutional approaches for self-organisation, Ostrom focuses on 
analysing three different questions using case studies: how and why long-lasting, self-
governed and self-organised common-pool resource institutions survive; how self-
organised institutions can deal with change; and why common-pool resource institutions 
fail. Since Elinor Ostrom is, arguably, the most influential scholar on theories of 
collective action, it is useful to understand the process by which she answers the first 
question in particular. Ostrom recounts and discusses the history of six different cases 
of long-enduring and self-organised common-pool resource management — two 
concerned with pasture and four irrigation cases — and then analyses what similarities 
exist among these case studies that could explain how they have been able to last for 
extensive periods of time, in one case, over 750 years. Ostrom (1990) finds that there 
are noticeable similarities around eight different factors: clearly defined boundaries; 
rules that match local conditions; institutional arrangements; monitoring; sanctions; 
conflict resolution; rights to organise; and nested enterprises. These factors become 
Ostrom’s eight design principles for long-enduring, common-pool resource institutions. 
She defines a design principle as:  
‘. . . an essential element or condition that helps to account for the success of 
these institutions in sustaining the CPRs and gaining the compliance of 
generation after generation of appropriators in the rules in use.’ (Ostrom, 1990, 
p. 90) 
 
The third work, Halting Degradation of Natural Resources (Baland and Platteau, 
1996), begins with an extensive review of natural resource management and commons 
theories, including a review of the prisoner’s dilemma and game theory in this context. 
The second part of the book, however, sets out to conduct an empirical assessment of 
the feasibility of local resource management, similar to those presented in the two 
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publications introduced above. After an extensive review of empirical analyses on this 
issue, including Wade’s and Ostrom’s, as well as an examination of their own empirical 
work, Baland and Platteau reach eight conclusions regarding conditions for successful 
collective action. 
Thus, these three publications share a common thread in that they all study existing 
cases of successful collective action in order to arrive at enabling conditions, whether 
they are called design principles, conditions or conclusions. These findings can be used 
to understand other instances of common-pool resource management and used to 
explain their success or failure. Sarker and Itoh (2001) provide a good example of how 
Ostrom’s design principles (the methodology would not change if other enabling 
conditions had been selected) apply to the case of long-lasting irrigation institutions in 
Japan. They examine each enabling condition in turn and analyse how it applies to the 
context of Japanese irrigation institutions, a methodological approach and analytical 
pathway which is used in this thesis as well. They find that the design principles are 
successful in explaining how the irrigation institutions in question have been able to 
endure and ‘solve the provision and appropriation problems of the Japanese irrigation 
CPRs’ (Sarker and Itoh, 2001, p. 100). Thus, they demonstrate the usefulness of the 
analytical approach that applies a set of enabling conditions to the context of specific 
case studies. In principle, this is the opposite approach to that taken by the authors who 
developed the enabling conditions, who studied existing cases of long-lasting common-
pool resource management institutions, looking for similarities that then led to the 
emergence of enabling conditions. This approach of applying a set of enabling 
conditions to an existing case of common-pool resource management is widely used in 
the literature on the following topics: community-based natural resource management 
(Cox et al., 2010; Fabricius and Collins, 2007; Haller, 2010); forests and wildlife 
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(Alomao, 2002; Andersson et al., 2014; Blaikie, 2006; Matta and Alavalapati, 2006); 
several other cases of water for irrigation (Beyene, 2009; Cody et al., 2015; Cox, 2014; 
Meinzen-Dick, 1997; Nagrah et al., 2016; Tang, 1989); and pasture for grazing (Landolt 
and Haller, 2015; McCarthy et al., 2004). The next step in the development of theory for 
this thesis is thus to select the set of enabling conditions most suitable for the 
application to the case of rural mini-grids.  
 
2.8 Enabling Conditions for Collective Action 
 
In deciding which set of enabling conditions to use in the analysis, this thesis starts 
from the most comprehensive set found in the academic literature and then refines that 
set to those appropriate in the application to rural mini-grids. Recognising similarities 
across the three key works introduced in the previous section, Agrawal (2001) 
developed an overarching framework that synthesises the enabling conditions for 
sustainable management of common-pool resources into 33 enabling conditions 
grouped under six categories: group characteristics, resource system characteristics, 
institutional arrangements and external environment  as well as two categories including 
characteristics with relevance to more than one categories (see Figure 2.2).  
 
 Figure 2.2 - Enabling Conditions for Collective Action 
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These include the enabling conditions identified in the three publications reviewed 
above, as well as nine conditions that Agrawal considered to be lacking from the 
original set of enabling conditions. These are particularly concerned with the 
characteristics of the resource itself, and the resource system, as well as the external 
environment. Agrawal formulates these enabling conditions (noted with ‘AA’ in Figure 
2.2) based on a comprehensive literature review of other work in regard to common-
pool resource management. 
The resulting theoretical framework facilitates analysis of reasons for long-term 
sustainability, or lack thereof, of existing collective action institutions in the presence of 
common-pool resources in a more comprehensive manner than the individual subsets 
developed by the seminal authors above. In particular, Moore and Rodger (2010) 
provide an example of how an analysis of a common-pool resource management case 
may be structured using Agrawal’s framework. They define wildlife tourism at 
Australia’s Ningaloo Reef as a common-pool resource due to the fact that tourists are 
hard to exclude, their actions affect the experiences of others and they have an adverse 
impact on wildlife. The authors then consider each of the groups of enabling conditions, 
discussing their applicability to the case of wildlife tourism, as well as the extent to 
which they are present in the case study, in order to understand their impact on 
sustainability. They find that, in particular, institutional arrangements significantly 
contribute to sustainability and that further research is needed in order to improve the 
applicability of the enabling conditions to this new context. 
Furthermore, a review of 12 common property regimes involving forest, water and 
pasture in semi-arid Tanzania found that there is no significant difference in the 
explanatory power of the enabling conditions among different types of common-pool 
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resources (Quinn et al., 2007). These studies therefore suggest that the application of the 
enabling conditions to other common property regimes such as a rural mini-grid, for 
example, would be equally powerful. A systematic application of Agrawal’s framework 
and the underlying theory of enabling conditions for collective action in the 
management of common-pool resources to rural mini-grids constitute a novel 
theoretical approach in the academic literature. Therefore, a closer look at the 
applicability of the framework to this new context is required, in keeping with the need 
for a refinement of enabling conditions identified by Moore and Rodger (2010) in the 
context of wildlife tourism in Australia. Before this first analytical step, however, it is 
necessary to establish that this type of systematic treatment of electricity in a rural mini-
grid as a common-pool resource does, in fact, constitute a theoretical innovation.  
 
2.9 The Limitations of Current Literature on Electricity as a 
Common-pool Resource 
 
An extensive search for relevant literature only identified three existing publications 
(two doctoral theses and a working paper) that touch on how electricity in rural mini-
grids in developing countries may be treated as a common-pool resource. In a working 
paper, Maier (2007) explicitly uses a common-pool resource perspective to analyse 
reasons for successes and failures of 27 community-based micro hydro mini-grids in 
Northern Pakistan. He finds that communities have established institutions and various 
rules of use, concluding that they are able to govern the use and ensure the maintenance 
of the plants in ways that often function better than state- or private-based models. In 
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most cases, the projects that have failed experienced external pressures, such as the 
arrival of the national grid. While Maier authored one of the few publications that 
concern themselves with institutional arrangements in mini-grids, he does not venture 
beyond treating electricity as a common-pool resource, identifying the attributes of a 
common-pool resource and describing the resulting challenges faced in its management. 
There is no systematic application of theories of collective action or reference to 
overarching enabling conditions for collective action through which institutions and 
transferable approaches may be developed. Maier’s treatment of mini-grids as common-
pool resource systems therefore stops well short of operationalising the various seminal 
contributions to theories of collective action and property rights reviewed above. 
In his doctoral thesis, Greacen (2004) also suggests that electricity in community-
based micro hydro mini-grids, in this case based on 59 projects in Thailand, can be 
treated as a common-pool resource. However, rather than elaborating on the manner in 
which experiences from other instances of collective action could be used to overcome 
the challenges faced by existing projects, he suggests a technological fix that could be 
used to address the problems: current limiters, which technically limit the maximum 
current that can be drawn by each household. Again, there is no attempt at a theoretical 
expansion of the collective action literature, nor consideration of the sophisticated part 
of this literature that deals with property rights and the impact of technologies such as 
current limiters on these property rights, as developed in detail in chapter 4 of this 
thesis. Furthermore, as this thesis will argue, technical fixes are unable to address 
several socio-cultural institutional considerations that still persist, such as managing 
distribution among users during seasonal demand that exceeds generating capacity. 
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In an analysis of the economic impacts of five community-based micro hydro mini-
grids in rural Kenya, Kirubi’s (2009) doctoral thesis also studies some aspects of 
collective action. He focuses on the contested effect of heterogeneity of the group on the 
sustainability of collective action and finds that heterogeneity of resource users 
increases chances of long-term success. This analysis only represents one small sub-
section of a thesis more broadly concerned with the impact of electricity access on rural 
development (as opposed to how to achieve pro-poor electricity access) and only 
concerns itself with one of the 33 enabling conditions identified in the theoretical 
framework in Figure 2.2 (i.e. G7 – heterogeneity of endowments, homogeneity of 
identities and interest).  
There is therefore currently no precedent in the peer-reviewed or grey literature for 
applying a comprehensive theoretical framework of enabling conditions for collective 
action to the issue of sustainably managing mini-grids for pro-poor rural electrification. 
While the common-pool resource characteristics of electricity in an isolated mini-grid 
have been previously identified by other authors, none of those authors has 
systematically applied theories of collective action or property rights theory as 
introduced in section 2.5. Even Maier (2007), who explicitly focuses on institutional 
arrangements in mini-grids, includes no in-depth discussion of theories of collective 
action, and the analysis of the existing institutional arrangements is not rooted in this 
theory (although given the importance of rules he identifies, the use of enabling 
conditions as an analytical tool would have been appropriate). In addition to this lack of 
depth and systematic application of the theory, none of the three publications makes an 
attempt at adapting and further developing the existing theory. Thus, the adaptation of 
theory presented in the next section of this thesis is the first of several original 
contributions to knowledge in this area, which this thesis makes.  
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2.10 Refining the Enabling Conditions for Application to Mini-Grids 
 
This section refines the enabling conditions in Figure 2.2 based on their 
applicability and salience in analysing socio-cultural enabling conditions for the 
sustainable management of pro-poor rural mini-grids. This approach is a direct response 
to Agrawal’s (2001) own critique of the framework’s exhaustiveness and the sheer 
number of potentially relevant enabling conditions. In order to reduce the framework to 
a more manageable size, and make it as relevant as possible to the context of electricity 
in a mini-grid, this section systematically examines the enabling conditions and the 
extent to which, and the ways in which, they relate to the management of electricity as a 
common-pool resource in the mini-grid context. Each of the categories of characteristics 
in Agrawal’s framework is considered in turn. Enabling conditions with relevance to the 
socio-cultural aspects of mini-grid management in the resulting refined theoretical 
framework are represented in Figure 2.3 (note: all codes and enabling conditions 
mentioned below refer to the codes presented in Figure 2.2). Enabling conditions are 
excluded from the refined framework due to any of the three following reasons: 
• Redundancy: the condition is by definition a characteristic of a rural mini-
grid as defined in this thesis. 
• Normatively inapplicable: the condition does not match the normative 
approach of this thesis. 
• Substantively inapplicable: the condition does not match the unit of analysis 
and area of study focused on in this thesis. 
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Agrawal’s ‘external environment’ (E1-4) category as a whole is therefore not 
considered, as many of the conditions in this category engage with issues at the regional 
and national level rather than the local level, which is the focus of this thesis. This 
category of conditions is thus substantively inapplicable to this analysis. This echoes the 
arguments made in section 2.3, to the effect that this thesis focuses on institutions at the 
local level, rather than institutions in the form of laws or regulations, which would fall 
under Agrawal’s external environment conditions. This does not imply that these 
external environment conditions are irrelevant — they represent a critical area for 
specific future analysis (see areas for future research articulated in the concluding 
chapter 7). 
 
2.10.1 Group Characteristics 
Several conditions within this category are, by definition, characteristics of all rural 
mini-grids and can therefore be set aside for the purposes of this analysis due to their 
redundancy. Neither of Agrawal’s two sources (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Wade, 
1988) listing small group size (G1) as an enabling condition specify a number that 
constitutes a small group. It is nevertheless, by definition, a characteristic of mini-grids 
as they have been defined in chapter 1. Clearly defined boundaries (G2) are also a 
natural condition of mini-grids. The boundary of the group is defined as the extent of 
those either directly connected to, or directly interacting in other ways with, the mini-
grid, e.g. by paying to charge mobile phones or LED lanterns (incidentally, as has been 
mentioned before, this is also the unit of analysis of this thesis). The condition of shared 
norms (G3) does not apply as these are only a requirement if group size is large, 
according to Baland and Platteau (1996). With regards to mini-grids in contemporary 
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East Africa, it is unlikely that any significant past successful experience (G4) is to be 
found with operating mini-grids — as has already been emphasised, most mini-grids in 
the developing world struggle to operate sustainably. A low level of poverty (G8) is 
also not a relevant characteristic as the explicit interest of this thesis, and the policy and 
practitioner efforts it seeks to inform, is in providing access to electricity for poor 
people via mini-grids. This condition is therefore normatively inapplicable. 
Heterogeneity of endowments and homogeneity of identities and interests (G7) as 
demonstrated by Kirubi (2009) are, however, potentially relevant characteristics. In the 
context of this analysis, the different sub-groups, among which heterogeneity of 
endowments and homogeneity of interest may exist, are limited to just the three 
categories: anchor loads, businesses and households. Of course, there are considerably 
more granular sub-groups within each of these categories, e.g. households within 
different income groups, but the analysis does not differentiate within them at that level, 
due to the exploratory nature of applying this framework to such a novel concept. A 
related socio-cultural issue, which has not been studied before, is the interdependence 
among group members (G6), which must be understood in the specific context of each 
mini-grid. Entrepreneurs exploiting the resource for economically productive uses upon 
which other users depend might, for example, act as facilitators of collective action, by 
increasing interdependence within the group. In this context the degree of complexity 
and specialisation of the local village economy and the extent to which people depend 
upon each other’s goods and services will therefore be considered a proxy measure for 
group interdependence. However, this also creates a risk of elite control or capture, 
which can be problematic, especially if appropriate leadership (G5) is lacking. It should 
be noted that appropriate leadership is defined as being ‘young, familiar with changing 
external environments, and connected to local traditional elite’ (Agrawal, 2001, p. 
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1654). As the empirical data will show, this definition of appropriate leadership is very 
specific and does not necessarily fit with the reality found in rural Kenyan communities. 
In fact, an appropriate leader according to this definition might be impossible to find in 
the context of a rural mini-grid. Especially the requirement for being young (in itself not 
a clearly defined term) is difficult to achieve and not necessarily useful in communities, 
in which village elders have been granted official roles by the government in the form 
of village councils as part of the decentralisation of Kenyan government.10  
 
2.10.2 Resource System Characteristics 
In a mini-grid, resource system characteristics are relatively straightforward to 
define. Small system size (R1) and well-defined boundaries (R2) are both given, for 
reasons analogous to those outlined regarding group characteristics. Low levels of 
mobility (R3) of the resource are also present by definition, as electricity cannot leave 
the resource system (i.e. the mini-grid). R1, R2 and R3 are therefore excluded from the 
refined framework due to their redundancy. The possibility of storage of resource 
benefits (R4) depends on the particular mini-grid design and whether batteries are 
present. The final characteristic concerned with predictability (R5) — meaning 
predictability of supply in this case — is again a function of the energy source used 
(solar/ hydro/gen-set/other). Since conditions R4 and R5 relate to specific supply-side 
technological considerations, neither of them is included in the refined framework, as 
                                                 
10 See: http://www.tikenya.org/index.php/press-releases/322-decentralised-units-at-the-county-level 
 74 
the aim is to focus on socio-cultural aspects of mini-grid management and these two 
conditions are substantively inapplicable. 
 
2.10.3 Group and Resource System Overlap 
In a mini-grid, the location of the resource system and user group (GR1) is identical. 
This condition can therefore be disregarded as being redundant. Low levels of user 
demand (GR4) are to be expected initially, as it takes time for communities to adapt to 
the use of electricity and build up demand. This build-up, however, will lead to a 
gradual change in levels of demand (GR5). The importance of this change, and how it 
interacts with the initially low levels of demand, can be a significant consideration as 
rising demand must be met by expensive system upgrades. In this context, high 
dependency by users on the resource system (GR2) relates to the manner in which 
different uses can increase dependency on the system and also potentially help generate 
the income streams necessary to maintain the system in the long term. This, however, 
requires fairness in allocation of benefits (GR3), pointing to the potential importance of 
the resolution of conflict between household uses (e.g. lighting and mobile phone 
charging) and productive uses (e.g. refrigeration or agricultural processing) in 
particular. As a result, conditions GR2–5 warrant closer analysis in this context. 
 
2.10.4 Institutional Arrangements 
Institutional arrangements are key to the types of socio-cultural issues with which 
this thesis seeks to engage; they may potentially play a crucial role in the sustainability 
of mini-grids, offering opportunities to create enabling conditions from the outset. Rules 
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(I1) must be simple and easy to understand, requiring members of the community to be 
able to comprehend them and their rationale. This is similar to the argument for 
requiring locally devised access and management rules (I2), which in the mini-grid 
context concerns the extent and nature of community participation in the formulation of 
rules, especially when there is no metering. The extent to which rules are easy to 
enforce (I3) is also relevant and relates to the degree of mutual oversight within the 
community. Graduated sanctions (I4) beyond simple disconnection have, to date, not 
been described in the literature on mini-grids, yet more analysis on their potential role 
could yield useful insights. Similarly, as sanctioning processes become more and more 
refined, the availability of low-cost adjudication (I5) takes on greater importance. 
Finally, and crucially, monitors and other officials must be accountable to electricity 
consumers (I6) in order to minimise, for example, the chances for elite capture and 
squandering of revenues. All of the institutional arrangements are therefore included in 
the refined framework. 
 
2.10.5 Resource System and Institutional Overlap 
Matching the use restrictions to regeneration of resource (RI1), i.e. matching supply 
and demand within the mini-grid, is one of the central challenges of managing any 
electricity network and hence must be included in the refined framework. 
 
2.10.6 The Refined Framework  
This refinement of Agrawal’s framework to the context of rural mini-grids hence 
leads to a set of 14 enabling conditions for collective action in mini-grid management 
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(see Figure 2.3), which must be considered in more depth based on empirical findings 
from the field visits and interviews described in chapter 3. These conditions are largely 
focused on the group characteristics, the overlap between group and resource 
characteristics, and the institutional arrangements governing the interactions between 
the group and the resource, as well as within the group itself. The group in this case 
comprises all those end users connected to the mini-grid (i.e. all authorized entrants, 
using the terminology defined in Table 2.1).  
 
 
 
The theoretical foundation formulated in this chapter is now operationalised in the 
methodology in chapter 3 and the following empirical chapters. This methodology, the 
following two empirical chapters (4 and 5) and the discussion (chapter 6) are directly 
motivated by and follow the structure of the research question and its five sub-questions 
formulated in section 1.5. 
  
Figure 2.3 - Refined Theoretical Framework 
Source: Author (developed based on framework by Agrawal (2001, pg. 1659)) 
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Chapter 3  - Methodology 
 
The methodology underpinning the original research and analysis conducted for this 
thesis is based on three distinct but related phases, which involved a combination of 
theory building, empirical data collection and theory application and analysis, where the 
results of the theory application phase in particular fed back into theory development. 
Figure 3.1 presents a flow chart outlining the three phases, the empirical and analytical 
steps taken in each of them, and how they build upon and relate to each other.  
 
Figure 3.1 - Research Design and Methodology in Three Phases 
 
 78 
 
The first phase focused on theory development, identifying the gap in the literature 
as well as suitable theoretical frameworks to fill this gap. These theoretical frameworks 
were then developed further and refined in order to render them applicable in analysing 
the socio-cultural factors that contribute to sustainable management of pro-poor mini-
grids. These segments were completed in Chapter 2. This theory then informed the 
research design of the second, empirical phase, which took the form of semi-structured 
interview questionnaires rooted in the theoretical frameworks and the selection of three 
Kenyan mini-grids to be investigated via field visits. 
The empirical data collection took place during two separate trips to Kenya in May, 
2014, and January to early March, 2015. During these visits, 27 interviews with 24 
experts in the field of mini-grids for rural electrification in Kenya were conducted in 
Nairobi and Kisumu (some were interviewed twice), including representatives from the 
private sector, inter-governmental organisations, the public sector and various types of 
not-for-profit organisations active in the area of rural electrification in Kenya and the 
East African region more generally. Additional details concerning interviewee selection 
are provided in section 3.2.4. The three mini-grids were selected due to three key 
factors: at the time of the field visit they had all been operational for over one year; they 
included community-based as well as private sector ownership models; and while they 
were similar in terms of the source of electricity (all involving some combination of 
solar PV, wind and diesel backup), the metering and payment collection technologies 
differed greatly among them. Section 3.2 provides a more in-depth introduction to the 
case studies as well as the rationale for choosing Kenya as the target country.  
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In the final theory application phase of the methodology, the empirical data 
collected in the second phase was analysed through the lens of the two theoretical 
frameworks developed in phase one and presented in chapter 2 above. Namely, enabling 
conditions for collective action and bundles of property rights were identified in order to 
determine the role of modern metering and payment technologies in the sustainable 
management of mini-grids, as well as the scope of non-technical, socio-cultural 
institutional interventions in addressing operational challenges. The results of applying 
this theory led to further theory development. Each of these three methodological 
phases is described in more depth below. 
 
3.1 Phase 1 – Theory Building 
 
The first phase of the research conducted in the preparation of this thesis consisted 
of the literature review as well as theory selection and development or refinement 
presented in chapter 2. After identifying the socio-cultural gap in the literature and 
identifying the common-pool resource characteristics of electricity in a mini-grid, a 
thorough review of property rights theory and theories of collective action was 
conducted in order to arrive at suitable theoretical frameworks for the analysis of factors 
affecting the sustainable management of pro-poor mini-grids in rural Kenya.  
In a first analytical step, the theory of bundles of property rights was applied to the 
context of isolated mini-grids, specifically taking into consideration the effect of 
prepaid meters and tariff collection technology using mobile money on the allocation of 
property rights and hence the assumption of roles within the mini-grid. Hypothesising 
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that these technologies can only solve some, but not all, of the operational-level 
challenges, the theory of enabling conditions for collective action as collated by 
Agrawal (2001) was chosen as a suitable theoretical framework in order to determine 
the possibility of non-technical socio-cultural or institutional interventions to address 
major operational challenges. 
The refinement of this theoretical framework of enabling conditions for collective 
action in the presence of a common-pool resource for the application to the context of 
sustainable management of pro-poor mini-grids in a developing country represents the 
first major contribution and analytical step presented in this thesis. For the first time in 
the academic literature, each enabling condition listed in Agrawal’s (2001) framework 
has been systematically considered in order to determine its applicability to the context 
of operational challenges in a rural mini-grid. The resulting refined framework of those 
enabling conditions most applicable to the analytical focus of this thesis presents an 
original contribution to theory building. This theory was then used to inform the 
research design for the second phase on empirical data collection. 
 
3.2 Phase 2 – Empirical Data Collection 
 
The empirical data for this thesis was collected in Kenya during two separate field 
trips between May, 2014, and March, 2015, over a total period of 10 weeks. Kenya was 
selected as the target country for this analysis due to three key factors. First of all, 
Kenya has been a leader in East Africa in developing its solar PV market, ahead of 
Tanzania and Uganda, for example, and can generally be seen as taking a leading rather 
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than lagging role in developing energy policy in the area (Hansen et al., 2015; 
Ondraczek, 2013). This means that there not only exists a relatively large number of 
experts with many years of experience in rural electrification in Kenya, but also that 
electrification models that have been shown to work in Kenya may also be capable of 
adaptation to other contexts in East African countries. Secondly, Kenya has experienced 
a rapid and widespread deployment of SHSs in the last five to seven years, leading to a 
wealth of learning on the deployment of solar PV in Kenya (see e.g. Byrne, 2011; Byrne 
et al., 2014), and a comparatively well-developed domestic market for solar PV (Hansen 
et al., 2014). Finally, Kenya has over a decade of experience with rural mini-grids, 
originally in the form of community-based mini-grids for the most part (i.e. donor-
funded and owned and operated by the community), which have experienced varying 
degrees of success and sustainability (Kirubi, 2009; Maher et al., 2003; Yadoo, 2012). 
These three factors further strengthen the case for Kenya as a target country, because 
there are a number of relevant cases of successful and failed rural electrification projects 
based on mini-grids, and hence a solid base of experienced experts from which to 
sample interviewees. Furthermore, Kenya has seen an acceleration of the involvement 
of the private sector in the financing, deployment and operation of rural mini-grids in 
recent years, and there now are an estimated 20 to 30 privately-owned, rural mini-grids 
in operation in Kenya (as has been detailed in chapter 1). These private sector mini-
grids all rely on advances in metering and payment collection technologies for their 
energy delivery models. Kenya therefore has a uniquely deep and broad history of mini-
grid development in East Africa, if not sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, and therefore is 
the ideal target country for this analysis. The potential pool of expert interviewees and 
case studies, from which to sample for the empirical research conducted for this thesis, 
is large enough that a sample that is representative of the entire pool, can be selected 
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without having to contact every relevant interviewee and visit every potentially relevant 
case study site.  
A 10-week period of field work was conducted, including time spent in Nairobi 
(hosted by the African Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS)) and in Kisumu in 
Western Kenya. Three field trips were also made to three different operational mini-
grids. Table 3.1 provides a description of the key characteristics of each mini-grid. This 
included two visits made during a separate period of field-based research in 
collaboration with, and with logistical support from, the Solar Nano-grids (SONG) 
project, a research project funded by the the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences 
Research Council and led by the University of Loughborough in partnership with 
Grameen Shakti, Caribsave-Intasave and the United International University in 
Bangladesh (Khan and Brown, 2014).  
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Table 3.1 - Case Study Characteristics 
Name Kitonyoni 
Location Makueni County, Eastern Province 
Operational since 2012 
Owner Cooperative, donor-funded 
Operator Cooperative and University of Southampton E4D 
Generation technology Solar PV with diesel backup generator 
Generation Capacity 14 kWp PV and 37 kW diesel (diesel never run at time of visit) 
Metering technology Post-paid meters and prepaid meters using scratch cards 
Types of customers Public facilities (e.g. clinic and school) and small businesses 
Name Mageta Island 
Location Lake Victoria, Siaya County, Nyanza Province 
Operational since 2013 
Owner Private company 
Operator Private company with local employee 
Generation technology Solar PV, single wind turbine, diesel backup generator 
Generation Capacity 5 kWp 
Metering technology Prepaid meters with mobile-enabled payment 
Types of customers Small businesses, some with households attached 
Name Olosho-Oibor 
Location Ngong, Kajiado County, Rift Valley Province 
Operational since 2009 
Owner Community-based organisation, donor-funded 
Operator Community-based organisation 
Generation technology Solar PV, single wind turbine, diesel backup generator 
Generation Capacity 10 kWp wind and solar, 10 kW diesel backup 
Metering technology flat fee, unmetered 
Types of customers Public facilities (e.g. clinic and school) and small businesses 
 
Source: author  
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As can be seen from their key characteristics, the three mini-grids visited are quite 
similar in size as well as the electricity generation technology used. However, they 
demonstrate a broad variety of institutional setups (community-based organisation, 
cooperative and private operator), as well as a range of metering and tariff collection 
technologies. Given the focus of this thesis on the role of metering and payment 
collection technology and the institutional arrangements within the mini-grid, these 
three case studies represent a useful sample of mini-grid based energy delivery models 
currently in operation in Kenya. This is because they exhibit the kind of contrasting and 
deliberate comparisons that Yin et al. (2006) suggest as one of the possible criteria for 
multiple case study selection, for example, between metering technologies used or 
ownership structures. During the visits to the three mini-grids, detailed hand-written 
notes were taken throughout the day, which were later used to compose more detailed 
memoranda. The following sections provide more background information on each of 
the systems, informed by these memos. Figure 3.2 shows the location of all three mini-
grids. 
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Figure 3.2 - Map of Field Visit Locations 
 
      Map Data ¤ 2016 Google 
 
3.2.1 Kitonyoni 
The Kitonyoni community-based mini-grid is located approximately four hours 
southeast of Nairobi in Makueni county. It was installed in 2012 by the University of 
Southampton as the first implementation site for the Energy for Development (E4D) 
project. The power generation consists of 56 solar PV panels for a total of 14 kilowatt 
peak (kWp) of generating capacity and a battery bank of 24 batteries, as well as a 
37 kW diesel backup generator. Figure 3.3 shows pictures of the central installation site. 
The PV panels are located on the roof, which is also used to collect rainwater in a 
cistern. The container on the left contains the battery bank, load control equipment and 
the diesel backup generator. The container on the right contains the office of the 
management committee as well as a charging station. It has been built on land that has 
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been set aside by the community and registered with the county in the name of the 
cooperative. The mini-grid extends to the school, charging station, dispensary, market, 
church and some businesses (tailoring and ironing, barber shop, hardware store, etc.) 
within a radius of 200 metres, but does not include any households. As part of the 
community engagement process, Southampton helped the community establish a 
cooperative which is tasked with the operation of the mini-grid. The cooperative 
currently has 190 members, a management committee and a supervisory committee. 
The management committee is tasked with organising the day-to-day maintenance of 
the mini-grid (mainly cleaning the PV panels), selling the prepaid scratch cards used to 
load credit on to the prepaid meters located in the businesses, collecting the tariffs from 
public facilities that are connected through post-paid rather than prepaid meters, such as 
the dispensary and church, and operating the central charging stations where small 
portable appliances such as mobile phones and LED lanterns may be charged for a fee.  
 
Figure 3.3 – Central Installation in Kitonyoni 
  
Source: author 
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 At the time of the visit, however, the actual load control and balancing of supply 
and demand in the system was done remotely by the University of Southampton using 
mobile network data transmission. The plan was to slowly transfer management to the 
cooperative as management capacity increases. Interestingly, the national grid was 
extended past the community shortly after project completion. Figure 3.4 shows a 
picture of the national grid running past the mini-grid. Yet the community decided 
against connecting to the national grid, because they expected the mini-grid to be more 
reliable than the national grid and they felt a certain sense of community pride in their 
system. Furthermore, the fee to connect to the national grid of approximately 35,000 
Kenyan Shillings (KSH) proved to be unaffordable for most community members. At 
the time of the visit, no member of the community had been connected to the national 
grid.  
 
Figure 3.4 – National Grid Passing Kitonyoni Mini-Grid 
 
Source: author 
National Grid 
Mini-Grid 
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3.2.2 Olosho-Oibor 
The Olosho-Oibor community-based mini-grid is located in Ngong county, 
approximately two hours southwest of Nairobi. The mini-grid was constructed in June, 
2009, by the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) in order to 
electrify the dispensary, which serves approximately 8,000 people in the area, the 
school with 400 students and the church, a focal point for the local community, which is 
quite dispersed due to the pastoral nature of their livelihood. The system originally 
consisted of 3 kWp of PV with a battery bank, a 3 kW wind turbine with a separate 
battery bank and a 10 kW diesel generator, which can charge both battery banks. At a 
later stage, the UNDP contributed another 4 kWp of solar panels to the system. The 
community contributed approximately KSH 60,000 ( USD 580) in capital as well as 
‘sweat equity’ (i.e. manual labour) by helping to bury the distribution lines 
underground, for example. Figure 3.5 shows a picture of the wind turbine on the left as 
well as the two buildings housing the mini-grid components on the right. The building 
in the centre of the image houses the shop and charging station and the second stage of 
4 kWp on the roof. The building on the right contains the battery bank, load control 
equipment, diesel backup generator and the office of the manager, as well as the first 
stage of 3 kWp on the roof.  
The mini-grid is owned and operated by a community-based organisation that was 
set up for this purpose with the help of UNIDO at the time the mini-grid was 
constructed. The community-based organisation employs a dedicated local manager, 
who is tasked with collecting the tariffs and conducting basic maintenance and repairs. 
The main income streams to the community-based organisation are from electricity 
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sales to a small shop, a barber shop, as well as the public facilities in the village such as 
the school, church, dispensary and a rescue centre for girls escaping their communities 
to avoid female genital mutilation. All of these connections are unmetered and pay a flat 
fee per month. In addition, the mini-grid also supplies a charging station, where 
customers can charge their telephones or LED lanterns for a flat fee.  
 
Figure 3.5 – Central installation at Olosho-Oibor 
   
Source: author 
 
The general reliability of the system, as well as its suitability to the environment, 
appears to be very good. Strong winds at night, coupled with sunshine during the day 
for most of the year, mean that the diesel generator is rarely needed. The local manager 
estimates that repairs are only required two to three times per year and that on average it 
takes between one to five days to have an expert arrive to perform the repair. A major 
problem, however, is that no one in the community knows the fair price for these repairs 
and the income stream from the mini-grid operation barely covers such operating costs. 
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As a result, the community-based organisation has repeatedly been obliged to find 
further donor money in order to finance repairs of the wind turbine, for example. At the 
time of the visit, the community-based organisation was in discussions with the United 
Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) to install a further PV 
bank to be used for pumping water, together with meters in order to improve the 
revenue stream. Despite these problems, the community-based organisation has shown 
considerable resilience in operating the mini-grid continuously since 2009. 
 
3.2.3 Mageta Island 
Mageta is an island in Lake Victoria, approximately five kilometres off the Kenyan 
coast and just east of the Ugandan border. SteamaCo, then called Access:Energy, 
electrified one of the fishing villages on Mageta in 2013 as a pilot for a privately owned 
and operated mini-grid in rural Kenya. This private ownership stands in contrast to the 
community ownership of the previous two case studies, and therefore will serve to 
illustrate the institutional differences between these two approaches in the empirical 
analysis of chapters 4 and 5 and the subsequent discussion in chapter 6.  
The system consists of approximately 5 kWp solar PV as well as a small (~0.5 kW) 
wind turbine and a diesel backup generator. All connections are metered and prepaid 
using the widespread Kenyan mobile payment system M-Pesa, enabling customers to 
top up their prepaid electricity meters by transferring funds via SMS. All the meters are 
centrally located, with an individual wire running to each end user in order to prevent 
any tampering with the meters. The system is monitored remotely, using an SMS-based 
data transfer protocol, yet SteamaCo also employs a local manager who is responsible 
for routine maintenance such as cleaning the PV panels, as well as acting as a first point 
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of contact for its customers. Figure 3.6 shows the central generation installation on the 
left, the centrally located prepaid meters in the centre and the individual wires running 
to each customer on the right. 
 
Figure 3.6 – Central Installation at Mageta Island 
   
Source: author 
 
The Mageta system has approximately 50 customers, almost all of whom are small 
businesses, such as telephone charging stations, bars, a video hall, a barber shop and a 
small grocery store. Only a few households are connected to the grid, yet it should be 
noted that most businesses are attached directly to households, so wherever a business is 
connected, the adjacent household also has access to electricity. Demand for electricity 
is strong, and SteamaCo has expanded the system since its construction in 2013. Even 
so, with 50 connections sharing a total of approximately 40 kWh of generation capacity 
on a sunny day, electricity is relatively scarce and as a result, quite expensive. 
According to the manager, the typical business pays 200 KSH (approximately USD 
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2.00) per day and the few connected households pay approximately 400 KSH per week. 
By comparison, there is a 600 KSH flat fee per month in Olosho-Oibor, for example. As 
a result, however, the Mageta mini-grid is able to finance all of its operating costs out of 
its revenue stream, as well as any repairs that have been necessary. Nevertheless, 
despite complaints, even by the manager himself, that electricity currently is too 
expensive, it is clearly apparent that the availability of reliable electricity has presented 
new business opportunities for the local community in addition to the traditional 
economic activity, which is dominated by fishing. 
 
3.2.4 Interviewee selection and interviews 
In addition to these field visits of operational mini-grids in rural areas of Kenya, 27 
expert interviews lasting 45–60 minutes were conducted in Nairobi and Kisumu. The 
interviewees were selected based on their experience with all aspects of designing, 
financing, deploying, operating and owning rural mini-grids. The initial set of potential 
interviewees was contacted, then further expanded using a guided (or exponential 
discriminative) snowball sampling technique. During the first field visit in May, 2014, 
which also included the field visits to Kitonyoni and Olosho-Oibor, nine interviews 
were conducted with a focus on interviewee familiarity with those two projects as well 
as the history of community-based mini-grids in Kenya. During the second field trip, 
which included the visit to Mageta in early 2015, a further 18 interviews were 
conducted, which, in addition to the same topics as in the first round of interviews, also 
focused on the role of the private sector in rural mini-grid deployment in Kenya. Table 
3.2 describes the professional background of each of the 24 anonymised interviewees 
(three interviewees were interviewed twice due to their familiarity with several of the 
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case study sites as well as relevant experience in the community-based and private 
sectors).  
Table 3.2 – Interviewees and types of organisations 
Interviewee 1 Private sector energy 
consultancy 
Interviewee 13 Private sector, off-grid 
electricity developer 
Interviewee 2 Non-profit organisation, 
energy access focus 
Interviewee 14 Private sector, off-grid 
electricity developer 
Interviewee 3 Non-profit organisation, 
energy access focus 
Interviewee 15 Donor agency 
Interviewee 4 Academia Interviewee 16 Private sector, off-grid 
electricity developer 
Interviewee 5 Private sector provider 
of mini-grid technology 
Interviewee 17 Non-profit organisation, 
rural development focus 
Interviewee 6 Private sector, finance Interviewee 18  Intergovernmental 
organisation 
Interviewee 7 Private sector, solar PV 
technology provider, 
formerly public sector 
Interviewee 19 Private sector, off-grid 
electricity developer 
Interviewee 8  Private sector energy 
consultancy 
Interviewee 20 Private sector, energy 
consultancy 
Interviewee 9 Private sector, finance Interviewee 21 Private sector, off-grid 
electricity developer 
Interviewee 10 Non-profit organisation, 
rural development focus 
Interviewee 22 Non-profit organisation, 
energy access focus 
Interviewee 11 Non-profit organisation, 
energy access focus 
Interviewee 23 Non-profit organisation, 
rural development focus 
Interviewee 12 Non-profit organisation, 
energy access focus 
Interviewee 24 Public sector 
 
The interviews were conducted using a semi-structured approach in the form of 
‘depth interviews’ (Oppenheim, 2000), in which conversation was permitted to flow 
within a clearly defined range of topics guided by a catalogue of questions. This 
catalogue of questions was directly informed by the theoretical frameworks. This meant 
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that the interviews aimed to elicit first hand experiences with different institutional 
arrangements in mini-grids, technical as well as non-technical responses to operational 
challenges and the role of different metering and payment collection technologies, in 
addition to questions concerning the interviewee’s professional background and 
experiences with rural electrification in Kenya and questions regarding the major 
operational challenges faced in rural mini-grids. The catalogue of interview questions 
comprised 34 questions, presented in Annex 1, from the following seven topics: 
1. General Background (current professional role, past experience with 
electrification and mini-grids) 
2. General factors affecting long-term sustainability of mini-grids (key 
operational challenges, ways of balancing supply and demand, advantages 
and disadvantages of community-based and private business models) 
3. Challenges specific to community-based mini-grids (successful or 
unsuccessful cases and their institutional setups, conditions in community 
affecting chances for long-term sustainability) 
4. Challenges specific to private sector mini-grids (successful or unsuccessful 
cases, interaction with the community) 
5. Institutional interventions to challenges (the role of rules, how they are 
determined, monitored, enforced and sanctioned, and how they evolve over 
time) 
6. Technical interventions to challenges (the role of current limiters, post-paid 
and prepaid meters and mobile money, their impact on interaction and 
relationship between mini-grid operator and end user) 
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7. The A-B-C (Anchor, Business, Community) of consumer groups (challenges 
of serving each consumer group and their influence on the long-term 
sustainability of the mini-grid) 
Of course, as these were guiding questions for semi-structured interviews, not every 
interviewee was asked each of the 34 questions from the catalogue. However, it was 
ensured that each interview included questions from each of the seven subsections. The 
only exceptions were the two sections specific to private sector and community-based 
mini-grids. If an interviewee was only familiar with one of those ownership models and 
had no significant experience with the other, the questions from the section on the 
unfamiliar ownership model were discarded.  
When explicit consent was given (26 out of 27 times), the interviews were recorded 
and detailed notes taken immediately after the interview. The recordings and notes were 
also shared with the interviewees, in order to provide them the opportunity to review 
what had been said and, if necessary, make changes. None of the interviewees, 
however, requested that the notes be changed or for sections of the recordings to be 
discarded. In a final step, the interviews were transcribed for later analysis.  
 
3.3 Phase 3 – Data Analysis 
 
In the first analytical step, the key operational challenges faced in rural mini-grids in 
Kenya were determined based on first-hand observations during the field visits and 
evidence collected during the interviews. The theory of bundles of property rights was 
then used to determine the effect of prepaid metering technology on the allocation of 
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property rights in a mini-grid and how this technology provides potential solutions to 
certain operational challenges. The next analytical step determined which operational 
challenges still remained despite these technologies. In addition to interview evidence, 
the fact that Olosho-Oibor is an unmetered system, Kitonyoni uses prepaid meters with 
locally sold scratch cards and Mageta uses prepaid meters with mobile-enabled payment 
greatly aided in determining which operational challenges are difficult to address using 
these technologies.  
In the next stage of the empirical data analysis, the refined theoretical framework of 
enabling conditions for collective action was operationalised in a coding methodology 
in order to determine to what extent this theory can provide a basis for the development 
of non-technological institutional responses to the remaining operational challenges. In 
order to achieve this the enabling conditions for collective action presented in the 
refined framework in Figure 2.3 have been used as codes for a thorough analysis of the 
interview transcriptions. This process allowed the extraction of relevant quotes from the 
interviews for each of the enabling conditions, which will be discussed in detail in 
chapter 5. As an example this coding process identified nine quotes relating to the code 
‘simple and locally devised rules’ and seven quotes relating to the code ‘gradual 
changes in demand’. This step of the methodology therefore used an initial coding 
technique with a focus on descriptive coding, which assigns topics to text passages 
(Saldaña et al., 2013). 
In a final step, the findings from the application of the two theoretical frameworks 
were consolidated, and it was determined how the two frameworks interact, to what 
extent they can inform the development of local management institutions and what 
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additions and augmentations to the theoretical frameworks are supported by the 
empirical evidence. 
 
3.4 Limitations and Potential Weaknesses of Methodological 
Approach 
 
Due to the financial and temporal constraints of independent doctoral research, the 
methodological approach taken in this thesis inevitably has some limitations and 
potential weaknesses. First and foremost among these is the limited number of case 
studies visited. This is largely due to time and cost limitations, as well as difficulties in 
obtaining detailed information concerning operating mini-grids. It proved particularly 
challenging to identify people familiar with certain mini-grids that appeared in the 
literature or project reports. As a result, it was often not possible to gain simple, yet 
reliable and specific information that would be required to organise a visit to the mini-
grid. In some cases, simply being informed of a reliable location and description of how 
to get there proved very difficult. Hence, the mini-grids visited cannot be claimed to be 
representative of the whole mini-grid sector in Kenya, let alone rural East Africa in 
general. Nevertheless, given their characteristics, they provide useful data to test the 
applicability and usefulness of the two theoretical frameworks operationalised in this 
thesis in this new context of rural mini-grids. In addition, the expert interviews allowed 
the insights generated from the field visits to be compared against and supplemented by 
experiences with other community-based and private sector mini-grids in the country. 
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In addition to these sampling difficulties, the visits to the two community-based 
mini-grids, which were organised together with the SONG project, were planned long in 
advance and in close collaboration with the local management. The managers and 
operators as well as the community members were aware of the timing of the visit, and 
the management provided a guided tour of both grids. This means that the conditions 
observed during the visits may not have been fully representative of everyday operation. 
The conversations with local management and some community members, however, 
still provided rich information concerning operational challenges. In the case of Mageta 
Island, this limitation was less relevant as the visit was organised at short notice, i.e. the 
management learned of the visit on the same day. The visit was guided by the local 
operating manager, who spoke very openly concerning the limitations of the system. 
Observation of normal everyday operation and short conversations with some 
community members regarding their experiences with the mini-grid were also possible 
without the manager as a permanently present guide. Due to monetary and time 
constraints, it was also not possible to conduct household surveys. Since the intention 
was not to gather ethnographic data or statistically significant survey outcomes, but to 
explore the usefulness of the two theoretical frameworks, the empirical evidence 
gathered on mini-grid operation proved sufficient to fulfil the primarily theoretically 
oriented goal of the thesis.  
The biggest limitation of the interview process is the almost complete lack of 
interviewees from the government or the state utilities. Despite repeated attempts to 
establish contact with officials at the Kenya Rural Electrification Agency (REA), the 
Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) and the Ministry of Energy (MoE), it proved to 
be very difficult to get a representative from any of these organisations to agree to an 
interview. This omission, however, is not a significant concern in relation to the focus 
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of the thesis on the local operational challenges that relate to mini-grids, as opposed to 
the broader policy environment. This is reflected in the exclusion of the external 
environment from the theoretical framework of enabling conditions. The focus of this 
thesis is on mini-grid-level operational challenges and methods of overcoming them, 
rather than those created, for example, by a lack of regulatory clarity. 
Generally speaking, the interviewee selection was based primarily on research of 
current and past mini-grid projects in Kenya as well as organisations involved in all 
stages of their implementation, but it also relied on snowballing. This means that any 
selection bias introduced in the original selection of interviewees tends to be 
perpetuated. However, by interviewing experts from a variety of sectors, including 
private developers, non-governmental and inter-governmental organisations, donors, 
development consultancies and think tanks, it was still possible to triangulate among 
different points of view and experiences in order to arrive at conclusions that are less 
likely to be biased towards one particular point of view than if fewer individuals from 
less diverse backgrounds had been interviewed.  
Another problem inherent in an interview-based research design is that it tends to be 
difficult to encourage interviewees to discuss failure. Yet often the most interesting 
lessons can be learned from failure. Nevertheless, useful information regarding failed as 
well as successful Kenyan mini-grids could be gathered by guaranteeing the 
interviewees’ anonymity, allowing conversation to flow freely and building trust 
throughout the interview. Interviewees were then directly encouraged at the later stages 
of the interviews to discuss failures that they had witnessed in the mini-grid sectors. 
However, it should be noted that interviewees limited their willingness to discuss 
failures to former rather than current employers or projects in most cases. 
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Finally, interviewing local practitioners and experts, i.e. foreign elites,  as a white, 
western researcher brings with it a certain positionality. In most cases the interviewer is 
seen as an outsider and thus the information provided to the interviewer might be self-
censored in order to project a particular image from the inside onto the outside world. 
However, as for example Herod (1999) has noted, being an outsider can also “provide 
the opportunity for small-talk at the beginning of an interview which can operate as an 
ice-breaker, or it may mean that people feel less threatened than if they were dealing 
with a local researcher and they may therefore be more forthcoming with sensitive 
information and the like” (pg. 325). While this positionality is unavoidable when 
conducting expert interviews it is important to keep it in mind when analysing the 
research findings.  
All of these methodological limitations, in particular those concerned with the depth 
and breadth of the data collected during the field visits to existing mini-grids, do not 
fundamentally impact the value of the research presented in this thesis, however. The 
emphasis of this thesis is very much on exploring the potential relevance of the new 
application of property rights and common-pool resource management theory to mini-
grid management, as opposed to providing a definitive, empirically-based assessment of 
the specific challenges of mini-grid management in relation to specific case studies. 
This theoretical testing is therefore what defines the methodological emphasis on 
interviews with individuals with broader experience of mini-grid management, as 
opposed to an emphasis on detailed case studies or embedded ethnographic observation. 
Moreover, the work undertaken in this thesis provides a solid basis for studies that can 
use the theory developed and preliminarily tested in this thesis to design more 
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empirically-focused studies in future (as outlined in more detail in the concluding 
chapter of this thesis).  
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Chapter 4  - The Allocation of Property Rights in Mini-
Grids 
 
This chapter examines the allocation of bundles of property rights within mini-grids 
by discussing the impact of different types of metering and payment collection 
technologies that are currently being used on the major routine operational challenges. 
This will be followed by a consideration of the effect of these technologies on the 
allocation of property rights to different entities (for example private companies or 
community-based organisations) and the resulting property rights regimes within mini-
grids. This analysis is underpinned by empirical data from the three case studies and 
expert interviews. Based on these data, the analysis provides the first evidence of the 
potential usefulness of a management platform as introduced in section 2.6. This could, 
for example, bring together the private owner/proprietor and the community represented 
by a community-based organisation, a novel concept that is discussed in considerably 
more depth in chapter 6. The analysis concludes by suggesting that there are remaining 
operational challenges that cannot easily be solved through technological interventions, 
but rather require a careful and systematic application of theories of collective action in 
order to arrive at innovative institutional arrangements to overcome them. The chapter 
begins by considering some of the advantages and disadvantages of different metering 
and payment collection technologies and their impact on the operational sustainability 
of mini-grids, based on evidence from case studies and interviews.  
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4.1 Technical Developments and their Impact on Operations 
 
The focus of this section is on the issue of metering and payment collection, rather 
than focusing on the technical challenges of mini-grid operation related to the 
generation technology, its suitability to the context or its maintenance and repair, which 
has been studied in detail (see chapter 2). This focus is important for a number of 
reasons. The challenge of metering and tariff collection was repeatedly identified as a 
critical factor by a number of interviewees and, as identified in section 2.2.1, the impact 
of modern metering and payment collection technologies on operations requires more 
research. Furthermore, the three case studies differ in their technical setup for metering 
and payment collection, thus allowing for a comparative analysis of the impacts that 
different technologies have on routine operations. First, the different metering and 
payment collection technologies are introduced in more detail. 
In a mini-grid, as is the case with every other type of electrical grid (at least in 
theory), there are a number of ways in which customers can be charged for the 
electricity they use. The technologically simplest approach is one in which the amount 
of electricity used, i.e. the number of kWh, is not measured at all. Instead, customers 
pay a fixed weekly or monthly fee for their connection to the grid. In this simplest form 
there is no limit to the power they can draw from the system, other than the technical 
limitations of the grid itself. In order to avoid excessive consumption, current limiters 
(also known as power limiters) may be introduced, which limit the maximum power 
that is drawn by each connection. The most common technical setup worldwide, 
however, are post-paid meters, which measure the number of kWh consumed in a 
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certain time period. These meters are then read either in person or remotely and a bill is 
issued to the customer accordingly. Finally, a utility can decide to install prepaid 
meters, on to which a customer may load a certain number of kWh that can then be used 
at will, similar to minutes purchased on a prepaid mobile phone contract. 
These prepaid meters have become increasingly commonplace in Kenya over the 
last few years, and even the national utility KPLC is changing most of their household 
meters to prepaid.11 Furthermore, there are two ways in which credit can be loaded on to 
the prepaid meter. A consumer can purchase a scratch card at a shop with a code that is 
then used to add credit to the meter. Alternatively, however, the customer can use 
mobile-enabled payment systems to add credit directly to the prepaid meter without the 
necessity of leaving home to purchase a scratch card. In Kenya, SMS-based mobile-
enabled payment is widespread and many who own a mobile phone, which as of 2013 
was almost 80% of Kenyans (Malack et al., 2015), also have a mobile money account. 
By far the most widespread system in use in Kenya is called M-Pesa, and is owned and 
operated by mobile network provider Safaricom, which is the leading provider by 
market share. M-Pesa kiosks, where it is possible to add funds to an M-Pesa account, 
can be found even in the more remote areas of Kenya and were present at every site that 
was visited during the empirical data collection for this thesis. 
Many of the donor-funded, community-based mini-grids established approximately 
5 to 10 years ago in Kenya (e.g. Olosho-Oibor [one of the three case study sites for this 
thesis] and several micro-hydro mini-grids in the Mount Kenya region) were designed 
as unmetered systems with either open access or current limiters. There are some 
                                                 
11 http://kplc.co.ke/img/full/4F8rkuaFUtAD_KENYA%20POWER%20USER%20GUIDE.PDF 
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advantages to this, such as reduced upfront cost (Interviewee 7) and straightforward 
financial forecasting due to the fixed amount paid by each customer in each period:  
‘It makes the business case easier. Everyone’s paying a fixed amount 
of money. In a franchisee type model where the entrepreneur is a 
local this works very well . . .’ (Interviewee 7) 
 
However, the challenges associated with unmetered systems outweigh the benefits 
by far. The biggest challenge in an unmetered system is in effect the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ as introduced in chapter 2. When paying a flat fee for electricity, there is no 
incentive to save electricity, but rather to use as much as possible in order to achieve the 
best price per unit consumed. Because of this implicit incentivisation for 
overconsumption, it is challenging to make an unmetered open-access system 
financially viable. Interviewee 15 provided the following example of an unidentified 
project:  
‘There was a case of a community project that was basically open 
access with a flat rate. . . . But after one year and a half the project 
was not realizing anything so they had to go back to their pockets to 
even have money to repair the system. So a donor had to come in and 
instead of being able to expand the capacity [they] had to introduce 
meters. It was very clear that if they had introduced meters from the 
beginning they would have gotten the right amount of revenue.’ 
(Interviewee 15) 
 
In the case of Olosho-Oibor the situation is similar, although meters have not been 
retrofitted there. The local technician, who is employed by the community-based 
organisation, reported that in the past, whenever there was a technical fault and 
 106 
consequently a repair needed, the community-based organisation approached the 
original donor, in this case UNIDO, to receive a donation to cover the cost of repairs. 
This was because the revenue from the flat fees was not enough to cover the operational 
costs and also set up a reserve. Raising the flat fee was also not an option, as this 
requires agreement among the members of the community-based organisation, who are 
themselves customers of the mini-grid. Thus, users were not willing to pay the full 
levelised cost of the electricity, including maintenance and repairs, even though they 
were only paying flat fees for a theoretically unlimited (from their point of view) 
electricity supply.  
Introducing current limiters, even though they improve the excludability of 
electricity as a resource (which is discussed in more depth in section 4.2), does not 
assist in resolving this issue. In fact, according to a number of interviewees 
(Interviewees 2, 5, 7 and 11), current or power limiters add more problems for the most 
part. First of all, current or power limiters constrain users to low-power appliances, 
which is in tension with the aspirations associated with electricity supply: 
‘. . . when you introduce electricity to a rural setting the people might 
start very low — 3 bulbs and stuff like that — but after some time they 
start acquiring appliances and it becomes very difficult to keep 
replacing the load limiter every time somebody buys an appliance.’ 
(Interviewee 11) 
 
Such continual upgrades to the current limiters would be costly as well as extremely 
inconvenient for the customer, who must wait for their current limiter to be upgraded if 
they wish to use more energy-intensive appliances and must also plan for step changes 
in their electrical expenditure, as current limiter upgrades are accompanied by higher 
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flat fees (Interviewee 7). While some limitation on electricity usage would certainly be 
necessary in a system in which supply cannot always meet demand, there are other less 
binary solutions, which are discussed below. In addition to the inconvenience, it is 
likely that some businesses would not be able to operate at all with the limitations 
imposed by current limiters. One such example is a hairdressing business, which is 
popular in rural villages but also energy intensive. A typical hairdryer will draw 
approximately 1000 W of power, whereas the typical current limiter used in a mini-grid 
would only allow approximately 100 W (Harper, 2013). One interviewee observes: 
‘A lot of businesses that do exist in these communities like 
hairdressing, which is very energy intensive. Having some sort of 
current limiter would mean they wouldn’t be able to run their 
business. You really need to know the profile of the businesses that 
will be connected to the grid.’ (Interviewee 2) 
 
This demonstrates the difficulty of operating the mini-grid in such a way that it can 
technically and financially sustain itself, while also keeping in mind the goal of pro-
poor sustainable electricity access. Evidently, current limiters are not well-suited to 
support this goal, as they can hamper economic activity and development if used 
indiscriminately and across all types of end users. Finally, relating to the issue of 
financial sustainability, current limiters do not support a viable business plan, as 
Interviewee 5 observed in comparing current limiters to post-paid meters: 
‘If you are trying to make something financially self-sustaining, 
effectively you are trying to sell your product, which is power. So 
current limiting is not a very good idea. Why would you limit people 
from buying your product?’ (Interviewee 5) 
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Because a current limiter with a flat fee limits the total amount a customer can 
consume in a given period of time it not only ensures that the customer does not use 
more than she paid for, but also limits the customer to this maximum amount, even if 
she is willing to pay for the ability to consume more. In this sense, post-paid meters 
have an advantage, as they do not limit consumption, but encourage people to consume 
more of the product that is being sold, i.e. electricity. Customers are able to consume as 
much electricity as they wish at the time when they need it, provided total demand does 
not exceed the total capacity of the mini-grids. Post-paid meters thereby provide 
convenience compared to current limiters. One interviewee stated: 
‘One of the advantages is encouraging the customers to use 
electricity. From the business point of view this is very good. […] 
After they have consumed some people then find it difficult to pay. So 
you sometimes have many people defaulting.’ (Interviewee 7) 
 
This introduces the obvious disadvantage of post-paid meters. Collecting the money 
from every customer at the end of the month is not just costly and labour intensive, but 
people often find it difficult to pay for the electricity they have consumed. Even without 
the additional costs incurred by following up with customers who are in arrears, a post-
paid meter must be read by a person who goes from door to door, and some homes or 
businesses may be unoccupied at the time of the visit. This applies in particular to 
withdrawal, which must be accomplished through physical disconnection from the 
mini-grid. Furthermore, if a post-paid meter is read monthly, this means that the 
operation of the mini-grid must be financed upfront for the billing period plus the period 
allowed for the payment to be processed, which is typically a period of approximately 
six weeks in total (Interviewee 7). While this is not a problem unique to rural mini-
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grids, the difficulty of collecting payments from customers, especially those in arrears, 
is exacerbated in this context, according to Interviewee 2: 
‘If it is your sister or friend you charge them 10ct per kWh whereas 
the agreed level was 45ct a kWh and because you have that 
relationship it might be more difficult to collect debt compared to 
having a computer that says you can’t have electricity .’ (Interviewee 
2) 
 
This alludes to the fact that prepaid meters, especially in combination with mobile-
enabled payment systems such as M-Pesa in Kenya, can overcome many of these 
challenges by reducing or even completely removing the opportunity for these types of 
conflicts of interest within the community. Furthermore, there are major logistical and 
operational advantages to using prepaid meters, which Interviewee 22 summarised as 
follows: 
‘Prepaid meters with mobile money are a bit of a game changer 
especially for mini-grids because it takes cash collection out of the 
system which is a huge issue. . . . Collecting 10-20 USD a month from 
100 households each month would be a lot of money for an operator 
who maybe makes 200 USD a month. The logistics of moving the 
money around and depositing the money can be very challenging. The 
bank might be 20 km away. Prepaid mobile money avoids a lot of that 
hassle.’ (Interviewee 22) 
 
Interviewee 7 also illustrated how this lack of financial infrastructure not only 
affects the mini-grid owner/proprietor, but also the customer. In this case, the 
interviewee’s father-in-law lived 30 km from the nearest town with a bank, meaning 
that saving money to pay at the end of the billing period was very difficult and involved 
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saving cash at home, where safekeeping the money may be challenging. As a result of 
this lack of financial infrastructure, it would be more customary to spend money as it is 
earned, a point that is raised again in relation to the seasonality of income. However, a 
post-paid metering system does not align with this spending pattern. 
In addition to eliminating the need for collecting payments in person and the 
associated costs, the combination of prepaid meters with mobile money is desirable to 
both the owner/proprietor and the customer because it eliminates the need for financial 
infrastructure such as a bank. This has, however, been replaced by the need for mobile 
network coverage and the presence of M-Pesa agents in the communities. Yet, in areas 
with poor network coverage these problems can be overcome by installing systems 
where customers use mobile money to pay for their electricity while they are in areas 
with good network coverage. Customers receive a code they can then use to add the 
credit to their prepaid meter, which is outside the network coverage area (Interviewee 
22). A further advantage of cashless transactions, according to Interviewee 5, is that 
they greatly reduce opportunities for theft. Cashless transactions using mobile money 
are therefore considerably more desirable than the ‘second-best solution’ (Interviewee 
22) involving scratch cards sold for cash. Compared to meters that can be directly 
prepaid using mobile money, scratch cards involve a number of problems regardless of 
the type of monetary transaction involved in purchasing them, particularly if the goal is 
to scale and replicate the business model: 
‘Trying to get scratch cards to the agents can be incredibly difficult. . 
. . There is a credit issue as well because you typically have to give it 
to the agents on credit and then trying to reclaim that cash from 
maybe 100 agents is a nightmare.’ (Interviewee 2) 
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Prepaid meters are also flexible and allow users to choose when they have money 
available to buy electricity. This exhibits a closer fit with the seasonal nature of the 
income pattern of much of the population in rural areas, especially in communities in 
which agriculture is one of the major economic activities. Prepaid meters provide 
customers an opportunity to purchase electricity in advance, when they have disposable 
income, but does not commit them to a monthly contract like flat-fee business models:  
‘People’s income here is very seasonal. If they are catching fish they 
have money. […] Being able to buy power when you have the money 
and not buy power when you don’t have it just makes sense.’ 
(Interviewee 5, referring to Mageta Island) 
 
As has been mentioned above, saving up for future expenses is difficult, especially 
in rural areas where financial infrastructure is lacking. For example, both Olosho-Oibor 
and Kitonyoni are several hours’ walk from the nearest bank and there is no bank on 
Mageta Island.  
Finally, prepaid meters that return usage data to the mini-grid operator via remote 
monitoring systems allow for more flexible business models and provide a much better 
understanding of the demand patterns within the community, according to Interviewee 
20. These significant impacts of prepaid meters, combined with mobile-enabled 
payment on the operations of a rural mini-grid, also affect the allocation of bundles of 
property rights among the different stakeholders. The next section therefore analyses 
how these different technologies can be analysed from the perspective of property rights 
theory, before the final section of this chapter considers the operational implications of 
this analysis. 
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4.2 Metering Technologies and the Allocation of Bundles of 
Property Rights 
 
 In order to analyse how different metering technologies affect the allocation of 
bundles of property rights within a mini-grid based on the empirical data presented 
above, it is important to reconsider the concept of a common-pool resource and 
associated concept of bundles of property rights. First of all, a common-pool resource, 
as introduced in section 2.5, does not need to be associated with a particular property 
rights regime, such as public, common or private property. In fact, as Ostrom and Hess 
(2007) argue  
‘. . . the world of property rights is far more complex than simply 
government, private and common property. These terms better reflect 
the status and organization of the holder of a particular right than the 
bundle of property rights held.’ (Ostrom and Hess, 2007, p. 15) 
Instead of the somewhat simplistic view of property rights as being private, public 
or common, Ostrom and Hess therefore argue for the classification of the five different 
property rights and associated positions for actors within a resource system set out in 
Table 4.1 below. 
Table 4.1 - Bundles of Property Rights Associated with Positions within a Resource System 
 FULL 
OWNER 
PROPRIETOR AUTHORISED 
CLAIMANT 
AUTHORISED USER AUTHORISED 
ENTRANT 
ACCESS X X X X X 
WITHDRAWAL X X X X  
MANAGEMENT X X X   
EXCLUSION X X    
ALIENATION X     
Source: Ostrom and Schlager (1996, p. 133) 
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Different actors or groups of actors (including a private person or company, a 
community-based organisation or the public sector) can hold different bundles of 
property rights and thus different positions within the same resource system. In 
addition, it should be noted that these property rights can be related to the resource 
system itself (i.e. the physical infrastructure of a mini-grid, such as solar panels, wires, 
meters, etc.) as well as the flow of resource units (i.e. the supply and consumption of 
electricity).  
There are therefore two operational dimensions along which the allocation of 
property rights within a mini-grid can be considered based on the delineation of 
different property rights into operational level rights (access and withdrawal) and 
collective choice rights (management, exclusion and alienation) as defined by Ostrom 
and Schlager (1996). The impact of different metering technologies is an operational 
level consideration, whereas the allocation of management, exclusion and alienation 
rights held by different actors is a consideration at the collective choice level. The 
impact of the different metering technologies discussed in the previous section is 
considered first. 
An open access system such as the one in Olosho-Oibor does not differentiate 
between access and withdrawal rights, meaning the authorised entrant and authorised 
user positions are identical. This basic allocation of property rights is not affected by the 
introduction of current limiters. The current limiter only limits the maximum resource 
flow rate from the resource system to the authorised user, i.e. the maximum electrical 
power that an end user can draw. Nor can a post-paid meter, although in effect 
privatising the resource (which is covered in more depth in section 6.1), affect the 
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allocation of bundles of property rights in and of itself. As long as an end user is 
connected to the mini-grid and is thereby an authorised entrant, she is also an authorised 
user, so long as she pays her electricity bills on time. This is equally true for post-paid 
meters as well as flat fee tariffs. Only if the end user fails to pay the tariffs is he or she 
physically disconnected from the mini-grid by a technician, meaning that the access and 
withdrawal rights are simultaneously revoked.  
With the introduction of prepaid meters (as is the case in Kitonyoni and on Mageta 
Island), this allocation of property rights becomes more sophisticated, as previously 
discussed in section 2.5. Whether a customer connected to the grid is an authorised 
entrant with access rights or an authorised user with withdrawal rights becomes 
dependent on the credit on their meter. Once their credit is exhausted, their withdrawal 
rights are automatically revoked until they have loaded additional credit on the meter. 
However, even if their withdrawal rights are revoked, their access rights remain, as they 
are not physically disconnected from the grid. They can load credit on to the prepaid 
meter and thus regain their withdrawal rights, without having to re-establish their access 
rights to the mini-grid. With the introduction of mobile-enabled payment systems such 
as M-Pesa, this process becomes even simpler, as the end user can regain withdrawal 
rights without even leaving their home or business to buy credit in the form of scratch 
cards. This automation of the allocation of withdrawal rights also means that exclusion 
(of the privatised resource electricity) in the case of prepaid meters is not controlled by 
a proprietor, who may favour relatives or friends within the community despite the fact 
that they are in arrears, but is an automatic process that is straightforward to understand.  
Furthermore, management, being the right (or in this context, the ability) to devise 
operational level rules, is also positively affected by the introduction of prepaid meters, 
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especially due to the availability of highly granular demand data and the ability to 
quickly react to this information. Thus, prepaid meters also facilitate the responsibilities 
of the authorised claimant, a position within the mini-grid that may possibly be held by 
a variety of different actors. This relates to the second dimension along which property 
rights theory can be used to understand mini-grid operations — the allocation of rights 
at the collective choice level.  
The institutional setup of the mini-grid is the major determinant of the allocation of 
collective choice level property rights. The operational-level rights of access and 
withdrawal are, by definition, always allocated to the end users, i.e. the anchors, 
businesses or households which form the different user groups for the purposes of this 
thesis. Meanwhile, collective choice level rights can be held by different entities. In 
Kenya, there are currently three different models in operation: public, private and 
community-based. In each case, all collective choice level rights are typically held by 
one single entity. The Kenyan utility KPLC, which is majority-owned by the Kenyan 
state, is the full owner, proprietor and authorised claimant of public mini-grids, which 
are not the focus of this study, as established in chapter 1. The allocation of property 
rights within each of the latter two categories (private and community-based) can, 
however, be illustrated based on the case study mini-grids. 
Mageta Island is a privately owned and operated mini-grid, meaning that the full 
owner, a Kenyan private company, is also the proprietor and authorised claimant of the 
system. In this position, the private owner decides who holds access and withdrawal 
rights based on their ability to consume electricity and pay for it, and not based on 
community consensus as might be the case in a community-based model. In this case, 
the authorised users are merely clients and any superior property right is held by an 
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entirely separate private entity. In the case of Mageta, the owner has decided to hire a 
local manager to represent it as authorised claimant. In addition to basic maintenance 
such as cleaning the solar PV panels, he can, for example, decide to start the backup 
diesel generator or limit the amount of power available to the grid based on the state of 
charge of the battery bank. Arguably, since he is hired by the private owner and could 
be dismissed, the right of management still rests with the full owner of the system. 
There hence is a clear dividing line in the Mageta Island grid, where everything below 
withdrawal rights in Table 4.1 is held by a private company that is exogenous to the 
community. 
In this respect, Olosho-Oibor is diametrically opposed to Mageta Island in that a 
community-based organisation is the full owner and proprietor of the mini-grid and 
employs a manager who represents it as the authorised claimant. Because the authorised 
users are also involved in the management, exclusion and alienation process through 
their representatives in the community-based organisation, there exists a certain degree 
of overlap between those holding collective choice level rights and those holding 
operational level rights. Importantly, as has been mentioned when introducing this case 
study in section 3.2.2, in reality, the manager is only an authorised claimant because any 
decision of exclusion must be passed through the community-based organisation. Thus, 
Olosho-Oibor represents the prototypical allocation of property rights for a community-
based mini-grid, just as Mageta Island is a prototypical example of a private sector 
mini-grid. 
Kitonyoni, while also a community-based mini-grid, exhibits a slightly more 
complex allocation of property rights. To review, Kitonyoni is fully owned by a 
cooperative with a supervisory committee, which is elected by the members of the 
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cooperative every three years and in effect holds the position of proprietor. The 
authorised claimant managing and operating the mini-grid is a management committee, 
which is established by the proprietor in the form of the supervisory committee. They 
are responsible for running the battery-charging hub, selling prepaid credit to the 
connected customers and maintaining the mini-grid. The University of Southampton, 
which holds the principal investigator role in the project, donated and built the 
Kitonyoni mini-grid. Through remote load management using SMS-based remote 
monitoring technology described earlier, the University also holds some of the 
authorised claimant rights. At the time of the site visit for this research, only 
approximately 1.5 kW of the available 14 kW capacity had been made available for 
consumption within the mini-grid, with the aim of slowly making this capacity available 
as demand in the community grows. Clearly, compared to Mageta Island or Olosho-
Oibor, the institutional arrangement in Kitonyoni is more complex, involving a nested 
structure of entities holding different bundles of property rights. In particular, the 
position of the authorised claimant is in effect held by two entities: the management 
committee formed of community members and the University of Southampton through 
its ability to remotely control the amount of electricity made available for consumption.  
Mageta Island and Olosho-Oibor hence sit at opposite ends of the spectrum of 
allocating bundles of property rights to the community or a private entity. While as a 
private property regime Mageta Island has the advantage of timely and straightforward 
management, the community is simply a customer and hence it does not seem to enjoy 
the same level of local support as Olosho-Oibor, a common property regime. Kitonyoni, 
however, shows that different positions within the property rights regime of the mini-
grid system can be held simultaneously by different types of actors — a finding that 
becomes important throughout the remainder of this thesis.  
 118 
The cooperative in Kitonyoni and the community-based organisation in Olosho-
Oibor can be considered institutions for collective action in the presence of a common-
pool resource, similar to community-based irrigation management institutions that have 
formed the basis for much of collective action theory (Bravo and Marelli, 2008; Ostrom, 
1990, 1992; Sarker and Itoh, 2001; Tang, 1989). The sense of ownership and support 
that this instils can be illustrated by the fact that in Kitonyoni the community remained 
committed to their own mini-grid, despite the arrival of the national grid, because they 
see its direct benefits and it gives them a certain sense of pride. By contrast, a member 
of the community in Mageta set up a small diesel-powered mini-grid as a private 
enterprise, which is now in direct competition with the other grid (see section 5.2. for a 
more detailed discussion of this).  
Three factors therefore provide the first indication that there may be benefits in 
combining private sector with community-based approaches to achieve sustainable 
mini-grid management models. First, the case of Kitonyoni shows that it is possible for 
more than one entity to occupy the position of authorised claimant. Second, the case of 
Mageta Island, as well as the interviewee evidence presented so far, demonstrates the 
benefits of a private sector owner, proprietor and authorised claimant (a private property 
regime) with the necessary technical and financial capabilities for sustainable mini-grid 
operation (this is revisited in chapters 5 and 6). Third, the resilience of the Olosho-
Oibor system (a common property regime), despite its financial and technical struggles, 
demonstrates the benefits of community involvement, which is further supported by 
interview evidence:  
‘Working with them [the community] to find out what they want and 
how much they are going to use is important. In this case they might 
not know the product very well. They know of the product but they 
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don’t know how to use it productively. . . . It absolutely has to be with 
the community because you can’t dictate what they are going to do 
and how they will do it.’ (Interviewee 9) 
‘From the conceptualization of the project you can help train people. 
Give them awareness skills. Let them understand what this system is. 
They didn't call you and tell you that they want you to build a solar 
system in their community. You're coming in to do it. So you must also 
explain to them the advantages of this system over what they are using 
right now. Don't just assume that “it's electricity, they will love it.” 
No. Make them aware what you introduce to them. You are 
introducing change in a community, basically.’ (Interviewee 15) 
 
On the basis of this more sophisticated conceptualisation of bundles of property 
rights informed by insights from the literature on common-pool resource management, 
it becomes possible to consider a carefully designed approach where the position of 
authorised claimant is held by a combination of community-based and private sector 
entities as a means of combining the advantages of both of these models.  
 
4.3 Combining Private and Common Property Regimes 
 
The analysis in the previous section suggests that within the theory of bundles of 
property rights, the role of the authorised claimant could be held by a management 
platform similar to the platform for resource use negotiation suggested by Steins and 
Edwards (1999) in the context of a complex common-pool resource (introduced in 
section 2.6). In the context of a mini-grid, such a management platform could bring 
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together the private sector owner/proprietor and the community represented by a 
community-based organisation. In such a model, the community, through a 
representative entity, would be involved in some aspects of the management and 
operation of the mini-grid, thereby providing a platform not only for interaction 
between the private owner of the mini-grid and the community, but also for essential 
aspects of building capacity and aligning expectations. A few initial findings from this 
chapter can be used to formulate some of the possible benefits, while chapter 6 develops 
the role and property rights position held by such a platform in more depth, and chapter 
5 determines in much more detail which operational challenges it could help to 
overcome. 
In direct response to the interview evidence presented at the end of section 4.2, a 
community-based organisation could be responsible for initiating stakeholder meetings 
with the community in which the private owner and proprietor could explain the plans 
for mini-grid-based electrification in the community, including the potential 
opportunities and, importantly, the limitations of the system. In return, the private 
company could gain a better understanding of how community members wish to use the 
electricity. An important advantage of such a platform for interaction between the 
private owner and the community, however, would be that the process of community 
engagement, which is currently typically only done one during the project development 
stage for a rural mini-grid (e.g. Franz et al., 2014) would not be a one-time snapshot of 
intentions for electricity use in the community. Rather, it could become a continuous 
and dynamic process in which the operator can adapt to the changing needs of the 
community. If the interaction between the community and the private owner is frequent 
and regular, this could allow the private company to proactively avoid operational 
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challenges by working with the community, rather than reacting to problems after they 
have developed. Interviewee 3 makes the following observation: 
‘. . . So the bottom line is, I think, the systems can complement each 
other. I think the sustainability of the private sector approach and the 
strength of the community approach where everybody is actually 
involved, when the two are married you have a better model.’ 
 
The need for interaction among different stakeholder groups is emphasised by this 
conception of a management platform which combines aspects of private and common 
property rights regimes. This relates to the argument made in section 2.4 that electricity 
in a mini-grid exhibits the characteristics of a complex common-pool resource and that 
useful lessons can therefore be learned from applying theories of collective action to the 
problem of electricity as a resource in a closed mini-grid system. This is particularly 
true for those operational challenges that remain despite the use of prepaid meters and 
mobile-enabled payment systems and their many advantages. Chapter 5 introduces these 
persistent operational challenges. By systematically applying the refined theoretical 
framework of enabling conditions for successful common-pool resource management 
developed in section 2.10, this thesis demonstrates how useful non-technical 
institutional responses can be developed by drawing on the set of enabling conditions 
for collective actions that are typically used in the context of other common-pool 
resources, such as water for irrigation. In doing so, it also further explores the ways in 
which a management platform may be able to positively affect the operational 
sustainability of a mini-grid. 
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Chapter 5  - Enabling Conditions for Collective Action in 
Mini-Grids 
 
This chapter represents the second empirical section of this thesis, and demonstrates 
how the refined theoretical framework presented in section 2.10.6 and in Figure 5.1 can 
usefully be applied to structure the analysis of these empirical data and therefore 
structure consideration of sustainable operation of rural mini-grids more broadly. In 
order to achieve this, the chapter considers each of the enabling conditions identified in 
the refined framework, thus demonstrating their relevance to the sustainable 
management of rural mini-grids, and provides examples from the case studies and 
expert interviews to illustrate the importance of each enabling condition for collective 
action. This facilitates a subsequent discussion of factors influencing the long-term 
operational sustainability of mini-grids. 
Throughout this chapter, it becomes clear that the two key operational challenges 
faced by rural mini-grids relying largely on renewable energy sources and, in particular, 
solar PV (as is the case in all three case studies), are centred around seasonal variations 
in supply and demand as well as the difficulties involved in serving a variety of 
different consumer groups from a supply of electricity that is much more limited than 
that of a national electricity grid. These challenges differ from the operational 
challenges related to metering and tariff collection because even in the presence of 
prepaid meters, these challenges may remain and thus, arguably, require institutional 
mechanisms to overcome them.  
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Essentially, the challenges are centred on matching supply and demand. One of the 
overarching enabling conditions to consider throughout the chapter is therefore: 
RI1: Match use restrictions to resource regeneration 
Whilst this need to balance supply and demand is common to all electricity grids, 
seasonal fluctuations of supply and demand are particularly challenging in a rural mini-
grid depending largely on solar PV, wind or both for electricity generation. The mini-
grid in Olosho-Oibor has historically struggled with this balancing act. The local 
manager recounted that at times it has been necessary to shut off entire segments of the 
mini-grid in order to avoid draining the batteries too quickly and being required to run 
the diesel generator — a costly backup solution, the operating expenses of which could 
not be covered by the low tariffs charged. During the rainy seasons in particular, it was 
often not possible to fully recharge the battery banks during the day, necessitating such 
load-shedding measures after sunset. The difficulty of load management was further 
exacerbated by a lack of technical understanding of the mini-grid. This is evidenced by 
Source: Author (developed based on framework by Agrawal (2001, pg. 1659)) 
Figure 5.1 - Refined Theoretical Framework 
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the fact that the community bought an electric welder, which they were never able to 
use as the mini-grid cannot supply the power required to operate it. In summary, 
Olosho-Oibor evidently struggles with this enabling condition. 
In Kitonyoni, on the other hand, load management is achieved through two different 
measures. First of all, the system has large amounts of excess generation capacity, i.e. it 
could support considerably more load than is currently demanded by the local 
businesses connected to the mini-grid. While this is a highly effective way to avoid 
overloading and minimise the need for load management, it is also very expensive and 
thus challenging to scale and replicate. This approach can only work in the context of a 
not-for-profit, donor-supported pilot project. Secondly, a team of researchers at the 
University of Southampton remotely control how much of the available electricity 
supply is released for consumption by local businesses, public facilities and the 
charging kiosk. The potential benefits and drawbacks of this arrangement are discussed 
below in relation to conditions GR5 (gradual change in levels of demand) and I1 (rules 
are simple and easy to understand).  
In terms of capacity utilisation, the grid in Mageta Island operates in a different 
mode than Kitonyoni; as demand for electricity grew, the private owner of the mini-grid 
added additional generation capacity to meet demand. However, this capacity was only 
added once it had become clear from detailed data on electricity usage that the demand 
for this additional capacity really existed. In general, the grid in Mageta Island is based 
on a highly technology- and data-driven approach that collects detailed and highly 
granular demand data for each connection. 
Further evidence of the challenges associated with load balancing, especially on the 
demand side, can be drawn from the interviews. Seasonal variations in demand are 
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greatest in areas in which agriculture dominates the village economy. During the harvest 
season, for example, there is considerably higher demand than usual, as people need to 
mill and grind their crops and have more income to spend on electricity. On the other 
hand, during the dry season, especially in January, demand tends to be lower as people 
are cash-strapped, and the seasonality is further exacerbated by the need to pay school 
fees at the beginning of the year. In the majority-Muslim northeast of the country, much 
lower demand occurs during Ramadan, as noted by one interviewee: 
‘For example, in the Northeast most of the people there are Muslim. So 
demand during Ramadan is normally very low compared to the other months . . . 
When the school begins that also affects almost all the payments. Or after the 
holidays when people spend a lot they then struggle in January.’ (Interviewee 7) 
 
Furthermore, demand varies throughout the day, with household demand peaking 
after sunset as demand for lighting increases. An interviewee notes that this peak is 
exacerbated by traditional practices in agricultural areas: 
‘. . . there are challenges because traditionally people tend to do processing in 
the afternoon and in the evening so the time of day affects balancing your power 
load as well.’ (Interviewee 1) 
 
Keeping these challenges in mind, the remainder of this chapter reviews in 
succession each of the enabling conditions of the refined framework developed in 
section 2.10 and reproduced in Figure 5.1, and presents evidence from the case studies 
as well as interviews that speaks to each enabling condition. The subsequent discussion 
in chapter 6 then analyses how this conceptual framework can contribute to 
understanding the role of socio-cultural institutional innovation in the management of 
mini-grids. 
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5.1 Group Characteristics 
 
G5: Appropriate Leadership 
The importance of appropriate leadership — defined by Agrawal as being young, 
familiar with changing external environments and connected to the local elite — in the 
management of a rural mini-grid and the impact on its long-term sustainability and the 
chances for successful collective action becomes evident in a number of empirical 
examples. Again, it should be noted that this definition of appropriate leadership does 
not necessarily fit the reality on the ground. In Olosho-Oibor, for example, the 
community-based organisation officially overseeing the management of the mini-grid is 
comprised of village elders, rather than a young leader, who are respected by the 
community but lack the technical and financial capacity required to operate it 
effectively. This is evidenced by the fact that the community-based organisation could 
not agree on a tariff that would cover the operating and maintenance costs and allow for 
a small reserve for repairs and unplanned maintenance to be accrued. Furthermore, 
according to the local manager, even though there have been customers in arrears, those 
failures to pay have never resulted in permanent or even temporary disconnection. 
Despite these problems, at the time of the visit the local manager had been able to keep 
the mini-grid operational for six years by attracting further donor funding from UNIDO 
and UNICEF. Appropriate leadership is clearly not fulfilling all the requirements within 
the community-based organisation in Olosho-Oibor, as the committee itself is not young 
and their familiarity with the external environment is unclear. However, this case 
illustrates that Agrawal’s definition of appropriate leadership is flawed in this context 
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and shows that a well-trained local manager is equally important and can supplement 
the leadership. 
In the case of Kitonyoni, the research group affiliated with the University of 
Southampton assisted the community in creating and registering a cooperative, which 
owns the mini-grid. This cooperative employs a dedicated management committee, 
which is comprised of three community members. The members include two women 
who have been trained in cooperative management as well as simple day-to-day 
maintenance, such as cleaning the PV panels from dust, as well as operating the kiosk in 
which prepaid scratch cards to load credit on to the meters are sold and where small 
appliances may be charged for a fixed fee. The management board of the cooperative is 
elected by the members of the cooperative every three years, ensuring accountability of 
the leadership as well (see also condition I6 – accountability of officials). This speaks 
once again to the importance of local, dedicated management, further supported by 
evidence from the interviews: 
‘He [the local technician] is the first point of contact to the management. Most 
of the time when you have an issue a wire came loose or very basic things so a 
technical person doesn’t need to go there. . . . You need a leader in the community 
that understands a little bit of the system and makes sense of it.’ (Interviewee 19) 
 
The case of Mageta Island emphasises this point even further. The private 
owner/proprietor employs a local technician who is the first point of contact for 
customers and deals with simple maintenance and repair requests. He also alerts the 
operator of any major repairs that are required. At the time of the visit, for example, two 
of the PV panels had been damaged in a storm and the technician had already ordered 
replacement panels from the owner. This is in stark contrast to Olosho-Oibor, where the 
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local manager complained that, especially in the first few years of operating the mini-
grid, he never knew who to contact in case of a technical fault such as a broken wind 
vane on the wind turbine or poorly performing batteries. It should be noted that 
appropriate leadership, as understood in the enabling conditions for collective action, is 
less concerned with the technological capability of the leadership, but rather the 
legitimacy of the process in which the leadership is selected and their connection to the 
community. In this sense, appropriate leadership is present in all three case studies, 
albeit in most situations in the form of a local manager (or management committee) 
who is connected to the community and an organisation (the University of Southampton 
for Kitonyoni and the private owner for Mageta Island) that is familiar with the 
changing external environment. Only in Olosho-Oibor is the appropriateness of this 
latter entity unclear. The requirement for appropriate leadership to be young is simply 
not realistic in this context. 
This therefore emphasises that appropriate leadership may comprise two entities: 
local management together with a specialised organisation that owns and operates the 
mini-grid. That the specialised organisation has the appropriate technological capability 
as well was a factor that was also raised in the interviews (see also condition I6 – 
accountability of officials): 
‘Having a specialized organization that is looking after several of these sites 
and has the industry know-how is integral. Otherwise it is like a classroom being 
built and then used as a chicken pen. You are just building the infrastructure and 
not creating the ecosystem around it.’ (Interviewee 2) 
 
The importance of a dedicated and specialised organisation in achieving appropriate 
leadership also becomes evident when considering a key challenge in managing a mini-
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grid: tariff setting. There are two potential pitfalls when determining tariffs with the 
direct involvement of the community rather than with a view to financial long-term 
sustainability and viability. In Kitonyoni, for example, tariffs were set based on 
community surveys. According to the village chief, community members were asked to 
predict what they would be able to pay for electricity based on current expenditure on 
other sources of energy (a typical stated preferences approach). They did not want to 
appear poor, so they overstated their ability to pay, resulting in initial tariff levels 
considerably higher than anything the community had previously spent on energy. In 
order to ensure the viability of the system, tariffs quickly had to be lowered to 
accurately reflect the ability to pay i.e. their stated preferences did not match their 
revealed preferences. The other issue with locally-determined tariffs is potential for elite 
capture and conflict, as noted by one interviewee and already mentioned in chapter 4 in 
relation to the benefits of prepaid meters over post-paid meters: 
‘There are mini-grids around that have followed an entirely community-based 
approach particularly for tariff collection and tariff setting. But they run into a 
number of issues because if it is your sister or friend you charge them 10ct per 
kWh whereas the agreed level was 45ct and then because you have that 
relationship it is more difficult to have debt.’ (Interviewee 4) 
 
This experience suggests direct peer-to-peer involvement in tariff payment 
collection could lead to operational difficulties and potential conflicts. Such dynamics 
seemed problematic within the community at Olosho-Oibor, where, as previously 
mentioned, disconnection due to failure to pay had not been enforced in practice. In 
summary, considering the enabling condition G5 (appropriate leadership) has 
highlighted the importance of dedicated management with a local presence and a 
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specialised organisation operating the mini-grid. Together, these two entities represent 
one viable way to achieve appropriate leadership as defined in the enabling conditions.  
 
G6: Interdependence Among Group Members 
Interdependence among group members is considered an enabling condition in 
collective action theory because it increases the likelihood that members will 
collaborate in order to avoid resource depletion and its negative associated effects. The 
empirical evidence in relation to mini-grids with regards to this condition is mixed. In 
Olosho-Oibor the interdependence between group members is more difficult to assess 
and observe due to the largely pastoral nature of the livelihoods in the area than in the 
other case study communities. A less collaborative village economy around electricity 
was observed than was seen in Kitonyoni and Mageta, which are based heavily on 
agriculture and fishing, respectively. It could be hypothesised that if there is indeed a 
comparatively lower degree of interdependence within the community, this could be 
one of the explanatory factors in the community-based organisation’s struggle to 
develop the types of collective action institutions discussed in this thesis. Such 
institutions allow for collaborative uses of a limited amount of electricity and, in turn, 
create opportunities for productive uses. Aside from a small shop, a charging kiosk and 
some of the computers originally donated by UNIDO that are still operational in the 
school, little new activity beyond lighting, least of all economic activity, has developed 
in the community. Nevertheless, other factors related to the group may have aided in 
keeping the grid operational despite all the challenges faced (see also condition G7 – 
heterogeneity of endowments and homogeneity of interests). 
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In this respect, Kitonyoni is a much more active village economy with a variety of 
end uses for electricity ranging from sewing to electronics repair and a hair salon. 
According to the logic of this enabling condition, the community should thus be more 
likely to succeed in acting collectively towards the benefit of the mini-grid. They are not 
only subsistence farmers; rather, they are a complex village economy depending on 
each other for products and services. Mageta Island is quite similar in structure in that 
there is a variety of different end uses, such as electronics shops, bars and a music hall. 
Despite the fact that most of the men in the village are fishermen and the vast majority 
of their income is derived from fishing, some of them have developed side businesses. 
The local manager is a good example of this phenomenon. He still goes fishing and also 
operates a small kiosk selling small electronic appliances. Thus, the community 
members depend on each other and the use of electricity, which, according to the logic 
of the enabling condition, makes them more likely to form collective action institutions 
in order to sustainably manage the mini-grid. Generally speaking though, 
interdependence of group members (condition G6) is closely related to heterogeneity of 
endowments and homogeneity of interests (condition G7). 
 
G7: Heterogeneity of endowments and homogeneity of interests 
As previously mentioned, Kirubi (2009) has considered this particular enabling 
condition in the context of electricity in a mini-grid as a common-pool resource using 
three case studies in Kenya. He found that, in the case of the mini-grids studied for his 
thesis, heterogeneity of interests is positively correlated with the likelihood of 
successful collective action since those with the highest interest in the operation of the 
mini-grid are motivated to encourage collective action to improve long-term operational 
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sustainability. However, most of the evidence from the empirical data collected for this 
analysis points in the opposite direction, in that homogeneity of interest is positively 
correlated with collective action, as suggested by the enabling condition. One example 
of this is pre-existing organisations, which provide a focal point for the community. 
These can be in the form of a faith-based organisation, an agricultural cooperative or a 
similar group, which can, to some extent, form the basis of new institutional 
arrangements around electricity as a resource. According to one interviewee:  
‘I think the best characteristic of a community is actually, in order to make 
these projects more successful, the setting of the community. I found out that if 
there is some kind of structure in the community and not just the political 
structure, if there is a community that is focused on an institution like school or is 
built around a school or a church and there are clear structures there that could 
really support the working of the project.’ (Interviewee 1)  
 
A good example of such an organisation is the Girls’ Rescue Centre in Olosho-
Oibor, which has helped to create a real sense of community in an otherwise relatively 
dispersed pastoral community and is therefore also linked to condition G6 
(interdependence among group members). As has been previously suggested, this helps 
to partially explain the fact that this mini-grid has survived for so many years in spite of 
almost constant ﬁnancial and technical difficulties. Of course there is no guarantee that 
such an organisation will create homogeneity of interest, as community members can 
still pursue different interests in their individual uses for electricity. However, it is 
important to recognise that a pre-existing organisation in the community can foster 
cohesion and create at least some shared interests, which, according to the logic of this 
enabling condition, can help to facilitate the emergence of collective action. In 
Kitonyoni and Mageta Island, such a structure fostering community cohesion and 
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shared interests does not exist. Without conducting a household survey, which was 
beyond the methodological scope of this thesis, it is generally difficult to assess the 
heterogeneity of endowments (in this case understood as different levels of income and 
wealth) as well as the homogeneity of interests. Nevertheless, the interdependence 
among group members, as mentioned under condition G6 above, suggests a certain 
degree of homogeneity of interests in the mini-grids that were the subject of field visits 
and exhibited characteristics of successful management. 
Condition G7 (heterogeneity of endowments and homogeneity of interests) was also 
raised in several interviews, in particular in the context of the overarching challenge of 
serving different consumer groups, namely, anchors (A), businesses (B) and the 
community (C), as defined in the literature discussed in chapter 2. In particular, over-
reliance on one anchor load can be problematic due to the misalignment of interests 
between the anchor load and the other consumer groups. One interviewee observes: 
‘If you put in an anchor [load] of course the anchor will consume 60% of the 
generation. Then you have 40% which the business people have to fight over 
together with the consumers on the ground to get it. So what do you really want to 
do?’ (Interviewee 15) 
 
Interviewee 7, referring to a community-based mini-grid in north-eastern Kenya 
called Mpeketoni, described how this can be a particular problem if the anchor is a 
‘sensitive’ load such as a hospital. In this case, there was an agreement with the 
community that the hospital’s surgeon would inform the mini-grid operator when 
critical surgery was scheduled to be performed so that the operator could ensure all 
other loads that could cause blackouts would be disconnected during that time, thereby 
guaranteeing the power supply during the surgery. This level of heterogeneity of 
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interests is clearly problematic, including if other users depend on the electricity for 
economically productive purposes. This therefore suggests that homogeneity of interests 
is indeed an enabling condition for collective action in a mini-grid. The role of the 
heterogeneity of endowments, however, remains unclear, suggesting that the practical 
relevance of this particular enabling condition (G7) is potentially confounded in the 
context of mini-grids. This raises further questions that may warrant additional research 
in relation to the management of other types of common-pool resources that are 
assumed to be subject to this and other enabling conditions assessed in this thesis. 
 
5.2 Group and Resource System Characteristics 
 
GR2: High Dependence on the Resource System 
The condition of high dependence on the resource system is closely related to 
conditions G6 (interdependence among group members) and G7 (heterogeneity of 
endowments and homogeneity of interests) and highlights a significant empirical 
finding: the importance of small businesses in forming the backbone of the long-term 
financial sustainability of the mini-grid and the creation of economic opportunities in 
the community. As Interviewee 5 stated, 
‘For us, businesses is where it’s at. They use more power, they generate good 
income, the income they can generate by having power is significantly higher than 
without. . . . You are essentially giving people the ability to pay your bills.’  
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However, this demand from businesses does not inevitably appear as soon as 
electricity becomes available. In fact, creating supplementary businesses, such as 
charging stations, agro-processing enterprises, water pumps or even television 
broadcasts of major sporting events, can help generate revenue from productive uses 
that is required for the ﬁnancial sustainability of the mini-grid, to foster economic 
development in the community, or to create demand during daylight hours: 
‘If you diversify your productivity – irrigation, water pumping, commercial – 
it’s better for the existence of the mini-grid. You are producing power but you 
also need someone to take the power in.’ (Interviewee 15) 
 
This idea of diversiﬁed productive uses relates to the concept of a complex and 
multiple-use common-pool resource which was introduced in chapter 2. Electricity, in 
fact, should therefore be considered a multiple-use common-pool resource because it 
can ideally (in terms of its contribution to human and economic development) be used 
for a diversified portfolio of activities. This, in turn, helps create increased dependence 
on the resource, which is an enabling condition for collective action. It could therefore 
be argued that the homogeneity of interests in condition G7 (heterogeneity of 
endowments and homogeneity of interests) should be augmented with heterogeneity of 
uses as an enabling condition for collective action in the context of a mini-grid. This is 
discussed further in chapter 6. Furthermore, such diversification of uses can also help to 
alleviate some of the challenges around seasonality mentioned above, as explained by 
one interviewee: 
‘The fact that some communities are agro-based and they get paid at certain 
times of the month is a really big challenge. What I have seen [is] most of the 
mini-grids are in a place that has some form of regular cash flow. It is probably a 
trading centre so that in addition to the revenues in agriculture there is also 
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revenues in trade or there is a government institution there or a training 
institution and that attracts a certain amount of businesses or people who have 
regular income. And those are the places where you would find these mini-grids 
being successful.’ (Interviewee 1) 
 
Kitonyoni is a good example of a customer base that is diversified beyond agro-
based economic activities and highly dependent on electricity. All of the end users 
connected to the mini-grid, apart from the public facilities (school, church and 
dispensary) use the electricity for productive purposes and are therefore financially 
dependent on it being available and reliable. On Mageta Island, the customer base is 
similarly diversified, although some households are also connected to the mini-grid in 
addition to businesses. One factor that could negatively affect the Mageta mini-grid in 
this context is the emergence of a competing mini-grid in the community. A local 
entrepreneur sells connections to a diesel generator at a fixed, unmetered, daily tariff. 
Even though he only provides electricity during daytime hours, as opposed to 24-hour 
availability of electricity through the mini-grid in the case study, this reduces the 
community’s dependence on the case study mini-grid. On the other hand, competition 
between two electricity providers could be beneficial for the community. The long-term 
effect of this competition remains to be seen, as the diesel-based mini-grid had only 
been installed a few weeks prior to the time of the visit and it appeared it was already 
struggling with reliability.  
While there are many fewer productive uses for electricity in Olosho-Oibor, high 
dependence on the system is still a relevant condition due to the importance of 
electricity for the operation of the community facilities such as the school, dispensary 
and especially the rescue centre for girls. Once more, this also relates to the 
homogeneity of interests discussed as part of condition G7 (heterogeneity of 
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endowments and homogeneity of interests). Generally speaking, it can be concluded 
that high dependence on the resource is an enabling condition present in all three case 
study mini-grids, and a factor that was generally considered to be critical by several 
interviewees, especially in relation to the presence of small businesses and productive 
uses for electricity. Thus, collective action, if necessary, would also be supported by this 
factor. 
In this context, it should be noted that the evidence presented so far also suggests 
that the dependence of households on electricity is much less important to sustainable 
management of the mini-grid than the dependence of productive uses (i.e. micro and 
small businesses) or socially valuable uses (e.g. hospitals or the Girls’ Rescue Centre). 
The households therefore depend on the other loads to make the operation of the mini-
grid sustainable, a point that closely relates to condition G6 (interdependence among 
group members) and that is revisited in the discussion in chapter 6. 
 
GR3: Fairness in Allocation 
The perception of fairness in allocation of electricity is a critical factor, in particular 
in those cases where demand for electricity exceeds the available generation capacity. In 
this context, fairness is not an absolute term, meaning that every single user gets exactly 
the same amount, but rather it refers to the perception of fairness in the context of the 
particular community structure, something that Agrawal (2001) also notes. Of the three 
mini-grids visited, the problem of excess demand is most pronounced in Olosho-Oibor 
where, as has been previously mentioned, branches of the mini-grid must at times be 
switched off in favour of others. However, since this allocation is decided upon by the 
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community-based organisation, which is respected by the community (although its 
demographic representativeness of the entire community is unclear), it appears to be 
considered by the community as fair. This overlaps with the issues respecting condition 
G5 (appropriate leadership) and the issues of its legitimacy as well as condition G7 
(heterogeneity of endowments and homogeneity of interests) and its relation to pre-
existing organisations, in the form of the Girls’ Rescue Centre in the case of Olosho-
Oibor. Interviewee 23, who was closely familiar with the project, described the 
allocation process as follows: 
‘. . . during the day they give priority especially to where they were charging 
the telephones and where they have the computers because in the school they 
don't need lighting during the day. Then they have some computers in the staff 
room for school. So as their day goes by maybe in the evening the priority will be 
given even to the hospital because they have one refrigerator they were using and 
they give it priority. So in the evening they want to be using the mobile phone 
charging unit then they also give priority to the rescue centre for the lights and 
maybe some of the students stay for one hour when they need it.’  (Interviewee 23) 
 
This demonstrates a clear, needs-based allocation approach, which prioritises those 
uses that are most dependent on electricity for their planned activities at any given 
point, relating back to condition GR2 (high dependence by users on resource system).  
On Mageta Island, the allocation is based on a purely for-profit model, i.e. 
electricity is allocated simply to those who can pay for it. While the simplicity of this, 
of course, makes management of the mini-grid straightforward, especially when 
combined with prepaid meters and mobile money, it is not a system that necessarily 
results in fair allocation, or rather allocation that is perceived as being fair. This was 
evidenced by the fact that even the local mini-grid manager himself complained that 
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electricity was too expensive. Thus it becomes clear that, given the pro-poor focus of 
this thesis, allocation of electricity should not be based purely on the ability to pay, but 
also take into consideration the needs of different end-users. This is not only true if 
electricity is a scarce resource, as in the case of Olosho-Oibor, but also when deciding 
who to connect to the mini-grid. In Kitonyoni only small businesses and community 
facilities have been connected but no households, as they were mostly located too far 
from the location chosen for the solar PV array. While this is a perfectly reasonable 
decision to make in order to save on the very high costs (both financially and in terms of 
technical losses) of extending a mini-grid by several hundred metres, those community 
members spoken to, including members of the cooperative management committee, 
expressed frustration with this decision, leading to the impression that the allocation 
was not perceived as fair by all community members in Kitonyoni. 
In the allocation of a limited amount of electrical power, this issue of balancing 
financial or economic considerations with actual and perceived fairness in allocation is 
particularly challenging, given the different types of end users: 
 ‘The challenge is basically the amount of power and how much you can give 
each of these categories [anchors, businesses, households] for them to be happy. 
The anchor takes a bigger portion. This is your main consumer. The businesses 
will take second and then the consumer with their basic needs will come third.’  
(Interviewee 15) 
 
This allocation schedule, if an anchor load is present, is entirely rational from a 
business management perspective, in that those customers who can consume the most 
and hence create the most revenue for the mini-grid get the highest allocation priority. 
However, a lack of perceived fairness in allocation can create problems: 
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‘You can even talk to the anchor load and tell them ‘please on this date can 
you reduce your consumption so we avoid disrupting people. Because when you 
disrupt many people they can be dissatisfied. But this one customer you can have 
a deal with. . . . So you want to take care of those who are bringing in a lot of 
money [the anchors] but also those who can make a lot of noise [the 
households].’ (Interviewee 7) 
 
Thus, fairness in allocation is an important enabling condition in mini-grids. This is 
not only the case when electricity is scarce, but also in relation to determining who can 
be connected to the mini-grid and who, for various reasons, might not be able to be 
connected. If either or both of those aspects of allocation are considered unfair by any 
end-user group, it can create conflict and hence make collective action in resource 
management less likely to succeed. 
 
GR4 and GR5: Initial Low Levels of Demand and Gradual Changes in Levels of 
Demand 
Clearly, these two conditions are closely related and are important in the context of 
mini-grids because shocks in demand or step changes in demand patterns can cause 
sudden under-supply, which can overload the mini-grid infrastructure, cause blackouts 
and potentially permanently damage the system. If demand increases more gradually 
there is time to react to those changes and develop load management solutions (see 
conditions I1 [rules are simple and easy to understand] and I2 [locally devised access 
and management rules] below). Furthermore, beyond short-term variations, seasonality 
can also create step changes in demand, e.g. due to increases in disposable income 
during the harvest season or large increases in demand for electricity for agro-
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processing. If these are not anticipated and load management measures developed in 
advance, they can also cause disruptions to the electricity supply. Gradual change thus 
relates not merely to the issue of how electricity usage changes over time, but also the 
predictability of this change (this is also suggested by Agrawal (2001)). If the demand 
changes are not distributed over long periods of time, i.e. several months, they must at 
least be predictable. 
Olosho-Oibor is an example of demand changes that were gradual enough that the 
local management had time to develop the load management schedules mentioned 
above under condition GR3 (fairness in allocation of benefits from common-pool 
resource) in collaboration with the community, despite the fact that the grid never 
earned enough money to invest in system expansion itself. That is, due to the initially 
low levels of demand and gradual rise in demand for electricity in a community that had 
had little to no previous experience with electricity before the installation of the mini-
grid (and hence would not have been able to accurately predict future demand patterns), 
there was enough time for collective action to emerge and develop institutional 
arrangements to overcome the challenges.  
Kitonyoni has pre-empted this problem in a considerably more expensive but highly 
effective manner, by building in large excess capacity and controlling remotely how 
much of this capacity is available for consumption in the mini-grid. In a way, this 
arrangement ensured through outside intervention that initial demand in Kitonyoni was 
low and would only be able to grow slowly, as more capacity was made available. 
Given the importance of low initial levels and gradual change in levels of demand, this 
arrangement is likely to be highly effective in supporting long-term sustainability, at 
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least until demand levels reach the maximum capacity available in the mini-grid. How 
long that may take is difficult to estimate.  
Mageta Island serves as a good example of the difficulty in forecasting demand 
growth. After the initial hub had been installed, which allowed approximately 30 
individual connections, demand for more connections grew faster than anticipated and it 
was necessary to install a second hub with another 20 connections. Yet, even with those 
two hubs there appears to be large excess demand in the community, as evidenced by 
the diesel-based mini-grid set up by a local entrepreneur. Thus, on Mageta Island, 
demand grew rapidly, leading to competition in electricity suppliers rather than the 
emergence of collective action, which, in fact, was not encouraged by the private sector 
institutional arrangement of the mini-grid. 
However, demand growing more quickly than initially anticipated is not an unusual 
challenge to encounter, as testified in the interviews in relation to other private sector 
mini-grids in Kenya: 
‘I couldn’t believe how quickly they figured out to use 2.5 kW . . . Much 
quicker than expected. A question of 6 months.’ (Interviewee 21) 
 
‘In the first one year the growth is very high and then it goes to about 5%. . . . 
When you have a private investor they don’t want to over-invest. . . . When that 
growth comes they [the private sector] might not be able to meet the demand. . . . 
When the demand goes up and you are not matching it the quality of supply goes 
down so the customers complain a lot.’ (Interviewee 7) 
 
In addition to the challenges concerning rapid demand growth, the seasonality of 
demand can create step changes in demand as has previously been discussed with 
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respect to condition RI1 (match use restrictions to regeneration capacity). Smoothing 
those step changes is highly desirable to avoid grid overloading and customer 
dissatisfaction. One potential solution, as suggested by one of the interviewees, may be 
to focus on trading centres, i.e. market towns that are a focal point of economic activity 
in an area where demand may be less seasonal. However, since 70% of Kenya’s rural 
population directly depend on agriculture for food and income (USAID, 2013, p. 5), this 
approach is likely to only have limited reach, particularly in light of the goal of 
universal electrification. Thus, there is a clear benefit from gradual changes in demand 
and, as is the case with many of these enabling conditions when considered in the 
context of a rural mini-grid, the relationship between enabling condition and collective 
action is reciprocal — a gradual change in levels of demand reduces the opportunities 
for dissatisfaction and conflict by allowing time for collective action institutions to 
emerge. But the presence of collective action institutions can also assist in the creation 
of other arrangements, which encourage gradual changes in demand through usage 
rules, another important enabling condition and one with a bi-directional relationship to 
collective action. 
 
5.3 Institutional Arrangements 
 
Institutional arrangements — where institutions are defined loosely, not just as 
specialised organisational structures but also rules, norms and commonly understood 
and accepted practices — are another key area in which concepts borrowed and adapted 
from theories of collective action can be a useful tool in overcoming the types of 
operational challenges faced by mini-grids that are discussed in this thesis. This is 
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particularly true for enabling conditions I1 (rules are simple and easy to understand) and 
I2 (locally devised access and management rules). 
 
I1 and I2: Simple and Easy to Understand, Locally Devised Rules 
Use rules in a mini-grid can be, for example, in the form of type-of-use rules, e.g. 
prohibiting the use of particularly power intensive appliances such as kettles or irons, or 
time-of-day rules, e.g. preventing either certain customers from using power at certain 
times of day, or preventing certain end uses at specified times of day. Such use rules are 
also an important tool in helping the community in understanding the limitations of the 
mini-grid, as Interviewee 15 recounted in relation to a donor-financed, community-
based mini-grid in the Turkana region of Kenya: 
‘We want people to understand that it is not that we don’t want them to use 
power but we want everyone to have access to this power and that you have their 
very basic needs covered within this. Through community awareness people need 
to understand that it’s a smaller system, there is also room to expand it, but it 
wouldn’t now be very prudent to start using heavy machinery that . . . shuts the 
entire system down. . . . Each and every household will already know exactly what 
they will use the power for . . . You will be given an amount of power based on 
your lot.’ (Interviewee 15) 
 
Based on this understanding, the consumers can begin to appreciate the challenges 
of matching supply and demand in a mini-grid. As a result, their expectations are more 
closely aligned with the limitations of the mini-grid and they are more likely to accept 
that occasionally the system can only support basic needs. This also relates to condition 
GR3 (fairness in allocation of benefits from common-pool resource). Through type-of-
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use rules, the limited electricity supply available in a small mini-grid can benefit a 
larger number of people than it could without those rules. One example was described 
by Interviewee 18 in relation to an older community-based micro hydro mini-grid 
(Kathamba in the Central province of Kenya), confirming that such rules are being 
implemented in practice: 
‘I went once to a village where they had something like 1 kW and were doing it 
from a small hydro. These guys had connected 41 homes and I was totally 
surprised. 1 kW, how do you divide that? But they were missing load limiters so 
you went to the houses and found this guy can only use 1 bulb or this guy can only 
use 2 bulbs.’ (Interviewee 18) 
 
Such rules thus can also ensure each community member has access to a similar 
amount of electricity, e.g. by determining that each household must at least be able to 
light their home. Time-of-day rules can also be fairly simple: businesses or community 
facilities are encouraged to operate during the daytime hours, when household 
electricity demand is very low, and discouraged to operate after sunset, when electricity 
is required for household lighting and entertainment and high-power end uses would 
quickly drain and unduly strain the battery banks (Interviewees 5, 9 and 23). More 
generally, these simple rules can be used to inform consumer behaviour that is in 
accordance with the technical speciﬁcations of the grid, as noted by one interviewee:  
‘. . . you can spread the load out throughout the day which major utilities 
around the world are trying to do but in this context you can make a direct 
message to people who don’t yet have electricity consumption habits so they don’t 
have to start with bad ones.’ (Interviewee 9)  
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This demonstrates a clear advantage of mini-grids over larger national grids if 
electricity is scarce and demand exceeds supply at times. While it is very difficult in 
large national grids to coordinate collective action and enforce use rules, the small 
group size of a mini-grid enables the development of use rules and makes enforcement 
easier (see conditions I3–I5 respecting rule enforcement and sanctioning). 
Consequently, load management and the smoothing of demand peaks can be more 
easily achieved. An overarching consideration, however, is the importance of not only 
ensuring that condition I1 (simple rules) is met, but also that these rules are locally 
devised in collaboration with the community, in accordance with condition I2 (locally 
devised access and management rules): 
‘ . . . And also the community members, like the business people who require to 
do business after sunset, you also bring them on board to understand the role they 
are going to play in this particular project. . . . You go there one day and find that 
they have come up with their own set of rules to run that facility that you didn't 
even imagine.’ (Interviewee 3) 
 
Despite this inference of the potential usefulness, applicability and practicability of 
simple, locally devised use rules in cases where demand exceeds supply during certain 
times of day or seasons, there is very little evidence of such rules in the case study mini-
grids. The only concrete example of such a rule can be found in Olosho-Oibor, in the 
form of the aforementioned deactivation of branches of the mini-grid during times of 
low supply. While this is a locally devised rule, which appears to be accepted by the 
community, it is relatively crude compared to the more complex type-of-use and time-
of-day rules that could be further devised. Why the development of such rules has not 
been attempted in Olosho-Oibor is unclear, though it can be hypothesised that the rules 
are implicit rather than explicit, in that the rescue centre, school and dispensary are 
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prioritised in the electricity supply and the two businesses (charging station and shop) 
that are directly connected to the mini-grid only operate during the day. 
In the cases of Kitonyoni and Mageta Island, the absence of use rules is due to 
structural and technical factors. Use rules simply are not necessary in Kitonyoni due to 
the large excess capacity built into the system. Nevertheless, the importance of local 
involvement in the design of any rules becomes clear when revisiting the fact that the 
University of Southampton only releases limited capacity for consumption according to 
a schedule, which has not been clearly communicated to the cooperative. While the 
cooperative is aware of the fact that this remotely-controlled capacity schedule is being 
implemented, they are unaware of the rules or the rationale for their development. The 
local village chief, who was available for conversation during the visit, expressed 
frustration with this situation and acknowledged that they had to contend with these 
limitations due to the fact that the mini-grid was ‘a research’. In Mageta Island, use 
rules are in effect communicated through price. That is, electricity is cheaper during the 
day and more expensive at night. However, while this sounds like a simple solution, it 
is, in fact, not particularly straightforward. Since the only other example of prepaid 
consumption that most community members have experienced is the mobile phone, 
which does not have different prices depending on the time of day, such intraday 
variations in the price of electricity can come as a surprise to consumers and hence 
cause frustration, according to Interviewee 5.  
Overall, it seems likely that simple and locally devised use rules could be a useful 
type of institutional arrangement in mini-grids, which struggle with load management at 
times. However, the fact that they must be locally devised means that the involvement 
of the community in designing them is absolutely critical. While this level of 
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community involvement might be daunting initially, there also are clear potential 
benefits, in particular for a private sector owner/proprietor. This again raises the 
potential for a management platform, along the lines of the platforms suggested by 
Steins and Edwards (1999), bringing together the owner/proprietor and the community 
as a potential institutional arrangement to design such use rules, among other things. 
Chapter 6 includes a more in-depth discussion of the potential role of such a platform. 
 
I3, I4, I5: Ease in enforcement of rules, graduated sanctions and low-cost 
adjudication 
Technological developments, such as the introduction of prepaid meters using 
mobile payment systems, are increasingly ‘a game changer’ (Interviewee 5) when it 
comes to tariff collection and the enforcement of payment. They eliminate the need for 
cash collection, reduce the need for conflict adjudication and reduce the risk of elite 
capture. There is, however, still a role for community involvement in the various 
aspects of enforcement of rules. In particular, enforcement of the type-of-use and time-
of-day rules previously mentioned can be conducted effectively in a peer-to-peer 
setting: 
‘There is the idea of two bulbs per household at night but again in the village 
when you buy a fridge your neighbour will know that you have a fridge. Or when 
you buy a TV your neighbour will know.’ (Interviewee 3) 
 
‘...the best way of looking at managing the loads at any one time is by actually 
controlling the appliances used by members. They’ve got a limited number of 
people and they know what they are using - it is basically a very close-knit 
community. So when one line disconnects they actually find out who was the 
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cause for that and that means there is a new appliance that has come into effect 
or something like that.’ (Interviewee 11) 
 
An additional benefit of this level of community involvement is that it discourages 
theft through bypassing the meter. Several interviewees mentioned that despite 
expectations of theft becoming a problem it did not transpire in practice to the degree 
they feared (Interviewees 5, 19 and 21). This suggests that if enough people benefit 
locally or are dependent on the resource (GR2), a mutual understanding develops that 
tampering with the system could affect everyone — an attitude typical of successful 
collective action. 
These enabling conditions are worth considering in more detail in the context of the 
case study mini-grids, particularly in relation to tariff collection. In Olosho-Oibor, 
access is unmetered and the flat-fee tariffs are collected in cash on a weekly or monthly 
basis. While rules are in place stating that failure to pay should eventually result in 
disconnection, according to the local manager disconnection has never actually been 
enforced. This suggests that while graduated sanctions are present (failure to pay does 
not result in immediate disconnection), their enforcement and the adjudication of 
conflict with customers who are in arrears, is challenging. This is likely due in part to 
the fact that the mini-grid is owned entirely by the community and is seen as having to 
serve the community members first. Financial sustainability is only a secondary 
consideration. Arguably, a specialised organisation such as the owner/proprietor would 
therefore be better at enforcing rules and adjudicating conflict, which refers to the 
condition of appropriate leadership (condition G5). 
In Kitonyoni and Mageta Island, prepaid meters and remote load management in 
effect enforce the rules. Thus, sanctioning in these cases is not gradual, but binary, as 
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has been discussed in relation to property rights in the previous chapter. Once prepaid 
credit on the meter runs out, the customer is essentially disconnected until she buys 
credit again. Since no other use rules are present, other forms of rule enforcement are 
not relevant in these two cases. 
The conclusions to draw from conditions I3 through I5 are therefore twofold. While 
community involvement can be a simple and effective way to mutually enforce use 
rules, the enforcement of tariff collection and the adjudication of conflicts resulting 
from failure to pay should be handled by a specialised organisation in order to avoid 
conflicts of interests or elite capture. A specialised organisation, such as the 
owner/proprietor, also helps advance the achievement of the final enabling condition. 
 
I6: Accountability of officials 
This enabling condition implies that accountability should be a requirement for any 
official — in this case anyone who holds management, exclusion or alienation rights — 
in any organisation involved in the ownership, operation and management of a mini-
grid. This would include a private company, a community-based organisation or a type 
of hybrid management platform (see section 6.4). In Olosho-Oibor, the local manager is 
employed by the community-based organisation and as such could be dismissed as 
would any other employee if they were to be found to misappropriate funds or 
mismanage the mini-grid in some way. In practice, however, it is questionable how 
feasible this course of action would be because there would be no obvious replacement 
with similar skills and experience in mini-grid operation. The leadership of the 
community-based organisation itself is comprised of respected community members but 
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it is unclear to what extent this is a representative and inclusive group. The leadership 
has remained constant throughout the existence of the mini-grid, suggesting that it is 
unlikely officials would indeed be held accountable if mismanagement were to occur, or 
that the structures needed to remove an official from office are even in place. 
In comparison, the management and leadership structure in Kitonyoni is much more 
transparent. The cooperative management committee is elected every three years by all 
members of the cooperative, ensuring that dishonest officials may be removed from 
office. The management committee then employs the actual managers tasked with the 
operation of the mini-grid itself. Thus, the necessary structures for the accountability of 
officials are in place in this case. The Mageta Island mini-grid is structured as a private 
company. The local manager is a direct employee reporting to the management of the 
owner/proprietor of the mini-grid. One form of accountability and conflict adjudication 
which the owner/proprietor put in place is a customer service hotline, where customers 
can report any complaints. However, more direct ways in which customers can hold the 
management of the mini-grid accountable do not exist, much like any other private 
company. 
Therefore, accountability of officials is a particularly relevant consideration in 
institutions in which the community is represented by a set of elected officials. One 
interviewee gave a particularly striking example of the consequences of a failure to 
establish mechanisms to hold officials accountable. In the case of a micro hydro mini-
grid called Thiba in the Central Province of Kenya, the chairman of the community-
based organisation owning the mini-grid declared the land upon which the powerhouse 
had been built as his property, and with it all the assets needed to generate electricity. 
Because the community had no way to remove the chairman, the situation escalated, 
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and in the end they burned down his house in protest of his appropriation of the mini-
grid assets: 
‘I believe they put the house of the chairman on fire. . . . As a form of protest 
that he appropriated all the assets because the assets were on his land together 
with his secretary.’ (Interviewee 16) 
 
Accountability of officials therefore is a highly relevant condition, which must be 
considered when facilitating the establishment of organisations and institutions for the 
operation and management of a mini-grid, in particular whenever the community is 
directly involved. Building in mechanisms to hold officials accountable is critical given 
the fact that both empirical chapters of this thesis have highlighted the importance of 
community involvement in mini-grid management, ideally in the form of a management 
platform bringing together the private sector and the community. 
 
5.4 Summarising the Empirical Findings 
 
In summary, this chapter has demonstrated the usefulness of systematically applying 
the refined framework of enabling conditions for collective action to the management of 
rural mini-grids. The key findings begin with the identification of two critical 
operational challenges: seasonality of supply and demand, and the challenges of intra-
day load management; and the difficulty of serving various different consumer groups 
— anchors, businesses and households — and their different power requirements and 
expectations.  
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The analysis then demonstrated the importance of local, dedicated management and 
how a specialised organisation should be tasked with the operation and management of 
a mini-grid. However, rather than imposing this organisation entirely from the outside, 
the discussion gives rise to the conclusion that the community should be directly 
represented. This is useful in order to better understand the various interdependencies 
between community members and their uses for electricity, as well as to align interest 
around mini-grid management and the goal of fairly allocating electricity among 
different end uses. Thus, as has been hypothesised at the end of the previous empirical 
chapter, the empirical data support the idea that a platform for resource use negotiation, 
as advocated by Steins and Edwards (1999) in the context of a complex, multiple-use 
common-pool resource, could potentially be a useful innovative institutional 
arrangement for the management of pro-poor rural mini-grids.  
While operationalising and empirically testing the benefits of such a local 
organisational structure is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is nonetheless clear that a 
management platform could serve a number of purposes. First of all, it could provide 
the forum for the creation of locally devised and simple to understand use rules in the 
form of type-of-use and time-of-day rules, which, to reiterate an important finding, take 
into account interdependencies within the community, degrees of dependence on 
electricity and the heterogeneity of interests within the community in order to arrive at 
an electricity allocation schedule which is considered as fair as possible. When it comes 
to the enforcement of those rules, a management platform could combine the ability to 
rely on mutual rule enforcement among community members with the benefits of a fully 
privatised approach to the enforcement of tariff payment, thereby greatly reducing the 
opportunities for elite capture and conflicts of interest. Finally, the analysis implies that 
 154 
ensuring the accountability of officials within this management platform is a critical 
condition. 
The following chapter considers all of these findings, as well as those presented in 
the previous chapter, and uses these insights to formulate empirically-informed original 
contributions to the theory of bundles of property rights as well as enabling conditions 
for collective action. It also further develops the concept of the management platform 
and demonstrates how the application of property rights theory and theories of 
collective action inform the operational/managerial role and position within the property 
rights regime of such a platform. This serves to further develop the practical 
implications of the findings of this thesis in terms of pro-poor access to electricity. 
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Chapter 6  - Discussion 
 
The previous two chapters have demonstrated how the theory of bundles of property 
rights and enabling conditions for collective action can be used to analyse key 
operational challenges in rural mini-grids, based on evidence from 27 interviews with 
24 experts and three case studies in Kenya. As such, the analysis has followed the 
example of other literature operationalising those theoretical frameworks, especially 
enabling conditions for collective action, by systematically analysing the applicability 
and relevance of these theoretical frameworks using data from existing case studies. 
This methodology has been commonly applied to other contexts of collective action in 
the presence of common-pool resources; in particular, cases of water for irrigation such 
as those reviewed as part of the theory discussed and developed in chapter 2. This 
chapter follows the same basic structure as the theory development in chapter 2 to 
discuss the empirical findings presented in the two previous chapters.  
The chapter begins by reviewing under which conditions electricity in a mini-grid 
exhibits characteristics of a common-pool resource and what this means for the broader 
applicability of the findings of this thesis. In particular, the importance of treating 
electricity as a complex, multiple-use common-pool resource is discussed. This leads 
into a discussion of the major operational challenges in a mini-grid, and in particular 
how they are affected by the introduction of prepaid meters and mobile money. This 
analysis is guided by a discussion of how the theory of bundles of property rights (see 
chapter 4) demonstrates how two property rights regimes, namely private and common 
property, may co-exist within the same system, involving the community as well as a 
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specialised private sector entity. A demonstration of the usefulness of this community 
involvement draws heavily on the findings from the analysis that applied the theory of 
enabling conditions for collective action (see chapter 5), and is motivated by the 
existence of operational challenges, which cannot easily be addressed through 
technological intervention but, rather, require institutional arrangements. Rather than 
merely verifying the presence of certain conditions in a case study against the 
theoretical ideal, they can be used to construct analytical flow charts in order to create 
narratives informed by the empirical data. These flow charts demonstrate the 
applicability of the theoretical framework as well as areas for further development of 
the theory. Two such analytical flow charts, which build upon each other, are developed 
to discuss the insights provided by applying theories of collective action to the 
operational challenges, which lend themselves to potential interventions in the form of 
institutional arrangements (see Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2). As part of this discussion, 
some new theoretical developments are articulated. The final section contains a detailed 
discussion of the potential role that a management platform could play in the sustainable 
management of rural mini-grids in Kenya, thereby bringing together the two theoretical 
frameworks used in this thesis (bundles of property rights and enabling conditions for 
collective action) and opening up an important field for further research.  
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6.1 Understanding Electricity as a Common-pool Resource and the 
Application of Theories of Collective Action 
 
Since treating electricity as a complex, multiple-use common-pool resource is one 
of the fundamental assumptions made in this thesis, it is worth returning to this issue to 
review the manner in which electricity exhibits the characteristics of a common-pool 
resource, and to what extent the underlying assumptions are met at the case study sites. 
First of all, electricity is rivalrous by its very nature, i.e. use of electricity is subtractive 
as each kWh can only be used once. Furthermore, in the case of a common-pool 
resource, it must be difficult to exclude users from accessing the resource. By choosing 
the mini-grid itself as the unit of analysis, it becomes possible to argue that, when 
connections are unmetered and unconstrained, it is difficult to control how much 
electricity each connected user can consume, leading to the potential for congestion, i.e. 
demand exceeding supply and consequently the system becoming overloaded. However, 
when more advanced metering and access control technology are introduced, in the 
form of prepaid meters in particular, exclusion becomes much less problematic. In 
essence, electricity becomes a private good, rather than a common-pool resource. As 
argued in section 6.2 below, however, in relation to bundles of property rights, this does 
not mean that the property rights regime must change completely from common 
property to private property.  
Thus, as illustrated in section 4.2, the common-pool resource nature of electricity 
depends on the metering technology used. This makes electricity a different type of 
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common-pool resource compared with the more traditional examples that have been 
studied, such as pasture for grazing, forestry or fisheries. The mini-grid is a human-
made resource system in which some aspects of access and excludability can be 
controlled through system design. Water for irrigation, however, is similar in this 
respect, in that system design can affect the institutions present in the resource system. 
Sarker and Itoh (2001, p. 92) referred to this connection as ‘the interdependent 
relationship between institutions (in other words, a special kind of social capital) and 
physical capital’. 
In the Olosho-Oibor grid, for example, where electricity is sold based on a flat fee 
and consumption is unmetered, electricity is a typical common-pool resource. In the 
cases of Mageta Island and Kitonyoni, electricity as a resource has been privatised 
through the use of technology. This privatisation, however, as the previous chapter has 
shown and as is discussed further in section 6.2, does not make the application of 
theories of collective action any less useful. In fact, the applicability of theories of 
collective action to the context of a rural mini-grid depends on a number of other factors 
not directly related to the common-pool resource nature of electricity, but rather 
informed by approaching the operational challenges faced in a mini-grid from a 
common-pool resource management perspective. 
These factors relate to the enabling conditions for collective action, and in particular 
the idea of small resource system (R1) and group size (G1) as well as the presence of a 
well-defined boundary for the group and the resource system (G2 and R2) (see Figure 
2.2 to recap on the full set of enabling conditions). The relevance of these factors in the 
case of mini-grids makes them well-suited to the application of theories of collective 
action, given the fact that all three of the key foundational works on theories of 
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collective action (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1988), which were 
reviewed by Agrawal (2001) for the development of the framework in Figure 2.2, 
mention these enabling conditions in some form. All of the mini-grids studied, as well 
as those discussed during interviews, fulfilled the following requirements: None of them 
is connected to the national grid and so they can each be defined as a closed resource 
system; and none of them has in excess of 100 connections or produces more than 20 
kW of electrical power. Compared with a national grid, with thousands of kW in 
generating power and millions of connections, the mini-grids are clearly comparatively 
small.  
The presence of a multiplicity of not just potential end uses for electricity but also 
types of user groups is another factor which has demonstrated common-pool resource 
theory and collective action to be useful perspectives for the analysis of electricity in a 
mini-grid. Through the logic of the complex, multiple-use common-pool resource, 
another important link between electricity in a mini-grid and theories of collective 
action is established: 
‘the activities/actions of one user group influence activities/actions by other 
user groups, that is, multiple uses are closely interconnected. Thus, it is the very 
nature of multiple use resources that makes collective action a necessity to deal 
with adverse impacts associated with multiple use.’ (Steins and Edwards, 1999, p. 
245) 
 
According to this argument, applying theories of collective action to the 
management of electricity in a mini-grid seems almost like a natural connection, 
considering that electricity can be used by a multitude of end users — anchors, 
businesses and households — for a variety of end uses ranging from agricultural 
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processing to appliance charging, entertainment and lighting. The similarities between 
water for irrigation (the prototypical complex common-pool resource) and electricity in 
a mini-grid are quite striking in this respect, as water may also be used by a multitude of 
end users (farmers, households, etc.) for a variety of uses beyond irrigation (drinking, 
cooking, agricultural processing, etc.). Thus, approaching the problem of managing a 
mini-grid from a common-pool resource perspective already hints at the operational 
challenge of electricity allocation, which is discussed further in section 6.3. However, 
there are a number of other operational challenges that should be properly discussed 
first. 
 
6.2 Bundles of Property Rights and the Role of Prepaid Meters 
 
It is worth re-emphasising that the focus of this thesis is on the operational 
challenges within the mini-grid itself. There are, of course, a number of other challenges 
related to the regulatory environment in Kenya, or other issues such as the poor state of 
physical infrastructure in many parts of Kenya, which have a direct impact on the 
difficulty of building and operating mini-grids. Nevertheless, as has been established in 
section 2.10, such external environment conditions are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Furthermore, as canvassed in chapter 2, the purely financial and technical challenges 
involved in mini-grid operation are already comparatively well-researched. The 
operational challenges that are the focus of this section are therefore primarily located at 
the point of interaction between the end user and the mini-grid and its operator. Rural 
mini-grids face a number of key operational challenges of this nature which affect their 
long-term sustainability. Chapters 4 and 5 have identified a number of those challenges, 
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which emerged from the interview and case study evidence, but it is worth summarising 
them again.  
One major challenge which mini-grids have faced in the past is the reading of 
electricity meters in person and physical collection of tariffs. Both of these activities are 
highly time-intensive, as they require going from end user to end user while they are 
present. In addition, the physical collection of cash poses further challenges, due to the 
lack of developed financial infrastructure in many remote rural areas. Not only is it a 
challenge for the customer to ensure they have sufficient cash available at the time of 
the tariff collection, but it may also be difficult for the mini-grid operator to deposit that 
cash into a bank account, as the nearest bank branch can be difficult to access. For 
example, there is no bank branch on Mageta Island. As chapter 4 demonstrated, 
however, prepaid electricity meters using mobile-enabled payment can completely 
remove these challenges. They obviate the need for tariff collection and meter reading 
at the same time, and thus are one of the most important technological innovations 
currently being implemented in mini-grids in Kenya. However, they also have an effect 
on the allocation of property rights within the mini-grid. As mentioned in the previous 
section, the introduction of metering technology in particular affects the nature of 
electricity as a resource, in effect privatising a common-pool resource. This is similar to 
the effect of volume and flow rate measurements privatising water for irrigation, as 
described by Yandle and Morris (2001). However, the effect of prepaid meters using 
mobile-enabled payment on the property rights regime is considerably more nuanced, 
when considered through the lens of the theory of bundles of property rights as shown 
in Table 2.2. Due to the importance of Table 2.2, and the fact that analysing the role that 
prepaid meters can play in the allocation of bundles of property rights represents a 
theoretical innovation, it has been reproduced below as Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1 - The Role of Prepaid Meters in the Allocation of Property Rights 
 
           Source: Author (developed from original framework by Ostrom and Schlager (1996, pg. 133)) 
 
As Table 6.1 indicates, prepaid meters automate the allocation of withdrawal rights 
by simply disconnecting the authorised user as soon as the credit on the meter runs out. 
This offers obvious advantages over post-paid meters or flat fees, where the 
disconnection of a user who is in arrears requires an in-person interaction, thereby 
increasing the potential for conflict. This also means that management and exclusion 
rights may be exercised remotely, using the mobile network connection that prepaid 
meters with mobile-enabled payment automatically have, thereby facilitating operations 
for the owner/proprietor. This is a good example of another challenge that advanced 
metering and tariff collection may help to overcome. Setting and changing tariffs, 
typically, is a challenging task and should not be the sole responsibility of a 
community-based organisation. Evidence of this has, for example, been presented in 
section 5.1 in relation to Olosho-Oibor, where the community-based organisation was 
unable to agree on tariffs that would even cover operating costs, thus making the mini-
grid dependent on continual donor support. This challenge has also been identified by 
other organisations implementing community-based mini-grids (e.g. GVEP, 2011). The 
granular demand data available through the use of remote controlled prepaid meters, on 
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the other hand, allows the owner/proprietor to precisely observe different levels of 
demand at different price points. However, as has been discussed in section 5.3, such 
tariff setting and, in effect, electricity allocation based purely on price discrimination, 
does not represent a pro-poor approach to electrification. A hybrid approach, which also 
gives community members a voice in such important decisions, has the potential to aid 
in overcoming this challenge. 
The potential value of a hybrid approach echoes what has already been suggested in 
section 4.3 and is discussed in the following two sections in considerably more detail. It 
also closely relates to Ostrom’s (2003) findings in a comprehensive review of property 
rights regimes associated with common-pool resource management, namely that no 
single property regime can be considered ideal for common-pool resource management. 
In the specific context of bundles of property rights, it is sufficient to say that the 
theoretical framework depicted in Table 6.1 provides the basis upon which to build a 
more nuanced allocation of property rights than any found at the case study sites. In 
Kitonyoni and Olosho-Oibor, all positions, from full owner to authorised claimant, are 
held by different community-based organisations entirely constituted of community 
members (with the exception of the involvement of the University of Southampton in 
Kitonyoni), whereas a private company holds all of those positions in the case of 
Mageta Island. However, as should be re-emphasised, the role of the authorised 
claimant, who holds important management rights such as the setting of tariffs and the 
ability to allocate electricity to different users at different times, should involve the 
community as well as a specialised and dedicated management organisation in order to 
ensure that the needs of the community are met, yet the operation, maintenance and 
repairs are performed by an entity with the appropriate technical and managerial 
capacity. This is particularly important due to the existence of two other major 
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operational challenges that have emerged from the empirical data, and which cannot be 
solved entirely through technological intervention, but rather should involve 
institutional arrangements to overcome. These remaining challenges are focused around 
two particular issues: the seasonality of supply and demand, which is closely related to 
the seasonality of income, and the mismatches this can create between supply and 
demand; and the difficulty of allocating a limited amount of electricity to a multiplicity 
of possible end uses and end users, i.e. the challenge of the complex, multiple-use 
common-pool resource nature of electricity in a mini-grid. 
 
6.3 Analytical Flow charts - Applying and Developing Enabling 
Conditions for Collective Action 
 
Given the complex nature of electricity in a mini-grid as a common-pool resource 
and the role that collective action can play in the management of a complex common-
pool resource, the refined theoretical framework presented in Figure 5.1 may be applied 
in more than one way. It may be used to structure the analysis of empirical data, as has 
been demonstrated in chapter 5, thereby analysing the presence and applicability of each 
enabling condition for collective action at the case study sites. Furthermore, it can be 
used to construct analytical flow charts for the exploration of potential institutional 
innovations to help overcome the two major remaining operational challenges discussed 
at the end of the previous section. Figure 6.1 shows the first such analytical flow chart, 
which explores the issue of intra-day variations and seasonality of supply and demand 
and the potential mismatches this can create.  
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6.3.1 First Analytical Flow Chart – Mismatches in Supply and Demand 
By considering the operation of a mini-grid through the lens of enabling condition 
RI1 (match restrictions on use to resource regeneration), the twin challenges of seasonal 
and intra-day supply and demand variations become clear. As has been introduced first 
in section 4.1 and then expanded upon in the introduction to chapter 5, demand patterns 
not only change throughout the day, as agricultural processing for example is typically 
done during the afternoon or lights are needed after sunset, but also vary with seasons. 
These two sources of variation in electricity demand and supply patterns can lead to 
mismatches between supply and demand and step changes in demand levels in 
particular, which may be analysed and understood through the consideration of enabling 
conditions GR4 (low levels of user demand) and GR5 (gradual changes in levels of user 
demand). 
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Figure 6.1 – Analytical Flow Chart for Challenge of Seasonality and Mismatches in Demand and 
Supply 
 
Source: author 
 
As has been shown in section 5.2, these two enabling conditions should be primarily 
understood as enabling the predictability of electricity supply and demand. Low initial 
levels of demand allow for slow and predictable initial growth in electricity demand, 
without immediately requiring system upgrades. As evidenced both in the interviews as 
well as the case study sites (in particular, Olosho-Oibor and Mageta Island), demand 
should be expected to grow, as end users increasingly establish new uses for electricity 
and begin to add electricity into their energy mix in addition to other more traditional 
energy sources such as kerosene. As demand thus grows slowly, the system may be 
upgraded to match the new demand levels and patterns, as has been done on Mageta 
Island. Thus it could be argued that condition GR5 (gradual changes in levels of user 
demand) should be augmented in the context of a mini-grid to state: 
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GR5: Gradual and predictable changes in levels of demand 
Agrawal (2001) also identified the importance of predictability, but only in relation 
to the resource flow, i.e. the supply side (in the context of a mini-grid, this would 
translate into the particular choice of electricity generation technology) rather than the 
changes in levels of demand as proposed in the augmented enabling condition GR5. 
More closely related to Agrawal’s definition of predictability (R5), a different route has 
been taken in Kitonyoni by incorporating large amounts of excess capacity at the outset 
and only slowly making it available to the community, rather than attempting to predict 
the exact timing of growth in demand. While this is, of course, an effective way to 
ensure that demand growth is limited to a pre-defined schedule, if demand grows more 
slowly than anticipated it is expensive to have this excess supply capacity sit idle for 
months or years until it is matched by demand. Alternatively, if demand grows faster 
than anticipated, it is frustrating for the end users to only slowly gain access to existing 
supply according to a pre-determined schedule. This approach is thus useful for a 
research project in order to understand how demand patterns grow and change (as is the 
case in the mini-grid operated by Southampton University in Kitonyoni), but is difficult 
to replicate in other settings. 
Thus, if demand patterns change more quickly than anticipated, there is insufficient 
capital for system expansion (as is the case in Olosho-Oibor) or this expansion simply 
requires time to be installed, applying theories of collective action to the problem of 
electricity allocation can suggest useful solutions. As has been suggested in section 5.3, 
there is a bi-directional relationship between the presence of an enabling condition for 
collective action and the potential for successful collective action itself. The relationship 
between condition GR5 (gradual and predictable changes in levels of user demand) and 
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conditions I1 (simple and easy to understand rules) and I2 (locally devised access and 
management rules) is one good example. Gradual and predictable changes in demand 
provide the time needed to develop use rules to cope with excess demand, for example 
in the form of time-of-day use rules or rules restricting the use of certain power-
intensive appliances such as irons or kettles. At the same time, this relationship also 
works in reverse: such use rules can encourage low initial levels of demand and gradual 
changes in demand. Caretta (2015) presents a useful example of this connection 
between use rules and predictability of demand changes in relation to water for 
irrigation in a Tanzanian community. The community organisation that manages water 
supply adjusts its allocation rules seasonally, according to the crops being planted and 
their water requirements. These changes in demand are gradual and predictable and thus 
lend themselves to management through collective action.  
Either way, if use rules or other demand-side management techniques are required, 
such as switching off branches of the mini-grid at certain times of day (or times of year) 
or limiting the amount of power that users can draw, condition GR3 (fairness in 
allocation of benefits from resource) becomes critical. Consequently, any form of 
demand-side management that is employed should be designed with fairness in 
allocation in mind. However, as section 5.3 has already shown, fairness in allocation in 
and of itself is difficult to define. Fair to whom? Does fairness simply mean that every 
connection to the mini-grid receives exactly the same amount of electrical capacity 
allocated at all times? The evidence from the interviewees in particular seems to suggest 
that perceived fairness in allocation by the different consumer groups is the most 
important factor. This also includes the pricing of the electricity as an allocation tool. 
Even though it is, of course, a reasonable strategy from a purely for-profit private sector 
business perspective to sell electricity to those who are able to pay the highest price, this 
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practice raises the issue of the impact on poorer community members, who are pushed 
out of the market or excluded from the outset. This could therefore further deepen 
already entrenched gaps in wealth within a community. The fact that such price 
discrimination is not perceived as fair has been demonstrated in the case of Mageta 
Island. This is not to say that the Mageta Island mini-grid is therefore unsustainable in 
the long term, but rather to argue that electricity allocation purely based on price is not 
compatible with the pro-poor focus of this thesis, and arguably is no better at achieving 
a perceived fair allocation of electricity than an arbitrary schedule imposed by an entity 
that is exogenous to the community. This leads to a suggested alteration to enabling 
condition GR3. At least in the context of electricity in a mini-grid, a more appropriate 
formulation thus would be: 
GR3 – Perceived fairness in allocation of benefits from the common-pool resource 
While Agrawal (2001) also noted the importance of the perception of fairness, this 
alteration to condition GR3 makes this emphasis more obvious and marked. Returning 
to the analytical flow chart presented in Figure 6.1, attempting to achieve this 
perception of fairness in allocation in the presence of excess demand, be it temporary, 
seasonal or chronic, and using the enabling conditions of the refined framework and the 
empirical evidence from chapter 5 as a guide, requires the presence and understanding 
of four further enabling conditions. First of all, the presence of appropriate leadership is 
necessary, as identified in enabling condition G5 (appropriate leadership is required). 
As has been discussed in section 5.1, appropriate leadership in the literature on enabling 
conditions for collective action has to date been defined as being young, familiar with 
changing external environment and connected to the elite. The evidence from all three 
case studies as well as the interviews, however, suggests that leadership does not need 
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to be young and, in the case of a mini-grid, must have some technological capability to 
operate the mini-grid and be locally present on a permanent basis. To cite a phrase 
repeatedly used in section 5.1, a mini-grid needs local, dedicated management. 
Furthermore, the evidence presented in section 5.1 has also suggested that appropriate 
leadership does not need to be in the form of a single person, but rather may be held by 
two separate entities, where one entity, for example, assumes technically capable, 
dedicated operational management and another manages interaction with the 
community. Appropriate leadership should thus be defined as being locally present, 
well-connected to the community and technically capable. In the case of a mini-grid, the 
group characteristics of the enabling conditions for collective action should therefore be 
expanded by a management condition in addition to the leadership condition (G5). This 
suggested new enabling condition requires: 
G9: Dedicated operational management with technological capabilities and local 
presence. 
This addition of a management condition G9 picks up the strand of the potential for 
a management platform bringing together a private owner/proprietor and the community 
as suggested in chapters 4 and 5, which is discussed in more detail in section 6.4. 
However, there are three additional enabling conditions which can be used to 
understand how to facilitate perceived fairness in allocation and that further support the 
argument for a hybrid management platform. These are conditions I3–5 that concern the 
ease of enforcement of rules, graduated sanctions for those who break the rules and the 
presence of low-cost conflict adjudication mechanisms. As the joint treatment of these 
three conditions in section 5.3 has shown, they further indicate the potential for joint 
management by a private owner/proprietor and the community, and are closely related 
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to the leadership condition G5 (appropriate leadership) as well as the new management 
condition G9 (dedicated operational management with technological capabilities and 
local presence). A specialised organisation, i.e. the organisation that also assumes the 
role of the locally present and technologically capable management, should be 
responsible for the enforcement of tariff collection and the adjudication of any conflict 
arising in connection with tariff payment. This includes the final decision on tariff-
setting after community consultation, as has been discussed in section 5.1 in relation to 
condition G5 (appropriate leadership). However, there is considerable scope for 
community involvement in other aspects of rule enforcement and sanctioning. First of 
all, section 5.3 has shown that community involvement discourages electricity theft 
from bypassing the meter, as the community can see the benefits of a functional system, 
understands the limitations of this system and, as a result, appreciates the potential 
damage that could be inflicted by tampering with it (in addition to the inherent dangers 
posed by tampering with an electrical circuit). Furthermore, as corroborated by several 
interviewees in relation to early community-based mini-grids in the Mount Kenya 
region, use rules can be mutually enforced by community members, as they are aware 
of the types of appliances that are being used by their neighbours. However, if such 
mutual enforcement is to be successful in ensuring a fair allocation rather than creating 
more potential for conflict, other aspects of the complexity of community involvement 
must be understood. The aforementioned example of a community-based irrigation 
scheme in northern Tanzania (Caretta, 2015) provides a particularly stark example of 
the dangers of this type of rule enforcement. Conflict arose between two farmers who 
were irrigating at the same time, which escalated to the point that one farmer killed the 
other. This tragic example further emphasises the need for appropriate conflict 
adjudication mechanisms (I5) that are easily accessible to the resource users in order to 
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avoid such escalation. The irrigation scheme in question reacted by increasing the 
number of locally available officials, further corroborating the validity of the new 
condition G9 for a common-pool resource (dedicated operational management with 
technological capabilities and local presence), even when the resource is different than 
electricity in a mini-grid. 
Three enabling conditions in particular can be applied to better understand critical 
factors to take into account when considering the involvement of the community in 
aspects of the operational management of the mini-grid, and in particular the allocation 
of a limited amount of electrical capacity. Condition GR2 (high dependence by users on 
resource system) was previously discussed in section 5.2, where it was suggested that 
the presence of a variety of productive uses for the electricity creates higher dependence 
on the resource system, in particular in the form of a variety of micro and small 
businesses, but also in the form of community facilities such as the Girls’ Rescue 
Centre in Olosho-Oibor. This dependence, in turn, supports the evolution of collective 
action in the management of electricity as a resource, according to the logic of the 
enabling condition. This is evidenced, for example, in the development of use schedules 
in Olosho-Oibor, where productive uses are prioritised during the day and the uses of 
the Girls’ Rescue Centre and village lighting are prioritised after sunset. Because the 
community is involved in the management decisions of the mini-grid through the 
community-based organisation that owns it, these allocation schedules take into account 
the complexity of the different dependencies on electricity by different user groups. The 
relevance of high dependence on the resource (GR2) as an enabling condition for 
collective action has also been confirmed for other common-pool resources such as 
forestry and water for irrigation (Fisher et al., 2010). 
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Additionally, as alluded to during the empirical discussion of condition GR2 (high 
dependence by users on resource system) in section 5.2, this dependence of anchor and 
business loads on electricity as a resource forms a reciprocal relationship with the 
operational sustainability of the mini-grid. In particular, the importance of micro and 
small businesses in generating the revenue required for financially sustainable operation 
is evidenced in the interviews and the case studies. One such example is Kitonyoni, 
where only micro and small businesses have been connected to the mini-grid. The mini-
grid, however, depends less on the rest of the community, i.e. the households, for its 
revenue, as they consume far less electricity than the commercial loads. Thus, the 
households depend to some extent on these commercial loads to make the mini-grid 
sustainable so that the mini-grid, in turn, can provide the electricity they require. There 
is hence a relatively clear interdependence among group members (condition G6). 
As introduced in section 5.1, the interdependence of group members is also a 
relevant enabling condition in other ways. Using the examples of Mageta Island and 
Kitonyoni, which are active and relatively diversified village economies, if community 
members depend on each other for specialised goods and services that require electricity 
to be available in order that they be provided, the increasing interdependence of group 
members should enable the emergence of collective action if electricity becomes a 
scarce resource. Neither Mageta Island nor Kitonyoni were experiencing significant 
electricity shortages at the time of the field work, so this remains a hypothesis at this 
point, albeit one supported by evidence from interviews that recounted examples of use 
rules emerging in mini-grids with large amounts of excess demand.  
The final enabling condition that forms part of the analytical flow chart presented in 
Figure 6.1 is G7 (heterogeneity of endowments and homogeneities of identities and 
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interests). During the in-depth analysis of the applicability of this enabling condition in 
section 5.1, the role of the heterogeneity of endowments could not be established 
conclusively. This aligns with the contested role of heterogeneity in endowments in the 
collective action literature. Gebremedhin et al. (2004), for example, find that 
heterogeneity of endowments, as measured by the ownership of oxen, negatively affects 
the success of collective action in pasture management. However, homogeneity of 
interest in the form of a pre-existing community organisation, such as the Girls’ Rescue 
Centre in Olosho-Oibor, may be beneficial to the long-term sustainability of the mini-
grid. This point is also closely related to the idea of a community being a community of 
interest, as formulated by Campbell et al. (2016) (canvassed in section 2.3), thereby 
locating the mini-grid within the wider socio-cultural context of the community. This 
therefore denotes the potential for some form of joint management between a private 
owner/proprietor and the community as a way to support increased homogeneity of 
interests. One further factor that is closely related to this condition, but also conditions 
G6 (interdependence of group members) and GR2 (high dependence by users on 
resource system), is the presence of heterogeneous productive and non-productive end 
uses for electricity, which has also been identified by other studies (e.g. Yadoo and 
Cruickshank, 2010). This also relates to the complex nature of electricity as a multiple-
use common-pool resource as discussed in section 6.1, yet is not featured in the 
literature on enabling conditions for collective action or reflected in Agrawal’s (2001) 
framework (Figure 2.2). In the context of electricity in a mini-grid as a resource, a new 
condition GR6 should thus be added to the group-resource system overlap category of 
the refined theoretical framework shown in Figure 2.3: 
GR6: Heterogeneity of productive and non-productive end uses for the resource 
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The addition of this sixth group-resource system overlap enabling condition leads 
directly into the construction of the second analytical flow chart, which may be created 
using the refined framework of Figure 2.3 as a guideline. This flow chart is concerned 
with the second remaining major operational challenge identified in section 6.2, namely, 
the balancing of interests among a multitude of different end-user groups in a mini-grid, 
further demonstrating the complex nature of electricity as a common-pool resource. 
Figure 6.2 shows this second analytical flow chart. 
 
6.3.2 Second Analytical Flow Chart – Balancing the Needs of Multiple End-
user Groups 
The second major operational challenge is balancing the different needs of multiple 
end-user groups within the same mini-grid with limited electrical capacity, which was 
introduced in section 6.2 and also discussed partly in the first analytical flow chart. The 
discussion of the current flow chart begins with the same issue of group complexity that 
was featured the end of the previous flow chart. In doing so, the second major 
remaining operational challenge can be addressed in more detail. Specifically, in order 
to understand the varying needs of different user groups, we return to the A-B-C 
(Anchor-Business-Community) classification of user groups, which was first introduced 
as part of the introduction to the concept of complex, multiple-use common-pool 
resource in section 2.6.  
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Figure 6.2 – Analytical Flow Chart for the Challenge of Serving Multiple End-user Groups 
 
Source: author 
Anchor loads (A) such as mobile phone towers, hospitals or other larger businesses, 
require prioritisation during times of electricity shortages due to their high dependence 
on the resource system (condition GR2), i.e. the mini-grid. This may be due to the fact 
that they are particularly sensitive to power outages, as is the case for hospitals or cell 
phone towers, where an interruption in the electricity supply can have considerable 
knock-on effects. However, they are not just dependent on the mini-grid. If an anchor is 
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present, the mini-grid is likely to be particularly dependent on the anchor load in return, 
not only in terms of its financial planning, but also because in times of shortage, the 
mini-grid operator heavily depends on the cooperation of the anchor load. 
As discussed in section 5.2, in relation to the all-important perceived fairness in 
allocation, this can have advantages as well, as the operator may only need to find an 
arrangement with one customer in order to shift large amounts of demand to different 
times of day when necessary. However, this allocation schedule still must be perceived 
as fair by the anchor client itself, as well as the other customer groups, according to the 
modified enabling condition GR3 (perceived fairness in allocation of benefits from the 
common-pool resource). 
Businesses (B), referring to micro and small businesses in this context, also exhibit 
a considerable dependence on electricity (condition GR2), but in addition have the 
potential to cause rapid and unpredictable changes in demand as they quickly develop 
more productive uses for electricity (see the discussion of conditions GR4 (low levels of 
user demand) and GR5 (gradual change in levels of demand) in section 5.2). This 
growing demand must be met in order to enable the small businesses to generate the 
additional income from the use of electricity that is required to pay for the electricity 
itself. As has been previously noted, businesses are the backbone of the mini-grid, 
because they can earn additional income from the use of electricity. This income can be 
used in part to operate a financially sustainable mini-grid, by means of the business’ 
payment for electricity. Thus there exists a reciprocal relationship between the mini-grid 
and the small businesses depending on it. Therefore, these small businesses must also 
perceive the allocation as being fair (GR3). 
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Finally, the community (C), which is understood as being the households in the 
community, also has its own demands. The households characteristically exhibit low 
levels of user demand (GR4) and thus represent a smaller revenue stream for the mini-
grid. Their potential for demand growth is also much smaller than for A and B, because 
unlike the productive uses of those two user groups, household use of electricity is 
rarely productive and thus does not generate additional income to pay for itself. Instead, 
electricity supplements and partially replaces other energy sources, such as kerosene for 
lighting. Demand growth can only be easily afforded through efficiency improvements, 
so that a larger energy equivalent can be purchased for the same amount of money. 
Nevertheless, meeting the demands of the households is paramount to a long-term 
sustainable mini-grid - as it is seen in this thesis - for two reasons. First of all, 
household electrification is critical for the goal of pro-poor, universal rural 
electrification, which is the focus not only of this thesis but a number of global 
initiatives as enumerated in chapter 1 (e.g. the SDGs and SE4All). Secondly, household 
electrification is critical for community buy-in. As the discussion in relation to GR3 
(fairness in allocation of benefits from common-pool resource) in section 5.2 has 
demonstrated, while the households may be the smallest income stream, they can be the 
most disruptive. One need only recall the case described in section 5.3 where 
community members set the house of the village chief on fire after he had appropriated 
all the mini-grid assets. Therefore, naturally, the households in the community also 
must perceive the allocation of electricity as being fair. 
Perceived fairness in allocation among these user groups thus requires the presence 
of conditions G5 (appropriate leadership) and G9 (dedicated operational management 
with technological capabilities and local presence), as well as mechanisms through 
which leadership and management can be held accountable for their actions (I6). 
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Appropriate leadership and management in this case could take the form of the 
aforementioned management platform, as promoted by Steins and Edwards (1999) and 
introduced in section 2.6 above, where the needs of the different user groups are 
understood. That is, a platform that is rooted within the community, but that is also 
aware of the technical and financial limitations of the system and therefore capable of 
developing, when necessary, electricity allocation schedules that take into account those 
limitations as well as the requirements of the different user groups. This is done in order 
to arrive at a system of simple and locally designed use rules (I1 and I2), which are 
perceived as fair by the majority, if not all, of the end users (GR3). These factors 
strengthen the argument for a joint management platform for the owner/proprietor and 
the community, bringing together the different end-user groups through community 
representation and a dedicated operational management (G9). Before further discussing 
this outcome, however, there are a number of theoretical developments that emerged 
from the discussion in this section to be reviewed, as they represent a key part of the 
original contribution to theory of this thesis. 
 
6.3.3 Additions and Augmentations to the Refined Framework of Enabling 
Conditions for Collective Action.  
The first original contribution to theory was using the refined framework of 
enabling conditions for collective action to construct analytical flow charts for the 
discussion of the two challenges of mismatches in supply and demand and balancing the 
electricity requirements of three different potential end-user groups. This, in turn, led to 
four distinct augmentations to the refined framework of Figure 2.3, representing another 
 180 
contribution to theory. Figure 6.3 shows those augmentations and additions in bold text, 
thereby creating a revised, rather than a refined, theoretical framework. 
The new group characteristic condition G9 (dedicated operational management with 
technological capabilities and local presence) has emerged directly from the evidence 
collected at the three case study sites as well as in the course of the interviews. Its 
importance, and the omission of this condition in the traditional theory on enabling 
conditions for collective action (see sections 2.7 and 2.8), is largely due to the increased 
technical and thus operational complexity of a mini-grid compared to the typical cases 
of common pool resources systems such as fisheries, pasture for grazing or even water 
for irrigation, albeit to a lesser extent. Furthermore, the inclusion of technological 
capabilities in this condition provides a potential link to the literature on innovation 
studies and specifically the role of learning mechanisms in achieving this level of 
technological capability (see e.g. Hansen and Ockwell, 2014) – a link that could be 
productively explored by means of further research. 
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The augmentation of condition GR3, making it ‘perceived fairness in allocation’, 
rather than merely ‘fairness in allocation’, emphasises the difficulty of defining an 
objective measure for fairness. Explicitly focusing on the perception of fairness by all 
resource users places greater emphasis on the importance of being inclusive of all user 
groups and interacting with them, a particularly critical point when considering pro-
poor universal rural electrification. The alteration to condition GR5 to include the 
predictability of changes in demand levels is also a simple, yet crucial clarification, 
which makes this condition easier to understand and thus apply. While slow changes in 
levels of demand are open to interpretation (‘slow’ means different things in different 
contexts), explicitly including the predictability of changes in demand makes this 
condition a more useful tool for analysis. As has been demonstrated above, the ability to 
reliably predict changes in electricity demand patterns is highly useful, especially in the 
context of a mini-grid, where system upgrades can be very costly.  
Source: Author (developed from original framework by Agrawal (2001, pg. 1659) 
Key: Building on the refined framework presented in figure 2.2, this framework represents a revised framework of 
enabling conditions for collective action. Augmentations and additions to the original enabling conditions are shown 
in bold text. 
Figure 6.3 - Revised Framework of Enabling Conditions for Collective Action 
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The final theoretical development in this section is the addition of a sixth group-
resource system overlap condition in the form of GR6 (heterogeneity of productive and 
non-productive end uses for the resource). This addition not only emerges directly from 
the empirical observations, particularly the interview evidence, but also serves to link 
this framework to the concept of complex, multiple-use common-pool resources. 
Meinzen-Dick and Bakker (1999), for example, also identify a number of different uses 
for water as a complex common-pool resource, including productive uses (field crops, 
garden crops and livestock) and unproductive uses (drinking, bathing and cooking for 
personal consumption). However, they do not make the link to enabling conditions for 
collective action as suggested in this thesis. While not fully explored in this thesis, this 
implies that some of the theory development may, through future research, also be of 
value in informing common-pool resource theory more generally, beyond the context of 
electricity in rural mini-grids. 
With the inclusion of these four augmentations, the revised framework of enabling 
conditions in Figure 6.3, together with the analytical flow charts in Figure 6.1 and 
Figure 6.2 thus provides a useful tool for the analysis of rural mini-grids. It should be 
noted, though, that the applicability of some of the conditions warrants further empirical 
testing. In particular, the role of the heterogeneity of endowments and homogeneity of 
interests (G7) could not be addressed conclusively in this thesis. Furthermore, low 
levels of user demand (GR4) are not desirable in the context of electricity in a mini-grid 
to the same extent as in natural resource systems. However, initially low levels reduce 
the initial capital costs required and thus still remain a relevant and applicable 
condition, in particular as related to the revised condition GR5 (gradual and predictable 
change in levels of demand). Finally, it should be noted that an entire second doctoral 
thesis could be written about conditions I1–I5, i.e. the design and enforcement of simple 
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and easily understood rules as well as the adjudication of conflicts resulting from their 
enforcement. While the next section begins to explore a potential platform that could 
take on this role, at least in part, this issue is too complex to be covered in its entirety in 
a thesis which primarily set out to demonstrate, for the first time, the value of 
systematically applying the theory of enabling conditions for collective action to the 
new context of rural mini-grids. It would also require significant new empirical 
fieldwork based on longer-term analysis of mini-grid management dynamics and 
community–management interactions based on a range of in-depth case studies (see 
areas for future research in chapter 7). 
 
6.4 The Potential for Common–Private Property Hybrid 
Management Platforms 
 
The previous two sections discussed the findings and thus contributions to theory, 
which emerged from the application of the two key theoretical frameworks used in this 
thesis — bundles of property rights and enabling conditions for collective action. This 
section combines the two theoretical frameworks in order to advance the development 
of institutional innovation for the management and operation of rural mini-grids. 
Throughout the empirical and analytical chapters of this thesis, the potential usefulness 
of a management platform that brings together the community with a specialised private 
sector owner/proprietor in the management of a rural mini-grid has been developed as a 
potential institutional innovation consistently backed by empirical evidence. This 
analysis includes empirical application of the theory of bundles of property rights in 
 184 
chapter 4, the discussion of those findings in section 6.2 and the two analytical flow 
charts developed using the framework of enabling conditions for collective action in 
section 6.3. 
The application of the theory of bundles of property rights has shown that there is 
room for more than one property rights regime to simultaneously co-exist within the 
same mini-grid system, as suggested in section 4.3. Specifically, based on the case 
studies used in this thesis as well as the interview evidence, there is scope for an 
approach that combines private and common property rights regimes into a ‘best of both 
worlds’ approach to mini-grid management. This is in contrast to the property rights 
regimes present at the case study sites, which are either fully private or common 
property. Such a hybrid property rights regime would mean that electricity as a resource 
is fully privatised through the use of prepaid meters with mobile-enabled tariff 
collection (with all of its operational benefits). Yet the different bundles of property 
rights (i.e. positions within the property rights regime that is the mini-grid) would be 
allocated to a specialised private sector owner/proprietor as well as the different 
possible end-user groups for electricity, ranging from anchor tenants, micro and small 
businesses to households. More specifically, the community would hold access and 
withdrawal rights, i.e. be the authorised user, and the private sector entity would 
exclusively hold exclusion and alienation rights, i.e. be the full owner of the system. 
Importantly, however, management rights would be held jointly by the private sector 
owner/proprietor and the community. The latter would be represented, for example, by a 
community-based organisation representing the various end-user groups. Thus, the 
authorised claimant position in the mini-grid would be held by a joint entity, which is 
referred to in this thesis as the common–private property hybrid management platform, 
due to its emergence from property rights theory. 
 185 
The importance and role of this management platform can be explained using the 
discussion of enabling conditions for collective action, thereby bringing together the 
two theoretical frameworks. Together, appropriate leadership (G5) as well as 
appropriate management (G9) interact in the management platform. They facilitate a 
match in supply and demand (RI1), predictability in demand pattern changes (GR5) and 
an allocation of electricity in times of shortage that is perceived as being as fair as 
possible by the entire community (GR3) while respecting the technical limitations of the 
mini-grid. In this context, appropriate leadership must be rooted in the village 
community and be inclusive not only of different end-user groups, but also other 
groupings such as women and young people. Appropriate management is defined as 
being a specialised organisation with local presence and technological capabilities. 
Figure 6.4 schematically shows how the two theoretical frameworks come together to 
define the role and position of the common–private property hybrid management 
platform.  
A common–private property hybrid management platform thus provides the nexus 
where the two theoretical frameworks intersect. While not all of the enabling conditions 
included in the new and revised framework in Figure 6.3 directly feed into the 
schematic in Figure 6.4, it nevertheless shows how the two narratives supported by 
bundles of property rights and enabling conditions for collective action combine to 
develop a new institutional arrangement for rural mini-grids.  
 
 186 
 
As has been previously mentioned, Steins and Edwards (1999) also identify the 
need for management platforms for collective action in the context of their discussion of 
collective action in the management of complex, multiple-use common-pool resources, 
focusing on fisheries and forestry. They do not, however, specifically identify common–
private property hybrids as a potential organising principle for these platforms. As a 
result of their analysis, they formulate five discussion statements which, according to 
the authors, should guide the study of these platforms (Steins and Edwards, 1999, p. 
253): 
• ‘Discussion statement 1: Platforms for resource use negotiation 
in multiple-use CPRs must consist of representatives of the 
different user groups (i.e. individual user groups need to 
appoint a representative who negotiates on their behalf in the 
platform)’. 
Figure 6.4 - Role and Position of a Common–Private Property Hybrid Management Platform 
Source: Author (developed from original framework by Ostrom and Schlager (1996, pg. 133)) 
Key: 
RI1 – Match use restrictions to resource regeneration 
G5 – Appropriate leadership 
G9 – Dedicated operational management with technological capabilities and local presence 
GR3 – Perceived fairness in allocation 
GR5 – Gradual and predictable change in levels of demand 
Operational 
Requirements 
Operational 
Outcomes 
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• ‘Discussion statement 2: Platforms must be physically (i.e. 
place and timing) and culturally (i.e. constitution and operation 
of meetings) accessible to representatives of all user groups’. 
• ‘Discussion statement 3: Platform performance depends on the 
level of organization of individual user groups within the 
platform, the relations between the various user groups, and the 
strengths and skills of the representatives of the individual user 
groups’. 
• ‘Discussion statement 4: New platforms for resource use 
negotiation in complex, multiple-use CPRs must not be built on 
existing forums for single-use resource management’. 
• ‘Discussion statement 5: Platforms must be facilitated by a 
third party to co-ordinate multiple user groups, to ensure 
continuity and to reduce or absorb the transaction costs of 
forming and operating the platform’. 
 
While Steins and Edwards argue that these are not prescriptive design principles for 
collective action platforms, further research — including this thesis — has 
demonstrated the usefulness of these statements when studying the effectiveness of 
platforms in managing a complex common-pool resource such as water for irrigation 
and other uses (Meinzen-Dick and Bakker, 1999; Ravnborg and Guerrero, 1999). Given 
that these discussion statements were formulated by Steins and Edwards as a result of 
an examination of the complexities of managing multiple-use common-pool resources, 
it is useful to compare their findings with the findings presented in this thesis in relation 
to the potential role and organisational structure of a common–private property hybrid 
management platform for rural mini-grids.  
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The first discussion statement directly echoes one of the findings of this thesis, 
namely, that the management platform must consist of representatives of all the 
different user groups. In this thesis, the user groups have been defined as anchors, 
businesses and households, yet more research is needed to identify and include other 
important user groups. In particular, the representation of households must be 
considered carefully in order to also include groups that typically are marginalised and 
underrepresented, such as women, young people and the poorest community members. 
Nevertheless, the finding that a management platform must be representative of all the 
different user groups is one that is also supported by the analysis in this thesis.  
In the second discussion statement, Steins and Edwards emphasise the importance 
of the physical and cultural accessibility of the platform to all representatives. This 
statement is closely linked to the leadership and management conditions G5 
(appropriate leadership) and G9 (dedicated operational management with technological 
capabilities and local presence). Condition G9, which has been added to the original 
theoretical framework as a result of the empirical findings in this thesis, relates 
particularly closely to this discussion statement and emphasises the importance of local 
accessibility of the management platform, which not only needs to include 
representation from all user groups but, crucially, the owner/proprietor as well. Again, 
the findings from this discussion align well with those formulated by Steins and 
Edwards in relation to management platforms for multiple-use common-pool resources. 
For a better understanding of the third discussion statement in relation to 
management platforms for rural mini-grids, however, considerably more research is 
required. In this statement, Steins and Edwards focus on the organisation and 
relationship among group members and the skills of their representatives. There is 
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clearly some overlap between this statement and the discussion that has been included 
in this thesis in relation to conditions G6 (interdependence among group members) and 
G7 (heterogeneity of endowments and homogeneity of identities and interests). The 
empirical data presented in this thesis offered some support for the hypothesis that a 
higher degree of interdependence among group members and homogeneity of interests 
(e.g. the Girls’ Rescue Centre in Olosho-Oibor) is an enabling condition for collective 
action, and thus would support the effectiveness of a management platform and 
positively impact the operational sustainability of a mini-grid. However, more research 
is necessary to conclusively establish the role of these complex interdependencies. This 
conclusion also relates to the issue already raised in relation to the first discussion 
statement, i.e. that further research will be required into appropriate mechanisms to 
identify all relevant user groups and their representatives. The literature on participatory 
development may offer a starting point for further research into this issue. Platteau and 
Abraham (2002), for example, offer a useful account of the difficulties involved in such 
approaches and particularly the dangers of elite capture. Rural mini-grids certainly are 
not immune to this danger, given the example of the village chief appropriating all the 
assets of an early community-based mini-grid, as described in section 5.3. 
The fourth discussion statement also exhibits a close overlap with the findings of 
this thesis in stating that the management platform must be purpose-built for the task of 
negotiating resource use. This is echoed in the finding that operational management 
should be executed by a dedicated and specialised organisation that is also responsible 
for implementing the common–private property hybrid management platform. This 
provides a further link to the fifth discussion statement on the role of a third-party 
facilitator for the management platform.  
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A comparison of the results of the discussion in this thesis with the discussion 
statements proposed by Steins and Edwards thus has a threefold use. First of all, the 
close overlap between the discussion statements and the findings from this thesis further 
support the hypothesis that electricity in a grid-independent mini-grid exhibits many of 
the same characteristics and thus involves similar management challenges as a complex, 
multiple-use common-pool resource. This further supports the systematic application of 
theories of collective action to the case of a rural mini-grid. Secondly, the overlap in the 
findings provides further guidance on the role and structure of the proposed common–
private property hybrid management platform, and supports the role and position of the 
platform within the property rights regime suggested in the schematic of Figure 6.4. 
Finally, and crucially, it denotes those areas where there is a particularly strong need for 
future research related to the organisational design of the management platform and the 
complexities involved in operationalising such a new structure, which would bring 
community representatives together with the private sector owner/proprietor. Chapter 7 
provides a more detailed description of the need for further research identified in this 
discussion.  
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Chapter 7  - Conclusion 
 
In this concluding chapter, the findings from the empirical chapters 4 and 5 and the 
discussion in chapter 6 are summarised, and the resulting empirical contributions and 
contributions to theory and practice, as well as the scope for future research, are 
formulated. First, the empirical contribution to knowledge is presented, demonstrating 
the validity of the methodology used for the purpose of this study based on the three 
case study mini-grids and 27 interviews. Second, the original contributions to theory 
made in this thesis are considered, beginning with the validity of the application and 
refinement of the theoretical frameworks used and recapping the revisions and additions 
to these frameworks developed during the discussion. In the process of reviewing both 
the theoretical and empirical contributions of this thesis, the findings are linked directly 
to the main research question and five sub-questions formulated in section 1.5. This is 
followed by a discussion of directions for future research based on the limitations of the 
thesis. Finally, the implications for practice that follow from the contributions to theory 
and the empirical contributions are summarised.  
Before continuing into this synthesis of the findings, it is important to recall the 
research questions as well as the motivation behind the research as formulated in the 
introduction in chapter 1. The research motivation can be summarized as follows. In 
principle, due to their ability to support productive as well as non-productive uses for 
electricity (due to their increased capacity compared to SHSs), mini-grids offer great 
promise in remote rural areas of the developing world in bringing electricity access to 
currently unserved populations (approximately 600 million of whom live in sub-
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Saharan Africa). The importance of electricity as a necessary precondition to human and 
economic development has been emphasised by the inclusion of universal access to 
modern energy as SDG 7, a goal shared by SE4All. In order for mini-grids to play a 
significant role in the achievement of this goal, however, replicable and scalable 
approaches to mini-grid management must be found, which combine a pro-poor focus 
that considers the needs of the entire spectrum of end users in a community with 
professional managerial and technological capabilities in order to achieve long-term 
operational sustainability. In this context, ‘sustainability’ is defined as the ability of the 
mini-grid to not only cover its operating costs and maintain, repair and upgrade the 
entire system, but also understand the needs of the end users in order to avoid and 
resolve conflict, which may arise from demand exceeding supply, or a mismatch of 
demand and supply patterns. The focus of this thesis has been explicitly placed on 
socio-cultural factors in the form of institutions (defined very narrowly as local 
specialised organisational structures for the management of  a boundaried resource 
system), rather than placing further emphasis on technical and financial factors involved 
in long-term sustainability of a mini-grid. While these technical and financial factors are 
obviously critical, to date they have been the focus of much of the literature on energy 
access in general and mini-grids in particular. The focus on institutional factors is 
clearly evident in the empirical and theoretical contributions to knowledge made in this 
thesis.  
Against the backdrop of this research motivation, the main overarching research 
question asked: To what extent can theories of collective action and property rights 
address challenges affecting the long-term operational sustainability of pro-poor rural 
mini-grids? 
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This research question has then been subdivided into the following five sub-
questions:  
➢ Sub-Question 1: What underlying assumptions must be made in order to treat 
electricity in an isolated rural mini-grid as a common-pool resource?  
➢ Sub-Question 2: What are the major operational challenges faced in different 
types of community-based and private-sector mini-grids in Kenya?  
➢ Sub- Question 3: How does modern demand-side technology, such as prepaid 
meters and mobile money enabled payment systems, affect the allocation of 
bundles of property rights in the mini-grid; which operational challenges can 
thus be overcome and which challenges remain?  
➢ Sub-Question 4: How can the existing theory on enabling conditions for 
sustainable institutions for common-pool resource management be used to 
analyse these challenges in mini-grids and develop non-technical institutional 
responses to them? 
➢ Sub-Question 5: Based on this analysis, what lessons can be learned from 
community-based and private sector mini-grids in Kenya for the operational 
sustainability of mini-grids, and how may these two approaches be combined? 
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7.1 Empirical Contributions 
 
The empirical contributions this thesis makes to the literature on mini-grids for rural 
electrification in developing countries support the choice of methodology used, which 
includes case studies as well as expert interviews. This choice enabled the analysis to 
draw conclusions from a broader evidence base, together with the more detailed data 
collected on the field trips to the case study sites. The first empirical contribution 
identified a set of key operational challenges faced in mini-grid management. The 
challenge of making a mini-grid financially sustainable with flat-fee tariffs for 
electricity stands out as one of the main obstacles, which was faced by the earlier 
community-based mini-grids in Kenya in particular. Additionally, collecting tariffs in 
cash is not only time- and labour-intensive, but also requires the presence of the 
financial infrastructure needed to deposit cash payments, which is often lacking in rural 
areas. The identification of these challenges provides a partial answer to sub-question 2, 
which is concerned with the major operational challenges faced in mini-grids in Kenya.  
While post-paid meters improve financial sustainability, since customers pay for the 
electricity they actually used, they do not solve the problem of tariff collection. On the 
contrary, they exacerbate these problems, because customers may find that they have 
consumed more electricity than they are able to fund at the end of the billing period. 
Prepaid meters using mobile-enabled payment systems (M-Pesa being the most 
widespread mobile money standard in Kenya) completely change this dynamic, as they 
remove the need for in-person tariff collection and cash transactions. Pueyo (2013), for 
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example, noted their value in simplifying the operation of rural mini-grids, but lacked 
sufficient evidence to support this observation. The empirical data collected for this 
thesis provides such further support. Some interviewees, primarily those from the 
private sector, saw a few drawbacks related to prepaid meters, chiefly due to the fact 
that they encourage customers to use less electricity when they are trying to maximise 
sales. However, based on the evidence presented in this thesis, the overall operational 
benefits still dominate. This conclusion forms a direct response to sub-question 3, which 
is concerned with the impact of different metering technologies on mini-grid operations. 
However, these technologies are less suitable in addressing the other operational 
challenges, which emerged from the study of the empirical data in response to sub-
question 2. These challenges primarily revolve around the allocation of electricity 
within the mini-grid. Such allocation can become necessary due to seasonality of either 
supply or demand, causing mismatches between the total electricity demanded from the 
system and the capacity available. Alternatively, it may be due to the challenge of 
serving a variety of different productive and non-productive uses for electricity 
throughout the day. If there is no consensus on allocation schedules in these situations, 
there is a possibility for a ‘tragedy of the commons’ to emerge, in which over-
consumption (or unbalancing of resource use and regeneration) can place the whole 
system at risk — the action of one end user can negatively affect the potential of all 
other end users to consume electricity.  
An analysis of these challenges has yielded a number of additional key empirical 
findings, by using the theory of enabling conditions for collective action as a framework 
to structure the empirical analysis and construct analytical flow charts. These findings 
respond to sub-question 4, which considers how the theory of enabling conditions for 
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collective action can be used to develop institutional responses to operational changes. 
First of all, the resulting analysis has emphasised the need for a locally present, 
dedicated and specialised operator with appropriate technological capabilities. This 
entails the ability to operate, maintain, repair and upgrade the mini-grid system and 
source necessary spare parts and supplies. The operator is also ultimately responsible 
for tariff-setting, metering and tariff collection (even though tariff collection is 
automated when prepaid meters with mobile-enabled payment are used). 
However, there are also a number of advantages in involving the community in 
some aspects of management, especially as it relates to finding solutions (e.g. simple 
rules) to the challenges around electricity allocation that are perceived fair by all end 
users. These include anchor tenants (if present), micro and small businesses as well as 
households. All of these types of end users, as well as other groups that are often under-
represented, such as women or the poorest community members, should be represented 
in a community-based organisation, which is created especially for the purpose of 
working together with the specialised operator in questions of electricity allocation. The 
benefits of community involvement are discussed in more detail when formulating 
implications for practice in section 7.4. 
Finally, combining insights from private sector and community-based mini-grids in 
order to respond to sub-question 5, this thesis has developed the concept of a common–
private property hybrid management platform, which brings together a specialised 
operator and a community-based organisation representing the needs of the different 
end users. While the concept of a management platform has already been developed in 
the context of other complex, multiple-use common-pool resources, conceptualising it 
as a way of bringing together a professional, private sector mini-grid operator with a 
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community-based organisation to solve challenges around electricity allocation and 
resolve conflicts arising from it represents a key innovation, and the main empirical 
contribution to knowledge of this thesis. However, given the theoretically exploratory 
nature of this thesis, there also are a number of theoretical contributions to knowledge, 
which help to further explain the role of this management platform and the position it 
holds within the property rights regime of the mini-grid. These are summarised in the 
next section. 
 
7.2 Contributions to Theory 
 
By means of the theory development in chapter 3 and the discussion in chapter 6, 
this thesis has developed a number of theoretical contributions to the literature on 
collective action for common-pool resource management (specifically, the theory of 
enabling conditions) and the theoretical field of bundles of property rights when both of 
these are operationalised in the context of sustainable management of pro-poor rural 
mini-grids. The first theoretical innovation is the systematic application of these two 
theoretical frameworks to the context of the management of rural mini-grids. While 
three other authors in the grey literature, identified in section 2.9, have previously 
touched on the possibility of electricity in a mini-grid as a common-pool resource and 
have applied certain aspects of theories of collective action to mini-grid management, 
their work has only resulted in partial application of these frameworks and they have 
not advanced the theory with the same systematic and analytical rigour as this thesis.  
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Before summarising this thesis’ contributions to the fields of collective action and 
property rights theory in more detail, however, another theoretical insight should be 
emphasised, which is developed in response to sub-question 1 relating to the 
assumptions required to treat electricity in a mini-grid as a common-pool resource. 
When electricity is unmetered and the mini-grid itself is seen as the unit of analysis, 
electricity can exhibit the characteristics of a common-pool resource. However, as soon 
as metering technologies, such as prepaid meters, are introduced, electricity as a 
resource becomes in effect privatised and thus the application of common-pool resource 
theory ostensibly becomes less useful. Once it is argued, however, as this thesis has 
done, that electricity is in fact a complex, multiple-use common-pool resource, many of 
the challenges around the need for resource allocation continue regardless of the impact 
of technology, in particular due to seasonal and intra-day fluctuations among a variety 
of end users identified in section 7.1. Thus, the application of theories of collective 
action for common-pool resource management remains relevant and potentially useful. 
This finding is further supported by the fact that, owing to the logic of Ostrom and 
Schlager’s (1996) concept of bundles of property rights, and as argued by Ostrom 
(2003), several different property rights regimes can co-exist within the same common-
pool resource management arrangement. This already points towards combining the 
theory of bundles of property rights with the theory of enabling conditions for collective 
action, which presents another theoretical innovation that is discussed below.  
However, it should be noted that Table 7.1, which shows the effect of prepaid 
meters on the allocation of property rights within the mini-grid, represents another 
contribution to theory and directly responds to sub-question 3 concerning the impact of 
metering technologies on the allocation of property rights within a mini-grid. Most 
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importantly, it demonstrates that prepaid meters automate the allocation of withdrawal 
rights. That is, an authorised entrant who has a connection to the mini-grid in the form 
of a prepaid meter in her household or business only becomes an authorised user once 
credit is loaded on to that meter. As a result, the prepaid meter facilitates the execution 
of management and exclusion rights held by the owner and proprietor of the system. 
This further supports the prior findings of Yandle and Morriss (2001) and Ostrom 
(2003) regarding the effect of resource storage and flow measurement technology on the 
ease of implementing property rights in practice, for example, in the case of water for 
irrigation. As outlined in section 7.1, this resolves a variety of operational challenges, 
yet some remain that may usefully be studied through the lens of theories of collective 
action.  
 
Table 7.1 - The Role of Prepaid Meters in the Allocation of Property Rights 
 
    Source: Author (developed from original framework by Ostrom and Schlager (1996, pg. 133)) 
The application of the theory of enabling conditions for collective action in the 
context of mini-grid management leads to further theoretical contributions, and 
therefore directly responds to sub-question 4. First of all, in order to reduce the ‘sheer 
number of conditions that seem relevant to successful management of common pool 
resources’ (Agrawal, 2001, p. 1660) to a more manageable number, those conditions 
most suited to the application to mini-grid management were determined by excluding 
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redundant and normatively or substantively inapplicable conditions, resulting in the 
refined framework in Figure 7.1.  
 
Figure 7.1 - Refined Theoretical Framework 
 
This refined framework was then used to structure the analysis of the empirical data 
and create analytical flow charts for the discussion of these findings, shown in Figure 
7.2 and Figure 7.3, which represent original contributions themselves. These flow charts 
create narratives around the two key operational challenges of (a) seasonality and intra-
day variations in supply and demand causing mismatches between supply and demand, 
and (b) the difficulty of serving a variety of different types of end users having different 
demands and expectations within a single mini-grid with a limited supply of electricity. 
These narratives are informed by the refined framework of enabling conditions for 
collective action. They therefore demonstrate the applicability and usefulness of this 
framework in the analysis of these operational challenges faced in rural mini-grids, thus 
forming a further response to sub-question 4. 
Source: Author (developed based on framework by Agrawal (2001, pg. 1659)) 
 201 
Figure 7.2 - Analytical Flow Chart for Challenge of Seasonality and Demand/Supply Mismatches 
 
Figure 7.3 - Analytical Flow Chart for the Challenge of Serving Multiple End-user Groups 
 
Source: author 
Source: author 
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Based on this analysis, the thesis developed several augmentations and additions to 
the refined framework (Figure 7.1), which represent a significant contribution to the 
theory of enabling conditions for collective action in the context of mini-grids (and 
potentially theories of enabling conditions for collective action in other resource types). 
Since they represent a key theoretical contribution of this thesis, these are listed below, 
with additions and augmentations to the original refined framework of Figure 7.1 shown 
in bold: 
o G9: Dedicated operational management with technological capability 
and local presence 
o GR3: Perceived fairness in allocation 
o GR5: Gradual and predictable change in levels of demand 
o GR6: Heterogeneity of productive and non-productive end uses for the 
resource 
The two new enabling conditions for collective action (G9 and GR6) and the two 
augmentations to existing conditions (GR3 and GR5) lead to the potential for future 
research into their applicability, which is discussed below. At this point it should also be 
noted that this research has not been able to shine further light on the role of 
heterogeneity of endowments (part of condition G7) as an enabling condition for 
collective action , which mirrors its contested role in the collective action literature as 
discussed in section 6.3.1 above. Homogeneity of interests (the other part of condition 
G7) as well as the interdependence of group members (condition G6), however, if they 
are defined, as in this thesis, to relate to the degree of specialization and 
interdependence within the village economy, can be considered potentially beneficial 
for the long-term sustainability of the mini-grid as a boundaried resource system. This 
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view on interests and interdependence has also led to the development of the new 
condition GR6, suggesting that heterogeneity of productive and non-productive end 
uses for electricity are further enablers for collective and thus sustainable resource 
management.  
The final theoretical contribution of this thesis is the combination of the two 
previous theoretical developments, which merges the property rights considerations in 
Table 2.1 with the revised set of enabling conditions for collective action presented 
above, thereby responding to sub-question 5 concerning the role that an approach 
combining aspects of private sector and community-based mini-grids can play in 
improving operational sustainability. This combination forms a new framework that 
simultaneously describes the position held by the common–private property hybrid 
management platform within the property rights regime of the mini-grid as well as the 
enabling conditions it requires to function and those it helps to promote. Because it 
represents the culmination of the empirical and theoretical developments presented in 
this thesis, this framework is reproduced in Figure 7.4.  
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Figure 7.4 - Role and Position of a Common–Private Property Hybrid Management Platform 
 
Thus, this thesis has developed contributions to the fields of collective action for the 
management of common-pool resources and the concept of bundles of property rights 
within the novel context of the sustainable management of pro-poor mini-grids. These 
theoretical contributions are situated alongside the empirical contributions outlined in 
section 7.1, which represent contributions to the literature on sustainable energy access 
in developing countries and, specifically, the recent socio-cultural turn in this body of 
literature described in section 2.3. Together, these empirical and theoretical 
contributions demonstrate the ability of property rights theory and theories of collective 
action to analyse and address certain challenges affecting the long-term operational 
sustainability of pro-poor rural mini-grids, thereby directly responding to the main 
research question of this thesis. Furthermore, by bringing together these diverse areas of 
academic work, the thesis reveals various opportunities for future research, which are 
reviewed below.  
Source: Author (developed from original framework by Ostrom and Schlager (1996, pg. 133) 
Key: 
RI1 – Match use restrictions to resource regeneration 
G5 – Appropriate leadership 
G9 – Dedicated operational management with technological capabilities and local presence 
GR3 – Perceived fairness in allocation 
GR5 – Gradual and predictable change in levels of demand 
Operational 
Requirements 
Operational 
Outcomes 
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7.3 Opportunities for Future Research 
 
The methodological limitations of this thesis, due to the time and cost constraints of 
self-funded doctoral research, have already been discussed in section 3.4. The 
limitations identified are primarily concerned with the fact that a more in-depth and 
longitudinal empirical observation of the case studies would be likely to provide richer 
empirical data concerning daily operational challenges. While the expert interviews 
have helped to address many of these gaps, they also reveal another gap, namely, the 
lack of government representatives among the interviewees. Thus, the methodological 
weaknesses provide the first opportunity for future research which would focus on 
directly addressing these weaknesses.  
The second avenue for a follow-up study, which could build on the theoretical 
contributions of this thesis and thus test their applicability further, is the 
operationalisation of the common–private property hybrid management platform 
advocated herein. This would require a mini-grid project that is currently under 
development by a private owner/proprietor, who is willing to collaborate with academic 
researchers on empirical data collection and the implementation of the management 
platform. The research would be critical in determining what factors affect the most 
suitable organisational structure of the management platform. For example, should the 
community be represented by a relatively simple community-based organisation or a 
more complex cooperative? As well, further research may determine whether such a 
platform can indeed successfully resolve the operational challenges around electricity 
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allocation treated in this thesis, thereby verifying whether or not the role and position of 
the management platform defined in Figure 7.4 translates into practice. Furthermore, 
there is a need to develop and empirically test other ways to categorise user groups in a 
more granular manner than anchor (A), business (B) and community (C) in order to 
ensure that the management platform is inclusive of minority groups that might 
otherwise be underrepresented, which relates to the further research goals identified 
when considering Steins and Edwards’ (1999) Discussion Statements 1 and 3. Finally, 
research in this area could also result in the early development of a blueprint for other 
practitioners in the rural electrification sector for continuous community engagement in 
the operational management of a mini-grid. 
In addition, there is a need for future research resulting from the omission of the 
external environment conditions of Agrawal’s (2001) framework in this analysis. Their 
relevance to and impact on the operational sustainability of mini-grids remains to be 
studied, as does the manner in which government regulation could support the creation 
of common–private property hybrid management platforms. In particular this research 
would need to engage with the literature on governance and the political economy of 
energy transitions – something that Newell and Phillips (2016) have, for example, 
engaged with in depth in the Kenyan context. The political economy of the articulation 
with external markets (condition E2) and the change of this level of articulation (E3) 
could, for example, be explored by reintroducing the potential of connecting mini-grids 
to the national grid and the governance challenges this creates. Furthermore, the 
analytical and empirical treatment of conditions E4a-d concerned with the role of the 
state in supporting local institutions and authority would need to consider the wider 
context of the devolution of power currently being implemented in Kenya and how this 
affects the governance of the renewable energy sector more specifically. This research 
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could help in defining the appropriate organisational structure of the proposed 
common–private property hybrid management platform within the existing political 
economy landscape of devolved, yet nested, levels of governance. This research would 
also need to overcome the aforementioned methodological weakness of a lack of 
interviewees from the public sector. 
Finally, testing the refined framework of enabling conditions for collective action 
developed in this thesis (see section 7.2) as applied in the context of other, more 
traditional common-pool resources, such as water for irrigation, pasture for grazing, or 
fisheries, also presents an opportunity for future research. In particular, sophisticated 
irrigation schemes that include the storage of water and measurement of flow rates of 
water at the various end-user points share many similarities with the effect of metering 
technology in a mini-grid. Thus, the similarity in resource characteristics could provide 
an opportunity for the testing of the refined framework developed in this thesis. This 
would aid in determining whether the additions and augmentations to the enabling 
conditions, having been developed based on the insights from mini-grid management, 
translate to other instances of common-pool resource management and are thus 
contributions to the theory in general, or whether they are unique to the case of mini-
grid management. In the latter case, they open the door for testing in other rural mini-
grids in different contexts (e.g. different socio-cultural and political contexts, via 
different combinations of technologies, etc.). 
 
 
 
 208 
 
7.4 Implications for Practice 
 
The first clear implication for practitioners is that prepaid meters with mobile 
money enabled payment considerably simplify the operation of rural mini-grids, in 
particular in Kenya, where mobile money is widespread. They remove the necessity of 
in-person tariff collection and the associated handling and management of cash. 
Customers can no longer be in arrears and physical disconnection of delinquent 
customers is not necessary. Finally, they provide granular demand data to the mini-grid 
owner/proprietor, thereby facilitating mini-grid operations by making demand 
fluctuations more predictable and allowing the owner/proprietor to react to increases or 
decreases in demand. 
A further implication for practice is the importance of locally-present management 
that has the ability to operate and maintain the mini-grid on a daily basis, perform 
simple repairs, coordinate more complex repairs with the owner/proprietor and be the 
first point of contact for customers. This interaction with the community is also 
important in relation to another key implication for practitioners. Some aspects of 
operational management must be taken on collectively by a private owner/proprietor 
together with an entity representing the diverse energy needs of the various types of end 
users (anchors, businesses and households). While the initial organisation of such a 
management platform might seem daunting, the evidence presented in this thesis 
suggests that the long-term benefits for the operational sustainability of the mini-grid 
outweigh this initial effort. 
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Involving the community in decisions of electricity allocation in times of scarcity 
helps to gain an understanding of the needs of different end-user groups and develop 
mutually satisfactory use schedules, which ensure that demand patterns closely match 
supply (e.g. in a solar PV mini-grid, the most energy-intensive activities should be done 
during those hours of the day when the power output of the PV panels peaks) and that a 
share of the limited amount of electricity available is allocated to each end-user group in 
a manner that is perceived as fair. These use schedules can also be mutually enforced by 
community members if appropriate conflict resolution mechanisms are in place, as is 
the case in other instances of collective action (e.g. Caretta, 2015; Meinzen-Dick, 1997). 
Developing such allocation schedules to closely match demand to the available supply 
offers the added potential to smooth demand peaks and thereby reduce the need to 
incorporate expensive excess capacity (which sits idle for the better part of the day or 
year), reduce the required size of battery banks and decrease upfront costs. Furthermore, 
community involvement in the management of the mini-grid also means that, together 
with the data provided by prepaid meters, the owner/proprietor of the mini-grid can 
better anticipate future demand changes as community members develop more uses for 
electricity. Thus, it will be possible to anticipate when upgrades to the system will 
become necessary and be economically sound, thereby positively affecting the long-
term operational sustainability of the mini-grid. 
Finally, this thesis has emphasised the importance of micro and small businesses in 
the long-term operational sustainability of mini-grids. Serving different types of end 
users, such as businesses and households, within the same mini-grid while possessing a 
limited capacity to supply electricity presents a number of challenges, as this thesis has 
shown. However, the concept of the common–private property hybrid management 
platform provides a conceptual approach to overcoming these challenges. The supply of 
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electricity to households as well as businesses is particularly important in the context of 
pro-poor rural electrification. The poorest households in a community often do not have 
an associated business, yet this should not affect their chances of being connected to a 
mini-grid. The improved financial sustainability provided by the revenue from small 
businesses, however, can enable the owner/proprietor of the mini-grid to also supply 
electricity to poorer households. By creating a carefully designed management platform 
with representation from all groups of end users, including households, the demands of 
the poorest members of the community have a significantly improved opportunity of 
being heard and met, and thus a step towards true ‘sustainable energy for all’ can be 
made.   
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Annex 1 – Catalogue of Interview Questions 
 
 
General Background 
1. What is your current role at your organisation and how did you arrive in your 
current position? 
 
2. Could you briefly describe your past experiences relevant to rural electrification in 
Kenya and, where applicable, in other countries and regions? 
 
3. What, if any, experience do you have specifically with the regulation, development, 
construction or operation of mini-grids in Kenya? 
 
4. Do you have experience with specific cases of rural mini-grids that you would be 
willing to talk about? These can be successful as well as unsuccessful cases. 
 
 
General factors affecting long-term sustainability of mini-grids 
5. In broad terms, what factors do you think are most important in determining the 
long-term sustainability of rural mini-grids? 
 
6. What, in your experience, are the most effective ways of managing electricity 
demand to match supply within a mini-grid? 
 
7. What are the major advantages and disadvantages of community-based mini-grids 
compared to private sector mini-grids? 
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Challenges specific to community-based mini-grids 
8. What are challenges to the long-term sustainability specifically of community-
based mini-grids? 
 
9. What are the most important factors in determining the financial sustainability of 
community-based mini-grids? 
 
10. How are tariffs set (and changed) and what are the key determinants? 
 
11. What, in your experience, are the most successful institutional setups (cooperative, 
village energy committee, etc.) for community-based mini-grids? What can be 
learned from this for private mini-grids? 
 
12. Do you think there are certain factors/conditions that make a community more 
likely to successfully manage their electricity supply?  
 
13. Are you aware of any particularly successful community-based mini-grids and, 
based on the previous discussion, what were the main reasons for their success? 
 
14. Are you aware of any failed community-based mini-grids and, based on the 
previous discussion, what do you think were the main reasons for their failure? 
 
 
Challenges specific to private sector mini-grids 
15. What are challenges to the long-term sustainability specifically of private sector 
mini-grids? 
 
16. What are the most important factors in determining the financial sustainability of 
private sector mini-grids? 
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17. How are tariffs set (and changed) and what are the key determinants? 
 
18. What are the best ways for the private sector to engage with their customer base 
before and after installation of the mini-grid? 
 
19. Are you aware of any particularly successful private companies installing mini-
grids in Kenya and, based on the previous discussion, what were the main reasons 
for their success? 
 
20. Are you aware of any private companies who were installing mini-grids in Kenya 
in the past and have since gone out of business and, based on the previous 
discussion, what were the main reasons for their failure? 
 
 
Social interventions to the challenges (collective action) 
21. In mini-grids with unmetered access to electricity (flat fees): 
a. What rules governing the use of electricity have you encountered, both in 
terms of the time of day and total demand? 
b. Which of these rules are most successful at managing demand to match 
the supply available? 
 
22. How and by whom were those rules determined? 
 
23. How are these rules enforced, i.e. what monitoring mechanisms exist? 
 
24. What sanctions/penalties are in place to punish rule breakers and discourage free 
riders? 
 
25. How do these rules change and evolve over time as demand patterns within the 
mini-grid evolve? 
 
 214 
 
Technical interventions to the challenges (metering and payment) 
26. In your opinion, which challenges in operating mini-grids can be overcome using 
the following technologies: 
a. Current limiters? 
b. Post-paid electricity meters? 
c. Pre-paid electricity meters? 
d. Mobile money (M-Pesa)? 
 
27. What are the trade-offs between an unmetered system and one using prepaid 
meters? 
 
28. What impact do these different technologies have on the financial sustainability of 
the mini-grid? Specifically with regards to tariff setting, revenue collection and 
O&M (incl. transaction) costs? 
 
29. How do these different technologies affect the relationship between the electricity 
provider and the consumer/different consumer groups (institutions, enterprises, 
households)? 
 
30. Are you aware of other technological means not covered in the previous questions, 
which are being used to overcome some of the operational challenges of rural mini-
grids? 
 
 
The A-B-C of customer groups 
31. Briefly describe what the key challenges are in selling electricity to the following 
customer groups: 
a. Large institutional/corporate ‘anchor loads’ 
b. SMEs, i.e. local businesses 
c. Households, i.e. the local community 
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32. For each of these customer groups, what do you think is the best tariff collection 
technology and why (unmetered flat fee, post-paid meter, prepaid meter)? 
 
33. Which of these customer groups is most critical for the long-term financial 
sustainability of the mini-grid? 
 
34. Do you think it is possible and desirable to have different tariffs (cross-
subsidisation) and different collection technologies for each customer group within 
the same mini-grid? 
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